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Abstract
Wireless technology is very popular and ever growing because of its convenience. Many
enterprises such as the University of Southern Queensland (USQ) are integrating Wire-
less into their network infrastructure. However, the performance and security of Wire-
less Local Area Network (WLAN) is a major concern. Wireless devices with different
standards would perform differently with each other. Furthermore, different security
implementations would have different effects on the network performance. Current
Wireless security protocols may provide adequate protection but they may also deteri-
orate the performance of the network.
In conjunction, Wireless networking is constantly being researched and tested for better
performance and security. As evidence, the developments and integration of various
Wireless security standards to date. They would complement the emergence of high
performing Wireless standards in the future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless technology in communication and computing has become very popular and
growing rapidly over the recent years. Number of telecommunication businesses is
escalating and many enterprises are integrating Wireless into their network architecture
combining or replacing traditional wired connections.
Wireless network has many advantages and disadvantages. Among the reasons why
Wireless network should be implemented (Shaw 2003, Carter & Whitehead 2004, Gast
2002):
1. Wireless network is highly flexible. It can easily be installed, used and expanded
when needed. A Wireless enabled computer can connect to a Wireless network
almost instantly depending on network configurations. In addition to fast set up,
the network can be expanded virtually effortlessly. If connections to an Access
Point (AP) exceeds the maximum number of devices that can be connected to it,
expanding the network is simply adding more Access Points (APs).
2. Wireless networks help deal with the problem of cluttered wires and cables. The
computer connected to the Wireless network can easily be moved around without
the hassle of handling too many cables or wires. Many devices need power cables
since battery power is highly limited and often provide power in too short of a
duration for medium to high usage. Thus, minimising the number of cables used
2is a bonus.
3. Wireless network is an ideal solution to implementing and upgrading a wired net-
work in an older building, with limited capacity to perform any wired networking
upgrade. This is because the communication technology in Wireless networks are
mainly contained in the specific equipments used, rather than through the wired
connections that are considered costly and power-draining. Further chapters will
explain the fundamentals of Wireless technology and its networking functions.
4. Wireless networks can be used to provide Internet access where standard Inter-
net connection is unavailable. For example in conference rooms, and by having
Internet access in such rooms, Internet or Intranet-based training sessions and
presentations can be conducted.
5. In addition to upgrading existing wired networks in buildings that has many
physical limitations, offices can be remodeled in an efficient and often cheaper
manner. Wireless network allows the transition or change without expensive
recabling work and Wireless network is not confined to physical obstructions. A
computer remains connected to the network while being mobile enough that it
does not have to be disconnected from peripheral devices such as scanners or
printers when moving. Just simply move and plug in computers at new desks.
Furthermore, as long as a computer (namely a portable device) that is connected
to the network is in range, the computer can move freely while still having access
to all the services and resources made available to the network.
6. Wireless network is a good investment as it offers a quick return according to Shaw
(2003). A study conducted in 2002 by Wireless LAN Association (WLANA)
found that when WLAN was installed, the average time to pay back the initial
cost in full was 8.9 months. This means that profits can be made in less than 12
months. Several case studies have been done on real-world Wireless networking
applications. The Sugarcreek Local School District in Bellbrook, Ohio, formed a
strategic planning committee to help the district integrate modern-day technol-
ogy. This committee came up with the challenge to put 25 workstation computer
laboratory in every school building and a computer in every classroom. This
task would involve networking all the computers. The first consideration was
3presented, setting up and operating a T1 phone line with speed up to 1.54 Mbps
that would cost $20,000 for the first year and an annual recurring cost of $10,000.
Initially setting up Wireless networking was $40,000 and speed of only 64 kbps.
A prototype of a new WLAN was developed at the same time based on the latest
technology during that period and it had a range of up to 20 miles and capable
of transmitting data at 2 Mbps. The set up and operation cost would only be
$16,000 and no recurring costs thus the school project became the pilot project
integrating the new Wireless networking technology.
7. Corporate information can be accessed by the workforce equipped with Wireless
Fidelity (Wi-Fi) enabled computers as well as their e-mails without having to
look for a cable connection. This saves time and money as it would increase the
productivity of the workforce.
8. Devices that are connected to the network can share resources. This is desirable
as companies do not have to spend unnecessarily. For instance, the company may
only need to buy a single laser printer to be used by workers in the same office.
9. Synchronising between devices can be done through Wireless and it is a more
convenient and faster way. When in range, devices can synchronise with each
other automatically instead of waiting to be connected using a cable or sync
cradle.
10. WLANs can be bridged and further create aWireless Wide Area Network (WWAN)
so that users in different locations can access the Internet, share files and access
network resources without the need for wired connections. This is prevalent in
important sectors for example, the health care and education sectors, where there
might be operations taking place at the same time in a large area.
11. Although currently, wired connection is faster than Wireless connection, Wireless
network speed in the future is predicted to be faster. With the development of bet-
ter Wireless technologies, fast network speed means that data can be transferred
in a shorter time while retaining all the major benefits of a Wireless computing
environment.
4Nonetheless, the switch from wired to Wireless comes at a cost. WLAN performance
and security are the two major issues that manufacturers and users alike face. Users
may exploit the full potential of Wireless convenience (mobility and portability) but
may still be unable to obtain a full strength signal and really secured network as desired.
These problems are rarely an issue in a wired network.
Carter & Whitehead (2004) further exposes the disadvantages of Wireless networking:
Power Consumption It is known that Wireless devices have radio transmitters and
receivers. Radio devices require a large amount of power to operate, thus com-
puter devices with Wireless adapters have a significant effect on power consump-
tion. Thus, battery power is often inadequate for medium to long period users
and they need power cables for the devices.
Interference The air medium is a common commodity to the public and it is used by
many types of radio (Wireless) devices. These devices use radio waves or signals
that may cause interference with each other and it is very hard to track down
and eliminate this problem.
Network Security This is one of the major problem of Wireless networks. In concur-
rent to the previous problem (i.e. Interference), Wireless networks and Wireless
devices are more susceptible to attacks because of its nature of using air as a
medium of operation. As mentioned above, the air medium is readily available
to the public and it is hard to impose restrictions without proper knowledge and
method.
Inconsistent Connections Unlike cable connections that have a direct and stable
connections between devices, Wireless devices depend strongly on the availability
and strength of radio signals in order to connect to a network. Therefore, the
connections can easily be interrupted and lost due to blocking transmission path.
Interference may also be a contributing factor.
Lack of Management Network administrators are unable to pinpoint each Wireless
device that is connected to the network. This is very much a contrast to wired
networks where administrators have complete control on the physical layout and
locations of devices to manage the network topology.
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1.1 Project Objectives
This project is focused on the WLAN security fundamentals for an enterprise. The
major objective of this research project is to provide proof of instability and vulnera-
bilities of WLAN security performance over existing technologies. Also, a proposal of
suitable improvement on the security performance of the Wireless LAN Testbed will
be made based on testing, findings and research of this project.
The minor objectives of this research project are to assess the historical risks, review
the current security technologies, and investigate the challenges and potential security
solutions. A Wireless LAN Testbed will be built to satisfy the above objectives of
this research project and security issues and technologies will be examined from this
Testbed.
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1.2 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 describes some background information on Wireless technology and the
various Wireless standards.
Chapter 3 further describes the technology of Wireless networking and details of
WLAN.
Chapter 4 discusses the security and the performance of current security technologies
being implemented in WLAN. The imperfection of current security technologies
are also addressed in this chapter.
Chapter 5 describes the design of a Wireless LAN Testbed. It includes the hardware
selection and softwares used for this research project.
Chapter 6 describes the experiments that have been done to proof the instability and
vulnerabilities of Wireless LAN Testbed security performance. It includes the
procedures and results analysis of tests.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation, includes recommendations and further work in
the area of WLAN security and its performance.
Chapter 2
Wi-Fi Technology
This chapter reveals the popularity of Wireless technology that leads to the vast devel-
opment of Wireless standards and Wireless networking technology over the recent years.
More Wireless devices are being manufactured to reach the high market demand and
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and Wi-Fi Alliance are mainly
responsible for the emergence of various Wireless standards. The IEEE 802.11 standard
is also described in this chapter as it is the major Wireless networking standard that
has designations across the alphabetical order, 802.11a to 802.11z. The standards are
released with different features and functions to dictate how a Wireless device operate.
Some are still under development to replace existing and obsolete standards.
2.1 The History
The evolution of technologies that lead to today’s modern technology started in the
early 1800s century (Wheat, Hiser, Tucker, Neely & McCullough 2001). Electromag-
netism was discovered in the year 1820 by a Danish physicist and philosopher, Hans
Christian Oersted. He was working as a professor at the University of Copenhagen dur-
ing that time. Michael Faraday, who was an English scientific lecturer and scholar, also
played a role in theorising induction in the year 1831. The discovery of induction has
lead to the creation of galvanometer and electric generator in which the fundamentals
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are still used in generators today. Self-inductance is also an important theory based
on electromagnetism and it was theorised by an American professor Joseph Henry.
Henry helped a man named Samuel Morse that lead to the emergence of telegraph
and Morse Code in the year 1832, revolutionising the method of world communication.
Samuel Morse was responsible in developing Wireless communication by conduction.
In the year 1887, a German named Heinrich Hertz became the first person to prove
that electricity can travel through the atmosphere in a waveform (Wheat et al. 2001).
He proved that electrical conductors can reflect waves and non-conducting materials
simply let the waves pass through the medium for example, air. Hertz also proved that
the velocity of light is equal to radio waves and it is possible to detach electrical and
magnetic waves from wires and be broadcasted. In taking Hertz’s findings and results,
an Italian inventor called Guglielmo Marconi built a Wireless receiver and intercepted
a faint Morse code signalling the letter “S”, sent across the Atlantic Ocean from a
colleague in England. This signals the worlds first truly long-distance communication.
Reginald Fessenden then proceeded to further develop Marconi’s achievements and he
became the first person to create a radio band wave of human speech. Thus, radio was
no longer limited to telegraph codes but also human speech.
Next in 1921, mobile radios were generally used for law enforcement activities with
operating band of 2 MHz range. It was developed for police and emergency services
personnel only and not for the public since the technology was still under experimen-
tal stages and not feasible for mass distribution. However in 1924, Bell Laboratories
invented a voice-based Wireless telephone that had the ability to be bi-directional, a
two-way communication suitable for the public. In 1935, Edwin Howard Armstrong
introduced Frequency Modulation (FM) in radio communication. This technology in-
creased the overall transmission quality of Wireless radio and also drastically reduced
the size of the equipments because previously, radio systems require a large space for its
sheer size and it was very expensive. When World War II began, the military quickly
implemented FM technology to provide two-way mobile radio communication. This
lead to companies wanting to develop the FM technology rapidly and companies such
as Motorola and AT&T immediately began designing radio equipments that are con-
siderably small. Many of the new inventions from companies became possible due to
the major invention of the circuit board.
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According to Wheat et al. (2001), the evolution of computers started in 1822 when and
Englishman named Charles Babbage created the first calculator called the “Difference
Engine”. Then in 1887, Herman Hollerith produced a punch card reader to tabulate the
American census for the year 1890. Later on, various other developments were produced
such as different other punch card technologies, binary representation and the use of
vacuum tubes. The first decoding machine called the Colossus was produced in 1940
during the war period, to break German codes. The next significant breakthrough
in computing was the creation of the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer
(ENIAC), created by Americans John Presper Eckert and John W. Mauchley. The
ENIAC was the first general-purpose computer that can compute at speeds 1000 times
greater than the Colossus, which could only perform each calculation at 3 to 5 seconds.
However, similar to the development of radio systems, early computer machines were
very big and consumed over 160 kW of power. When it was running, it dimmed lights
in an entire section of Philadelphia. The main reason for these machines to consume
so much power was because of the use of the vacuum tube technology. Therefore, the
invention of the transistor in 1948 was very significant, computers began to shrink in
size and started getting faster and smaller. In 1981, the company IBM introduced the
personal computer (PC) that can be used in homes, schools and also businesses. When
PCs were slowly getting more and more popular, emphasis was needed to harness their
true potential power and make them work together. Thus, the emergence of Network
technology that consisted of a mainframe. This mainframe stored information and
performed processes that were connected to several “dumb terminals”that provided
the input. The Ethernet was developed in the early 1970s and was used to link many
PCs together within an area to form a Local Area Network (LAN). A LAN connects
devices over a short distance. Sometimes businesses are composed of several LANs that
are connected together thus, yielding Wide Area Networks (WANs) that can span to a
much wider physical distance. The Internet is considered the largest WAN that spans
the entire globe. To date, digital subscriber line (DSL) service to provide fast Internet,
WLAN and the mobile phone system is the latest and becoming the most developed
technologies.
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2.2 What is Wi-Fi?
Wireless technology has been prevalent in many countries including Australia for many
decades. Technologies such as radio, television and mobile phones have been around for
a very long time. In recent years, Wireless technology for telecommunications has been
widely used. As affirmation, it is reported that the sales of mobile handsets continued to
grow worldwide, going up from 482.5 million in 2003 to as many as 816.5 million in 2005,
according to Pyramid Research (2005). Wireless technology in computing has also been
increasingly integrated in private homes, small businesses and enterprises. Similarly,
Table 2.1 shows the popularity of Wi-Fi around the world and its complementing figures
from the year 2004 to 2006, and the prediction for 2009.
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Table 2.1: Wi-Fi Adoption. The table shows the trend of Wi-Fi users from the year 2004 to
2006 and showing the estimated figures expected in the year 2009 (adapted from (Pyramid
Research 2005)).
Wi-Fi Users by Region (in thousands)
Year
2004 2005 2006 2009
Asia Pacific 32,937 55,341 81,048 168,193
Western Europe 16,681 24,877 33,546 63,746
Central and Eastern Europe 2,109 3,172 4,383 9,875
Latin America 2,386 3,401 4,528 8,331
Africa/Middle East 287 664 1,096 2,747
North America 20,570 30,235 40,454 74,174
Total 74,969 117,690 165,056 327,066
Wi-Fi Paid Subscribers by Region (in thousands)
Year
2004 2005 2006 2009
Asia Pacific 765 1,950 3,540 9,585
Western Europe 333 921 1,747 5,118
Central and Eastern Europe 14 45 102 461
Latin America 46 135 262 769
Africa/Middle East 0 12 32 136
North America 700 1,480 2,844 7,219
Total 1,858 4,542 8,528 32,286
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Wi-Fi is the term given to indicate Wireless products. It is a brand name originally
licensed by the Wi-Fi Alliance, a non-profit organisation formerly known as the Wire-
less Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA) prior to the year 2003, to describe the
underlying technology of Wireless networks based on the worldwide standards and spec-
ifications (Carter & Whitehead 2004). Wi-Fi Alliance is a trade group that intended
to use the designation for mobile computing devices. It is now very popular that the
title has become a generic label commonly describing the technology, mobile computing
devices and many applications including internet access, gaming and basic connectivity
of consumer electronics for example game consoles and DVD players.
A device that bears the “WI-FI CERTIFIED”brand such as a computer, laptop or
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) has the convenience to connect to a network without
the use of cables (mobile or portable) when in proximity of a Wireless AP. This is
named infrastructure mode as defined by the Wireless standard mentioned further in
Chapter 3.
Wi-Fi also allows connectivity in ad-hoc mode, again defined in Chapter 3, which
enables devices to connect directly with each other without the use of any AP. This
connectivity mode is useful in consumer electronics and gaming applications within
a small area network, much the same way where wired connections has been pre-
dominantly integrated.
Since Wi-Fi is broadly used around the world, it is important that a standard of oper-
ation is developed for manufacturers and users. The IEEE is a non-profit organisation
developing standards for various technology advancements such as electrical and elec-
tronics, telecommunication, computing and Wireless technologies inclusive. They work
in parallel with Wi-Fi Alliance who in addition, ensures interoperability between dif-
ferent devices. In the beginning, IEEE did not test devices for interoperability thus the
emergence of Wi-Fi Alliance (Wi-Fi Alliance 2006). Interoperability is a major aspect
to Wireless networking as manufacturers are focused in delivering devices to users from
all over the world.
The most established standard for Wi-Fi is the 802.11 authorised and governed by
the IEEE. This standard dictates how Wi-Fi devices operate, consisting of modulation
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techniques, frequency band as well as security protocols. 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g and
designations 802.11i and 802.11n (still under development) are examples of different
protocols for Wi-Fi standard. A typical Wi-Fi device of standard 802.11a uses 5 GHz
frequency band and the 802.11b Wi-Fi standard protocol has a raw data rate of 11Mbps.
A device of 802.11g standard has data rates up to 54 Mbps and mainly utilises 2.4 GHz
frequency band. These standards are further explained in the next section. Wi-Fi
is one of the most developed technology in parallel with other Wireless standards and
technologies for example IEEE 802.15 (Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Net-
works (WPANs)), Bluetooth and Infrared (IR) communication technology developed
by Infrared Data Association (IrDa).
2.3 Wireless Standards
As mentioned in the previous section, there are many Wireless standards available in
the market and under development today. In the computing world, standards become
obsolete when older standards are slowly abandoned for newer standards. More often
than not, the latter standards are developed to enhance older standards and success is
again short lived by increasing demand for better performance and security. Table 2.2
summarises the most important and relevant Wi-Fi standards to this research project,
followed by sections detailing some of these standards.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of 802.11 standards. The table shows a brief comparison of various
Wireless standards with a typical wired Ethernet specification.
IEEE
standard
Speed Frequency
band
Range
(Indoor)
Notes
802.11 1Mbps,
2Mbps
2.4GHz First standard developed in
1997. Featured frequency-
hopping and direct-sequence
modulation techniques.
802.11a up to
54Mbps
5GHz ˜30 me-
ters
Second standard (1999), but
products were not released
until late 2000. Can be con-
sidered obsolete at this point.
802.11b 5.5Mbps,
11Mbps
2.4GHz ˜50 me-
ters
Third standard. The most
common Wi-Fi standard.
Slowly being replaced by
802.11g.
802.11g up to
54Mbps
2.4GHz ˜30 me-
ters
Another common standard in
devices today. Latest stan-
dard.
802.11i Enhanced security standard.
802.11n 200 - 540
Mbps
2.4GHz
or 5GHz
˜50 me-
ters
Still under development. Up-
graded Wireless performance.
10-Base-T Ethernet
10Mbps Fast Ethernets operate up to
100Mbps.
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2.3.1 IEEE 802.11
The IEEE 802.11 standard was first released in 1997 (IEEE Computer Society 2003a)
and it was developed to operate among the ISM bands (for more information, see
Appendix B). The IEEE 802.11 belongs to a group of many other IEEE 802 standards,
as seen in Figure 2.1. They are also called Working Groups that deal with Local and
Metropolitan Area Networks (Gast 2002, Wheat et al. 2001).
Figure 2.1: The IEEE 802 family. The figure shows the IEEE 802 family and its relations
to the Open System Interconnections (OSI) basic reference model. (adapted from (IEEE
Computer Society 2003a)).
Each of the Working Groups have different functions:
802.1 : Bridging and Management
802.2 : Logical Link Control
802.3 : CSMA/CD Access Method
802.4 : Token-Passing Bus Access Method
802.7 : Broadband LAN
802.11 : Wireless
IEEE 802.11 standard in turn has its own subdivisions that define the different features
and functions for Wireless devices to operate by. There are many 802.11 designations
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but only a few are most relevant to this research project. Namely the IEEE 802.11a,
802.11b, 802.11g, the newly released 802.11i and finally 802.11n is still under develop-
ment as of the time this dissertation is written.
2.3.2 IEEE 802.11a
The IEEE 802.11a was developed in 1999 but devices were released in 2001 (IEEE
Computer Society 2003b). It operates in the 5GHz band range and provides up to
54Mbps data rate. To achieve this, IEEE 802.11a uses a modulation method called
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM).
2.3.3 IEEE 802.11b
The IEEE 802.11b was first released in 1999 and again in 2001 with amended spec-
ifications (IEEE Computer Society 2001a). It uses a 2.4GHz bandwidth operating
frequency range and transmits data up to 11Mbps. It uses the direct-sequence spread
spectrum (DSSS) modulation method.
2.3.4 IEEE 802.11e
The IEEE 802.11e provides enhancements to the 802.11 standard (Wheat et al. 2001).
The enhancements include multimedia capability that is made possible with the adop-
tion of Quality of Service (QoS) and other security improvements. QoS provides the
functionality required to accommodate time-sensitive applications such as video and
audio and it includes queuing, traffic shaping tools and scheduling. These characteris-
tics allow priority for traffic. For example, data traffic that is not time sensitive has a
lower priority than applications like streaming video and other real-time applications.
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2.3.5 IEEE 802.11g
The IEEE 802.11g standard was released in 2003 (IEEE Computer Society 2003c). It
is a combination of IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11b specifications. It operates in the
2.4GHz band region as 802.11b and it uses the OFDM modulation technique to achieve
up to 54Mbps data transfer rate.
2.4 Protocol layers
The IEEE 802 Working Groups are focused on the two lowest layers of the OSI model
that incorporates both physical and data link components (Gast 2002, Wheat et al.
2001). Subsequently, IEEE 802 consists of two major components called the Physical
(PHY) layer and Medium Access Control (MAC) layer. The MAC layer acts as a
bridge between the link layer and the physical medium and the PHY layer defines
modulation techniques, namely the frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) and
DSSS. Previously, the 802.11 PHY layer documented the IR mechanism and to date,
the high-rate direct-sequence layer (HR/DSSS) and OFDM has been added. The 802.11
MAC and PHY layers are highly complex compared to the other IEEE 802 MAC and
PHY specifications thus much of the complexity details are hidden.
2.4.1 PHY layer
The PHY layer defines the frequency band, data rate and other details for radio trans-
mission (Gast 2002, Wheat et al. 2001). Divided into two sublayers, the Physical Layer
Convergence Procedure (PLCP) and the Physical Medium Independent (PMD). The
PLCP is used to map MAC frames onto the radio frequency medium and PMD system
is used to transmit those frames. The architecture of PHY layer and the association
with the Data Link layer or MAC layer is shown in Figure 2.2.
Modulation of RF signals
Initially, Wireless communication and data transfer used FSK, PSK and QAM for
modulation (Olexa 2005, Wheat et al. 2001). However these modulation techniques
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Figure 2.2: Physical layer logical architecture. (adapted from (Gast 2002)).
were for one-way communication thus duplex systems were developed in two forms,
Frequency Division Duplexing and Time Division Duplexing. Duplex systems allow
receivers to send messages acknowledging that information received is good or contains
error. When this has been achieved, Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) and
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) were needed to address Wireless networks for
many users simultaneously using the one common network capacity.
Spread-Spectrum Modulation
TDMA and FDMA systems are unattainable because they do not accommodate in-
terference rejection and high throughput. They are also unable to provide adequate
active frequency management and interference control to multiple users. Spread spec-
trum modulation is the solution to these matters. FHSS and DSSS uses spreading or
hopping codes that are unique and works on the principle that collisions would certainly
happen. Thus, when two or more users collide on a common channel continually, data
might be lost and can only be recovered on the next reception. Since the spreading
or hopping code is unique to each user, the receiver on the device may single out the
desired channel. Consequently, this reduces the need for frequency management and
interference control and allows radio device designs to address coverage and capacity.
OFDM
Since there are only limited numbers of frequency bandwidth available for use in Wire-
less networking, effectively implementing the right modulation method is very impor-
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tant. OFDM is a variation of FDM that uses a large number of channels that overlap
each other when transmitting data. In one bandwidth there are sub-channels, also
called ’tones’, appears as an independent carrier that contains its own modulator/de-
modulator (modem). Although these sub-channels are overlapped, they are still spaced
apart at certain frequencies that provide ’orthogonality’. The center of the modulated
carrier is centered on the edge of the next carrier beside it thus preventing the de-
modulator to see the frequency of that adjacent carrier. OFDM is known for its high
spectral efficiency, great flexibility to conform to available channel bandwidth and lower
susceptibility to multipath distortion.
2.4.2 MAC layer
MAC layer forms the core framing operations and the interaction between the Wireless
network and a wired network backbone. It regulates access from Wireless devices
into the shared radio frequency band so that data transmission do not interfere with
one another (Gast 2002, Wheat et al. 2001). In order to achieve this, 802.11 uses
a Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) scheme to control access from the Wireless
device to the transmission medium (i.e. underlying air medium). Collision Avoidance
(CSMA/CA) is used to address the issue of frequency collisions that may waste data
transmission capacity. A distributed access scheme with no centralised controller is
used, similar to how Ethernet connections operate. It also has two sublayers, the
Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) and Point Coordination Function (PCF).
DCF uses an Ethernet-style contention algorithm that provides access to all traffic.
It will first check if the radio link is clear and ready to transmit data. PCF is a
centralised MAC algorithm that provides contention-free service by polling stations in
turn. Higher priority traffic (traffic with greater time requirements) would utilise this
function in order to be allowed to transmit frames after a shorter interval. PCF resides
in APs and restricted to infrastructure networks only. The basic order of how network
communication is processed in the MAC layer is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Contention-
free delivery is passed through the PCF then using DCF before transmission whereas
normal data delivery uses DCF directly.
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Figure 2.3: MAC coordination functions. (adapted from (Gast 2002)).
802.11 also specified Scanning as a primary MAC function (Gast 2002, Wheat et al.
2001). The MAC can perform a passive or active scanning for Wireless stations to
search for APs in a network. Passive scanning is essential as Wireless stations scans each
channel for the best AP signal. It will take note of all the information from ’beacons’
including signal strength and do a comparison before deciding on which network to
connect to. The optional active scanning is similar but it will broadcast a probe frame
and retrieve probe responses from all APs in range before making a decision. It is a
faster way of locating a network however, it will create an overhead on the network.
2.5 Framing
Framing is a unique feature in Wireless data link adopted in the MAC layer of 802.11
devices (Gast 2002). Framing encapsulates the data for transmission after adding the
preamble and PLCP header. It assigns binary bits, 0 or 1, to different fields so that
Wireless stations can process the data accordingly.
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2.5.1 Frame Control (FC)
Framing utilises four address fields but not all fields may be used and the values assigned
to the address fields may vary on the type of frame being transmitted. Figure 2.4
illustrates the fields that are transmitted from left to right with most significant bits
appearing last. Table 2.3 further describes each field of the MAC frame and the bits
are numbered from right to left.
Figure 2.4: 802.11 Frame Format. (adapted from (Yeo 2005)).
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Table 2.3: Generic 802.11 MAC Frame. (adapted from (Gast 2002, ZyTrax, Inc. 2006)).
Field Bits Notes/Description
Frame Con-
trol
15 - 14 Protocol version. 2 bits indicating which version of 802.11 MAC. Cur-
rently assigned as 0.
13 - 12 Type. To identify the type of frame used (i.e. Management Frame(00)
or Control Frame(01) or Data Frame(10).
11 - 8 Subtype. Extension to Type field above. 4 bits long.
7 To Distribution System (DS). 1 = to the DS.
6 From DS. 1 = exit from DS.
5 More Fragment bit. 1 = more fragment frames to follow (0 = last or
unfragmented frame).
4 Retry bit. 1 = frame is a re-transmission. To avoid duplicate frames.
3 Power Management bit. 1 = station is in power save mode or active
mode. Able to power down parts of the network interface (also called
atomic frame exchange).
2 More Data bit. 1 = additional frames buffered by the AP to accommodate
destination stations in power save mode.
1 WEP bit. 1 = data encrypted and frame is changed slightly.
0 Order bit. 1 = frames are strictly ordered and additional processing by
both data sender and receiver is needed.
Duration
/ID
15 - 0 If data frames = duration of frame. If Control Frame = ID is of trans-
mitting station.
Address 1 47 - 0 Source address (6 bytes long).
Address 2 47 - 0 Destination address (6 bytes long).
Address 3 47 - 0 Receiving station address (destination Wireless station).
Sequence
Control
15 - 0 16-bit field used for defragmentation and discarding duplicate frames.
Divided into a 4-bit fragment and 12-bit sequence number fields.
Address 4 47 - 0 Transmitter station address (transmitting Wireless station).
Frame
Body
0 - 2312 bytes. Also called the Data field. Maximum payload of 2304
bytes but with WEP overhead, becomes 2312 bytes.
Frame
Check
Sequence
FCS is a 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). See Section 4.2 for
further description.
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Duration
The Duration field carries the value of the Network Allocation Vector (NAV) (Gast
2002). The NAV is simply a timer that indicates the amount of time the frequency
is reserved and used for data transmission. If the NAV is nonzero, the medium is
indicated as busy by the carrier-sensing function of the MAC. If the NAV is zero, the
carrier-sensing function indicates that the medium is idle and ready for use. Four rules
for setting the Duration field in the data frames:
1. The Duration field is set to 32,768 if the frame is to be transmitted during the
contention-free period.
2. Frames that are not part of an atomic exchange and not acknowledged by receivers
are frames transmitted to broadcast or multicast destination. It has a duration of
zero. Contention-based access to the radio medium can begin after the completion
of such data frame transmission.
3. In parallel to the previous rule above, when there is no more fragments remaining
in the frame (i.e. More Fragment field is bit 0), contention-based access can
resume operation. Also, at this point the final fragment would only need to
reserve the medium for its own ACK.
4. Conversely, if the More Fragment field has a bit 1, that means there are more
fragments remain in transmission. The Duration field is then set to the amount
of time required to transmit two ACKs, three short interframe spaces and the
time required to transmit the next fragment.
Addressing and DS Bits
The number and functions of the address field depends on the type of network de-
ployed (Gast 2002). In other words, it depends on which DS bits are set. For ease
of understanding, there are four different functions the address fields can be used for.
First function is the Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS), no APs and no distributions
systems are used. Address 2 has the source address and Address 1 has the destina-
tion address since Address 1 and Address 2 does not necessarily always be source and
destination addresses respectively. Address 3 carries the Basic Service Set ID (BSSID)
in order for stations to check for broadcasts and multicasts and this ensures that only
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stations connected to the same BSS can process the broadcasts and multicasts. This
BSSID is simply created by a random-number generator and it is 48-bit long. It is
used to distinguish one BSS from the others throughout the same network, much like
a filter.
Figure 2.5: Address field usage in frames to the DS. (adapted from (Gast 2002)).
Figure 2.5 shows the features of devices typically used in a network. In an infrastructure
network, there is at least one client, an AP and a server connected through Wireless
and distribution systems. In the case of communication between a client and the
server, frames are sent through the 802.11 network using BSSID, source address and
destination address in Address 1, Address 2 and Address 3 fields respectively. Again,
Address 4 is not used. When frames are to be transmitted to a device on the DS, the
client becomes both the source and transmitter. The AP becomes the receiver but only
an intermediate destination because the frame will be relayed to the DS before finally
reaching the server. Table 2.4 shows that the BSSID is set to Address 1 because the
client is connected to the AP directly and the AP is responsible in creating the BSS
from its own Wireless interface. Table 2.4 summarises the use of address fields in data
frames transmission.
In the reverse process of the server replying to the client, frames are transmitted through
the AP again. This time, the frame is created by the server thus the server’s MAC
address is the source address in Address 1 field. The AP uses its Wireless interface as
the transmitter address and relay then relaying the frames to the client (destination
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Table 2.4: Use of address field in data frame transmission. (adapted from (Gast 2002)).
Function ToDS FromDS Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 Address 4
IBSS 0 0 DA SA BSSID not used
To Ap 1 0 BSSID SA DA not used
From AP 0 1 DA BSSID SA not used
WDS 1 1 RA TA DA SA
and receiver). Similar to the previous case, the AP’s interface address is the BSSID.
Figure 2.6: Wireless Distribution System. (adapted from (Gast 2002)).
Finally, the address fields are used in a Wireless Distribution System (WDS) or some-
times called a Wireless bridge as represented in Figure 2.6. Two wired networks, the
client and the server, are joined by APs acting as Wireless bridges. The source and
destination addresses remain to be the client’s and the server’s addresses respectively.
If the frame is bound from the client to the server, the transmitter is the client’s side
AP and the receiver is the server’s side AP and vice versa for frames bound from server
to client.
2.5.2 Control Frames (CF)
Request to Send (RTS)
According to Gast (2002), for large transmission the RTS frames are needed to gain
control over the frequency since reservations to access the medium can only be done
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for unicast frames; broadcasts and multicasts can be transmitted immediately without
reserving access to the medium. RTS frames are optional but it is highly useful in
reducing frame collisions. This frame is the first part of a hand-shake communication
that has to be performed and validated before sending data frames.
Clear to Send (CTS)
The CTS frame is the respond to the RTS frame request, the second part of the hand-
shake communication (Gast 2002). It provides clearance to indicate that data frames
are permitted for transmission. The CTS frame has a time value and it is used as
reference to pause all other frame transmission whilst the data frame is sent from the
requesting station. This again would minimise collisions among frames being trans-
mitted by many different stations on the same network and ultimately result in higher
throughput.
Acknowledgements (ACK)
The ACK frame is a positive feedback from receiving stations to tell the sending station
that no errors are found in the data frame sent (Gast 2002). The error checking process
utilises the FCS field in the Frame Control as shown in Table 2.3. If the sending station
does not receive an ACK frame after a period of time, the sending station will simply
retransmit the data frame and puts a bit 1 in the Retry bit as seen in Table 2.3.
Power-Save Poll (PS-Poll)
Gast (2002) explains that when a station wakes from a power-saving mode, it will
transmit a PS-Poll frame to the AP to retrieve any buffered frames.
2.5.3 Management Frames (MF)
Management frames are required by stations to establish and maintain communication
with each other (Gast 2002). 802.11 has provided three simple procedures in managing
the Wireless network:
1. Mobile stations must first search and locate a compatible Wireless network to
connect to, either using Active or Passive Scanning.
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2. Next, the network must authenticate the mobile station before establishing a
connection.
3. Lastly, the mobile station must associate with the AP of that Wireless network
to gain access to its wired backbone.
The types of management frames are:
Beacon frames are used to announce that a network is available. It is transmitted at
a regular intervals to allow mobile stations to locate and identify a network in
range. It is also used to match the parameters of a mobile station joining the
network. The AP transmits beacon frames in an infrastructure network and it
usually defines the BSS of that network.
Probe Request frames are used by mobile stations to scan the area for existing 802.11
networks. As mentioned before that a mobile station must first locate a network,
Probe Requests are sent to APs asking permission to join the network in range.
When an AP receives the frame, it will use the SSID and support rate information
contained in it and if the mobile station supports all data rates of the network and
has the SSID of that particular network, access is granted to the mobile station.
Probe Response frame is sent by an AP in an infrastructure network after encounter-
ing Probe Request frames above. This frame carries all the information contained
in a Beacon frame and it is used by the mobile station to match the parameters
and join the network.
IBSS announcement traffic indication map (ATIM) is sent to a station in low-
powered mode to notify that it has buffered data. Since there are no APs in an
IBSS to buffer frames, ATIM is needed.
Disassociation and Deauthentication Disassociation frames are used to simply end
the connection between a mobile station and the network. Deauthentication
frames are used to end the authentication relationship between the station and
the network.
Association Request Before actually connecting to the network, a mobile station
must locate and authenticate itself to the AP and finally sends an Association
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Request frame to gain access to the network. This frame has a Capability Infor-
mation field to indicate the type of network desired by the mobile station and it
is also used to verify a match with the parameters of the network.
Reassociation Request frame is simply used to reassociate the mobile station with
the network when it moves from one BSS to another in the same extended service
area. Stations may also need to reassociate with the AP if they temporarily leave
the network coverage area and re-enter at a later time. The Reassociation Request
frame differ from Association Request frame because it includes the address of
the current AP in order for the new AP to get any association data and buffered
frames from the old AP.
Association Response and Reassociation Response When mobile stations send
Association or Reassociation Request frames, the AP may send Association Re-
sponse or Reassociation Response frames respectively. The operations are much
like the Probe Request and Probe Response frames exchanges.
Authentication frames are exchanged between the mobile station and the AP for
authentication purposes. It may include several authentication algorithms thus
the Authentication Algorithm Number field is used for selection. It may also
include several steps of authentication process thus it includes a sequence number
(Authentication Transaction Sequence Number) field in each authentication frame
exchange. The frame body has a Status Code field and a variable Challenge Text
field that depends on the authentication implementation method.
2.5.4 Data Frames (DF)
802.11 data frames are carriers of protocols or packets flowing from higher layers in
the network (Gast 2002). A data frame is encapsulated in the body of a frame, Frame
Control, Management Frame or Control Frame. For example, a beacon frame body
contains the SSID, timestamp, and other important information about AP and the
network.
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2.5.5 Frame Classes
Frames can be divided into different classes (Gast 2002) as seen in Table 2.5:
Table 2.5: Frame Classes. (adapted from (Gast 2002)).
Class 1 frames)
Control Management Data
RTS Probe Request Any frame with bit 0 for ToDS and FromDS.
CTS Probe Response
ACK Beacon
CF-End Authentication
CF-End+CF-ACK Deauthentication
ATIM
Class 2 frames)
None Association Request/Re-
sponse
None
Reassociation Request/Re-
sponse
Disassociation
Class 3 frames)
PS-Poll Deauthentication Any frames including those with either the ToDS
or FromDS bits set.
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2.6 How Wi-Fi works?
Wi-Fi allows data to be transferred through the air medium using specific frequency
bandwidth from the radio spectrum (Geier 2005a). The specific bandwidth is allocated
by the governing bodies of Wireless telecommunication. Information (electrical or digi-
tal) signals are converted into a form (Radio Frequency, RF, or light signals - analogue
signals) suitable for transmission from one point to another. This is called modulation,
which is done in the transmitter of a Wireless transceiver. There are many methods of
modulation:
• Frequency Shift-Keying (FSK)
• Phase Shift-Keying (PSK)
• Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM)
• Spread Spectrum (FHSS and DSSS)
• Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (ODFM)
• Ultrawideband Modulation
Common Wi-Fi uses both single carrier DSSS radio technology (802.11b) and FHSS.
They are part of the larger family of spread spectrum systems and multi-carrier OFDM
radio technology (802.11a). Amplifiers are used to increase the magnitude of these sig-
nals before departing an antenna in order to achieve better propagation. This amplifi-
cation does not affect the human hearing thus making it advantageous and appropriate.
The analogue (sinusoidal) signals travel from a Wireless workstation to an AP. This
can be illustrated as in Figure 2.7, the Wireless workstation may be identified as the
computer devices and the AP is also known as base stations. Then the sender device
may receive feedback or that data can continue to travel to another Wireless worksta-
tion from there. Further at the receiving end, an opposite process occurs, the analogue
signals are demodulated into digital signals again. The signals contain useful data for
the destination computer. It is within the network interface card (NIC) installed in a
computer device that actually provides the interaction between the device and the net-
work. The network card used would have to comply with the international standards of
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Wi-Fi, provided in earlier sections. The steps mentioned above involve clients or users.
Figure 2.7: Basic Wireless network infrastructure. The figure shows a basic Wireless net-
work infrastructure.
The term client refers to computer devices that operate on a Wireless network. The
computer device is specifically designed for the user. A user can be a person directly
operating or using the Wireless network, or a machine such as a robot receiving direct
instructions over a Wireless network. The user is the component at the receiving end
(commonly known as the end-user), thus it is a very important part of the Wireless
network. The user may initiate or terminate the Wireless network services through an
operating system (OS) of a computer device such as Windows XP, LINUX or MAC
OS. Some Wireless network infrastructure may have end systems, computer devices
that are designed to communicate with other computer devices on the same Wireless
network. For example, servers, databases and websites are end-systems.
2.7 Chapter Summary
Wireless networking is constantly evolving. The increasing integration and usage of
many Wireless networks are proof of the vast development on Wireless networking
technology by IEEE and Wi-Fi Alliance. For example the widely used IEEE 802.11
standards, the 802.11a, 802.11b and the 802.11g. Many more high performing and
more secure standards under development today for instance, the 802.11i and 802.11n.
Wireless devices manufactured and sold throughout the world would only increase in
the coming years thus the need for on-going or advancing Wireless networking projects.
Chapter 3
Wi-Fi Networking Technology
This chapter describes the fundamentals of WLAN alongside other Wireless networks
used for various applications. Wireless devices may communicate with each other in
two modes, Ad-Hoc or Infrastructure modes to connect to a network. In USQ, users
on campus may connect to the network to access the Internet, lecture notes, and many
other University resources. The ICT is responsible in implementing and monitoring
the Information Technology services. A combination of various security mechanism is
enabled for the Wireless network on campus (i.e. Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP)
40-bit/64-bit authentication and encryption, MAC Address Filtering, SSID hiding and
Virtual Private Network (VPN) client for staffs to connect to departmental servers
(supports 128 and 168 bit encryption rates).
3.1 Wireless Network
The IEEE 802.11 network standard explained in the previous chapter (Chapter 2) is
built around the basic service set (BSS), which simply defines how devices communicate
with each other within a network (Gast 2002, Wheat et al. 2001). There are two types
of BSS namely the independent or ad-hoc mode and infrastructure mode which are
explained further in this section and illustrated by Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.1.
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3.1.1 Independent networks
In Ad-Hoc mode or Peer-to-Peer mode, Wireless stations communicate with each other
directly without the use of an AP (Gast 2002, Wheat et al. 2001). Typically, this mode
of communication is set up for specific purposes and applications for a short period
of time. For example, this network, also known as Independent BSS (IBSS), can be
used by participants of a meeting in a conference room to share data only during the
meeting. The IBSS can be terminated when the meeting ends which would be after a
short duration. Figure 3.1 is a simple representation of the Independent network.
Figure 3.1: Independent network. (adapted from (Microsoft Corporation 2006))
3.1.2 Infrastructure networks
In infrastructure mode, the Wireless network operates with at least one AP. This is
a primary aspect in this research project. All communication happens through the
AP and it requires two hops for one station to communicate with another station in
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the same service area (Gast 2002, Wheat et al. 2001). The first hop comes from the
originating mobile station that transfers the frame to the AP. Then the second hop
occurs where the AP transfers this frame to the destination station. The simplest
configuration of Infrastructure network is shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Infrastructure network. (adapted from (Microsoft Corporation 2006))
Wireless networking provides convenience for users to be able to freely roam a certain
area and still be connected to the network. A Wireless infrastructure network may con-
tain more than one BSS in order to achieve this. According to Wheat et al. (2001), an
Extended Service Set (ESS) performs this task where APs can communicate with each
other forwarding traffic from one BSS to another. As well as switching the connection
of the devices from one BSS to another. ESS utilises a medium called the Distribution
System (DS) that forms the spine of WLAN. The DS is responsible in making the
decisions whether to transfer traffic from one BSS to a wired network or back out to
another AP or BSS as the user is moving. Figure 3.3 shows a Wireless network that
consists of several clients that are connected to their respective AP in range, a server,
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the DS, BSS and the ESS.
Figure 3.3: Infrastructure network illustrating BSS, DS and ESS.
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3.1.3 Network Services
When defining network technology, network services can be defined and Wireless device
manufacturers can implement these network services as they see fit (Gast 2002). Nine
services are available, three services are defined for data moving and the remaining
six services are management control. Following are short description of all network
services:
Distribution This service is used for frame delivery to its destination station.
Integration This service is provided by the distribution system for frame delivery to
an outside non-IEEE 802.11 network.
Association Used to establish which AP a Wireless device can connect to.
Reassociation As a user moves into the range of another AP, this service is used to
change the connection from the previous AP to the adjacent AP or BSS.
Disassociation To terminate the association of a mobile station.
Authentication It is a security service that establishes the identity and credibility of
a station before connecting to an AP.
Deauthentication In parallel to disassociation, this service is used to terminate the
authentication between the AP and the authenticated station.
Privacy Provides protection against attacks on Wireless networks. This service is
further explained in the next chapter, Chapter 4.
MSDU delivery MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU) delivery service is used to ensure
data getting to the recipient or end-user.
3.2 Wireless Local Area Network
Similar to a wired connection, a WLAN can enable devices within a building or campus,
generally in a small area, to communicate and access applications and information
without wires.
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The many applications for Wireless networking are (Carter & Whitehead 2004):
• E-mail
• Messaging
• Scheduling
• Data Collection
• Web Browsing
As mentioned before, a typical Wireless network infrastructure would consist of Radio
NICs, APs, Routers, Repeaters and Antennas as well as computer systems functioning
as servers and clients (Geier 2005a). The typical Wi-Fi setup can contain one or more
APs and one or more clients. An AP broadcasts its Service Set Identifier (SSID),
or generally called the Network name, via packets that are called ’beacons’. Beacons
are broadcasted every 100 milliseconds and transmitted at 1 Mbps. The signals are
relatively short therefore does not affect the performance of the network. Since 1
Mbps is the lowest rate for Wi-Fi standards, it assures that the client who receives
the beacon can communicate at the rate of at least 1 Mbps using any IEEE 802.11
standard. Based on the user settings (i.e. the SSID broadcasting) the client may
decide whether to connect to the network of the broadcasted AP. This instruction will
further be processed by the firmware of the device.
The firmware running on the client’s Wi-Fi NIC is of major influence. For example,
when two AP’s of the same SSID are in range of the client, the firmware may decide
based on signal strength, which of the two AP’s it will connect to. On the other hand.
the Wi-Fi standard leaves connection criteria and roaming options totally open to the
client. This is one of the advantages of Wi-Fi but it also means that one Wireless
adapter may perform substantially better than the other. In Windows XP, there is
a feature called zero configurations which shows the user any network available or in
range and let the end-user connect to it on the fly. In the future, it is expected that
Wireless NICs will be more and more controlled by the OS. Microsoft’s newest feature
called SoftMAC will take over from on-board firmware according to Geier (2005a).
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The region covered by one or several APs is called hotspot. Hotspots can range from a
single room to large metropolitan areas, such as Brisbane and Sydney, where citywide
hotspots have been put into operation to allow internet access for the public.
3.3 WLAN implementation in enterprise
Many enterprises are integrating Wireless into their network infrastructures (Geier
2005a). Different companies may implement different types of Wireless network. The
various types of Wireless networks are as follow:
• Wireless Personal-Area Network (PAN) - close range Wireless application.
– mostly private users with small devices.
• Wireless Local-Area Network (LAN)- networking in a small area
– most private or home users and enterprises such as USQ.
• Wireless Metropolitan-Area Network (MAN) - Wireless broadband internet.
– iPrimus Broadband, IntraPower Pty Ltd Wireless network and Telstra Wire-
less Hotspots.
• Wireless Wide-Area Network (WAN) - long range connectivity for mobile appli-
cation.
– major telecommunication companies such as Telstra, Optus and Vodaphone
Table 3.1 shows the comparison of the above Wireless network types in more detail. It
includes the performance, various standards used and their applications.
For clarification purposes, WPAN is typically Wireless networking that links together
low powered devices such as laptops, mobile phones and PDAs. WPAN technology
includes Infrared and Bluetooth that have a maximum range of around 10 meters and
data rates up to only 1Mbps. The 802.15 WPAN standard has been developed to
provide interoperability between WPAN devices and WLAN devices of 802.11 stan-
dard (Shaw 2003).
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Wireless Network Types. The table shows a more detailed
comparison of the many Wireless Network Types. (adapted from (Geier 2005a)).
Type Coverage Performance Standards Applications
Wireless
PAN
Within
reach of a
person
Moderate Bluetooth,
IEEE
802.15 and
IrDa
Cable replace-
ment for periph-
erals
Wireless
LAN
Within a
building or
campus
High IEEE
802.11,
Wi-Fi, and
HiperLAN
Mobile extension
of wired networks
Wireless
MAN
Within a
city
High Proprietary,
IEEE
802.16 and
WIMAX
Fixed Wireless
between home
and businesses
and the Internet
Wireless
WAN
Worldwide Low CDPD and
Cellular
2G, 2.5G
and 3G
Mobile access to
the Internet from
outdoor areas
WLAN is the major focus in this research project and previous chapter (Chapter 1) have
outlined the advantages and disadvantages of WLAN. Also, the standards, functions
and workings of a WLAN has been provided in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The USQ has
implemented WLAN technology into its network infrastructure. Students may connect
to the internet and home drive on the network in wireless mode.
Fixed line networks to homes are still implemented in most areas to provide the ever
growing popular broadband Internet access. Especially when there are already existing
pathways for telephone cables. Previously, Wireless MAN (WMAN) is implemented to
accommodate users or subscribers that do not have access to physical cables in order to
gain broadband Internet access. Today, it is implemented for more reasons, particularly
for being relatively cheaper and simpler to implement for homes and small enterprises.
WMAN can be considered an extension of WLAN since stations communicate with
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base stations and connections are in turn routed to a core network.
WWAN is one of the most significant Wireless technology. It is the technology for
Wireless telecommunication in wide coverage area and this network has seen the devel-
opment of vast improvements. To date, WWAN can provide data rates that range from
9.6Kbps to 348 Kbps (2G and 2.5G technologies) and even up to 2Mbps (3G systems).
Figure 3.4: Overview of Wireless Networks (adapted from (Baghaei 2003)).
Figure 3.4 shows the comparison between various Wireless networks, WWAN, WLAN
and WPAN and their respective technologies. It also includes the comparison between
data rates and their mobility level, which indicates a standard to be implemented only
in stationary, able to move but in small areas and finally wide area coverage.
3.4 WLAN infrastructure in USQ
USQ has integrated various computing and networking technology on-campus in Toowoomba.
This ranges from computer labs for students to computerised video projection equip-
ment in lecture theaters for staffs (University of Southern Queensland 2003). The
University has most of the computers in labs on-campus connected to servers and net-
worked using cables. Staff and students can also connect to Wireless network using
devices fitted with Wireless NICs.
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The Division of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Services in USQ,
Toowoomba provides communication and Information Technology (IT) services and
support to students and staff on-campus and off-campus. This department of the
University is responsible in implementing and maintaining the networking services in
University including Wireless network. The major infrastructure of WLAN on-campus
is APs or base stations connected to University’s high speed backbone. These APs or
base stations are fitted with appropriate antennas and they are installed at strategic
locations that provide adequate coverage for users around campus. The University is
using Ethernet 802.11b standard in its Wireless network infrastructure which specifies
11 Mbps data transmission rate. This gives about 160 meters range in large, clear
spaces and approximately 50 meters range indoors. Although this is said to be largely
dependent on building construction and fit-out. Transmission rates decrease as the
distance between the AP and the user’s device increases. Range and performance
are also affected by interference from devices such as microwave ovens and cordless
telephones situated around campus. Furthermore, security might be a significant factor
to Wireless performance and this research project is objected to proof this theory.
Among the security implemented into the University’s Wireless network are:
• Wired Equivalency Privacy (WEP) 40-bit/64-bit authentication and encryption.
• MAC Address Filtering.
• SSID hiding.
• VPN client for staffs to connect to departmental servers (supports 128 and 168
bit encryption rates).
According to Wheat et al. (2001), there are many factors that may have to be considered
in implementing Wireless into the existing network infrastructure in an enterprise.
Financial constraints may lead to inadequate implementation of security mechanism.
This has been confirmed by ITS in implementing 802.11b only.
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3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter had further described the technology of WLAN alongside other Wireless
networks used for various applications. Small and low powered devices may commu-
nicate with each other without the use of APs (Ad-Hoc mode). This is suitable when
transferring small data and in short durations. When using APs (infrastructure mode),
devices are able to connect to a network that provides services such as Internet and
access to company resources. In USQ, users on campus may connect to the network
to access the Internet, lecture notes, and many other University resources. The ICT is
responsible in maintaining the computers and online resources for USQ including the
Wireless network. ICT has implemented a combination of various security mechanism
for the Wireless network on campus (i.e. WEP 40-bit/64-bit authentication and en-
cryption, MAC Address Filtering, SSID hiding and VPN client for staffs to connect to
departmental servers (supports 128 and 168 bit encryption rates)).
Chapter 4
WLAN Security
Security is one of the major concerns in networking especially in Wireless network-
ing. This chapter discusses the aspects of today’s WLAN security and their known
shortcomings. There has not been a security protocol that can be considered perfect
but with the efforts of many developers, better security options are being released and
replacing current weak security protocols. It also outlines the security performance of
WLAN from past projects. Figure 4.1 illustrates the Wireless network environment
and some of the problems.
Figure 4.1: Security and Management of Enterprise WLAN (adapted from http://
manageengine.adventnet.com/).
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4.1 WLAN Security Background
Geier (2005b) explained that there is constant security threat over Wireless networks.
Traffic monitoring and Unauthorised Access pose great threat to users. A ’hacker’ may
have access into computers to gain vital data. Important data can also be intercepted
over the air. A casual ’snooper’ can easily monitor and intercept unprotected data
packets using software tools, also called ’packet sniffers’, available for the public such
as AirMagnet and AiroPeek. Usernames, passwords and other private information may
be monitored illegally without the users’ knowledge. Miller (2003) has classified these
threats as Theft.
Campbell, Calvert & Boswell (2003) also defines it as Identity Threat. The following
threats continue to jeopardise the success of having adequate network security:
Identity theft An unauthorised person may steal the identity and personal informa-
tion of an authorised person, then impersonate to gain vital resources such as
money. Campbell et al. (2003) stated that the research by Identity Theft Re-
source Center found that each year, over 700,000 Americans have their personal
information illegally obtained and used. This is a concern since many applica-
tions and activities are done over the Internet and Wireless network that are very
vulnerable to attacks.
Privacy concerns Privacy refers to the ability to control personal information that
is used to access sensitive information and also used during confidential com-
munication. Privacy according to Campbell et al. (2003), is a major focus for
companies since considerable effort is needed in complying to recent privacy laws.
Privacy should also be appropriately treated as risk management issue where legal
elements are combined with reputation and operations risks.
Wireless access Increasing popularity of WLAN and Wireless Internet access from
mobile devices such as mobile phones and PDAs have lead to the need for better
security. As mentioned in the previous sections, Wireless connection uses radio
frequencies to transmit and receive data. Firewalls does not have the same effect
on RF signals compared to wired connections thus the standard approach to
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access, authentication and authorisation on Wireless devices have been greatly
changed.
Primary factors of Wireless Security can be divided into 5 categories (Geier 2005b):
• Theft
• Access Control
• Authentication
• Encryption
• Safeguards
Access Control is characteristically a hardware component that is applied between the
AP and the protected side of the network. It simply controls traffic between the open
side of the Wireless network and the important resources in the network. Manufactur-
ers now have integrated this form of Security solution inside APs but at the expense
of higher cost, lack of open connectivity and short of efficiency in support services.
Network administrators who fail to actually implement even this type of security mea-
sure would allow any random user to access the network whenever in range. Thus, the
network would be vulnerable to ’hacker’ attacks and computer virus attacks. Current
Access Controllers consists of Subnet Roaming and Bandwidth Management.
Authentication is another low but important form of WLAN Security. It is a method of
identifying users that has requested access to the network. It compared the credentials
of the user to the database and a match would grant access to the user but if the
authentication process fails, the network access is denied to the user. Every Wireless
NIC in the market has an internationally unique MAC address to identify itself. This
address can be used for Authentication. Routers can be set up to authenticate certain
and particular MAC addresses which are specially authorised to use the network. This
is also called MAC address filtering. Any random or deliberate unauthorise access
to the network can be prevented. However, there is the exception of ’spoofing’ where
MAC addresses are duplicated and masqueraded to gain authorisation into the network
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illegally. Authentication can be further elaborated into two systems. Namely, open
system and closed (encrypted) system. Any user is free to roam onto an open or
unsecured Wireless network which may still be authenticated by the SSID verification
where the SSID acts like a crude password (Wheat et al. 2001). Only authorised users
have permission to connect to an encrypted Wireless network. In a practical process,
Authentication is followed by Authorisation. When a request is presented to the AP
and the user has been approved to gain access to the network, a context within that
authentication determines the particular tasks or resources that the user can access.
Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting in a structure together is the AAA user
access control model. Accounting is the final aspect in AAA and it is a process that
measures and records the use of network resources. This monitoring and reporting of
events and usage of the network can be used for trend analysis, policy maintenance and
capacity planning or upgrading.
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) security protocol is a client-
server authentication approach that is widely used in many network access server (NAS)
environments. It’s major function is to authenticate remote users (Gast 2002, Campbell
et al. 2003). It is based on the Requests for Comments (RFC) 2138 and RFC 2139
implementations. The key features of RFC 2138 are:
• Client/server model.
• Network security.
• Flexible authentication mechanisms.
• Extensible protocol.
At present, two more widely integrated security mechanisms (combined authentication
and encryption) in Wi-Fi data privacy are:
• Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
• Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
4.1 WLAN Security Background 47
WEP is an encryption and authentication standard implemented in most NICs. WEP
encrypts data before being transmitted over radio waves to protect the data during
transmission from one end point to another (Miller 2003). This includes either a 64-bit
(also called 40-bit) or 128-bit (also called 104-bit) levels authentication modes with a
user specified network key or passkey needed to decode data into usable form.
Moreover, another form of WEP authentication is known as shared key authentication.
Arbraugh et al as cited in Bing (2001b) explains that this authentication method uses a
standard challenge and response along with a shared secret key. A Wireless workstation
(initiator) sends an authentication request management frame indicating that “shared
key ”authentication is to be used in the system in order to gain access to the network.
Then, the recipient (responder) responds by sending an authentication management
frame containing the challenge text. The challenge text is generated by using WEP
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) and a random initialisation vector (IV).
Encryption is an excellent way to avoid eavesdropping on Wireless network traffic.
Encryption scrambles data and makes it unusable thus ’packet sniffers’ are unable to
view or use the data, also can be defined as Cryptography (Vladimirov, Gavrilenko &
Mikhailovsky 2004). These data can only be obtained and unscrambled (decrypted)
by authorised users in the network. To understand encryption in simpler terms, it is
illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Simple encryption system. (adapted from (Nichols & Lekkas 2002))
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Data is encrypted using Rivest Cipher (RC4), or sometimes known as Ron’s Code 4
named after its developer Ronald L. Rivest. It is a synchronous stream cipher which
is the default cipher used by WEP and WPA. It is a variable key-size stream cipher
and its operations are byte-oriented (Gast 2002). In more detail, RC4 uses a variable
0 - 256-bit key size. As described in Vladimirov et al. (2004), RC4 encrypts data bit
by bit and able to encrypt/decrypt data on the fly. The streaming algorithm designed
is advantageous over speed and throughput. It is also designed to generate identical
keystreams on both encrypting and decrypting sides thus becoming a reliable tool.
Similar to shared key authentication system, RC4 cipher uses PRNG to generate its
keystream and perform a Binary Addition to its XOR encryption/decryption algorithms
as depicted in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Binary Addition encryption. (adapted from (Nichols & Lekkas 2002))
Initially known as WEP2, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is an upgrade of
WEP. It is also from the IEEE 802.11i standard before its final release (Geier 2005a,
Held 2003). TKIP encrypts data with a key produced by a large 16-octet IV which is
added to a combined temporal key and client’s MAC address. This ensures that every
Wireless station uses different key streams for encryption. The temporal key is changed
for every 10000 packets and it still uses the RC4 encryption cipher from WEP.
Attempts to identify weaknesses of cryptographic algorithm and their implementations
is called Cryptanalysis which is also defined as an attack on the network. Finally,
the complexity and importance of data encryption towards network security lead to
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Cryptology, where both cryptography and cryptanalysis help look at the problem in
the mathematical properties of encrypting.
VPN is an encrypted connection that flows through a shared public infrastructure
network and two network nodes can have a dedicated and secure link between each
other (Campbell et al. 2003). It is a flexible and cost saving security option for organ-
isations to have access to corporate data using the public Internet without the risk of
unauthorised access to the information, also called a remote access VPN. As mentioned
in Chapter 3, USQ has implemented this security mechanism for staff to gain access
to information using the same public network on-campus without the risk of students,
non-staff or unauthorise access to the information. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec)
and Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) are the two key technologies in im-
plementing VPN alongside the common Generic Route Encapsulation (GRE) protocol
and Layer Two Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) Tunneling protocol (Vladimirov et al. 2004).
The concept of VPN and tunneling is encrypting data then enabling one network to
send the data through another network. This is performed by implementing the lowest
levels of existing Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) which is
much popular than User Datagram Protocol (UDP) connection. The VPN software
or hardware then encrypts the data and wrapping it in another IP packet for delivery
through the public network. IPSec is an enhanced encryption method for VPNs and
it supports both IP version 4 (IPv4) and version 6 (IPv6).
Campbell et al. (2003) further explains the following aspects as designs to address the
threats mentioned above:
Integrity refers to the reliability that data is not altered or destroyed when used
legally or illegally. It is important that data integrity is maintained as data sent
is still identical to data received even for none confidential data. For example,
business transactions may be common information but it would be an issue if
figures in the transactions can be modified.
Confidentiality is hiding information and protection of data against third party and
unauthorised access to sensitive information. Businesses are responsible in main-
taining confidentiality on customer data or even internal company data. In main-
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taining a trustworthy environment between company and customer, customers
have the right to privacy and confidentiality.
Availability is defined as the continuing or continuous service of computer systems
such as applications and database servers, storage devices and network providers.
It is the opposite of denial-of-service attacks that have a significant effect
in slowing down or even crashing systems. It is recommended that companies
integrate differing availability levels that would address the different business im-
pacts during downtime. This is important when businesses are highly dependent
on networked applications, the Internet and various other customer oriented ser-
vices. System downtime to any of the services may result to serious consequences
such as customer dissatisfaction, lack of credibility and even lost revenue.
Moreover, in safeguarding Wireless networks, the most recent and recognised tech-
niques in tackling Wireless Security issue is the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS),
cited in Boukerche (2002). Expert systems or knowledge-based IDS and behaviour-
based IDS can detect intrusions into Wireless networks by searching for activities known
to be dangerous. Firstly, it will scan a proper traffic behaviour and consider it as nor-
mal. The systems’ database would include specific attacks and system vulnerabilities
to be compared with this previously saved network traffic activities. Seeking in real
time, an alarm is immediately triggered if any action is found to be of unacceptable
nature. Campbell et al. (2003) further cites the different types of IDS, the soft-
ware form Computer-based IDS, using hardware device named Network-based IDS and
both these IDS perform under two different methods, Anomaly-based Detection and
Signature-based Detection. Following are descriptions in more detail of these IDS and
Detection methods:
Computer-based IDS is used to secure critical network servers and other systems
that contain very important information. Software applications known as agents
are installed into each computer on the network. These agents analyses the system
and compare it to its database to determine any security breach. These agents
are focused to computer-related activities and it is extremely sensitive.
Network-based IDS monitors a specific network segment. It contains a sensor that
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passively analyses the network traffic in the monitored segment and compare it to
the parameters that have been configured by security personnel. The parameter
configuration is done through a management system that displays alarm infor-
mation from the sensor. An alarm is triggered when illegal packets are detected
in the traffic and this causes the router to block all traffic from the source device
that sent the packet.
Anomaly-based Detection involves building a database that contains the profiles
of user activities. This includes attributes such as time spent by the user when
logged on to the network, location of network access and accessed files. Anomaly-
based Detection is not a popular detection method. This is because users do
not access the network in a static manner and often in enterprises, employees
are transferred between other departments or work (accessing the network) at a
different location.
Signature-based Detection is similar to antivirus programs in detecting network
attacks. It contains a list of ’signatures’ that is used to compare against the
activity of the network. When a match is found, the IDS would take action in
logging the event and triggers an alarm to a management console. Although
this is considered the better method of IDS, sometimes it may produce “false
positives”according to Campbell et al. (2003), meaning that normal activity is
taken as malicious.
4.2 WLAN Security Problems
Four primary causes of network security threats (Campbell et al. 2003):
Technology weaknesses Every network and computing technology today has an is-
sue with security. Especially Wireless network and Wireless computing tech-
nologies where Wireless implementations has changed the standard approach of
security.
Configuration weaknesses Security problems can be caused by misconfiguration
where vulnerabilities are easily exposed if detected.
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Policy weaknesses Poor choice of security options can make the best network tech-
nology vulnerable to abuse.
Human error This is a major issue where individuals may share their passwords or
accidently give out their passwords.
4.2.1 Technology weaknesses
Technology weaknesses in WLAN security may include weaknesses in TCP/IP commu-
nication protocol, operating systems and the network equipment (Campbell et al. 2003).
As mentioned in the previous section, WEP is one of the first authentication and encryp-
tion security mechanism that is still widely implemented in many home and enterprise
security policy. However, there are known problems in WEP, outlined by the Inter-
net Security, Applications, Authentication and Cryptography (ISAAC) group at the
University of California, Berkeley (Gast 2002):
1. Manual key management causes major concern to network security in very high
user population such as in an enterprise. In an ideal secured environment, rekey-
ing would be performed and simultaneously distributed to all systems on the
network when any employee leaves the company. However, due to administrative
burden this does not happen often enough. Consequently, the key would become
public over time. Passive ’sniffing’ attacks nowadays only require the WEP keys
to gain access to the network then all traffic is readable to the attacker.
2. Even though WEP comes with a long 128-bit cipher key option, standardised
WEP offers a shared secret of only 40-bit (or 64-bit) alike USQ Wireless network
security implementation. Gast (2002) found that security experts recommend
at least 128-bit encryption over sensitive data. This is contradictory as there is
no standard being developed for longer keys apart from only 64-bit keystream.
Therefore, interoperability between multivendor devices in a single network is not
guaranteed.
3. Attackers are able to know if a keystream is reused from WEP’s use of IVs. Two
frames that appear to have the same IV would most probably be using the same
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secret key. Poor implementation of WEP would further degrade this problem
as IVs would not be as random as desired. Stream ciphers are vulnerable to
cryptanalysis when the keystream is reused.
4. Given that network administration staff and typical network systems are over-
worked, infrequent rekeying of WEP encryption password is common. This in
turn enables attackers to gather what is called decryption dictionaries. It is
a large collection of frames encrypted with the same keystream and a decent
amount of frames intercepted means a decent amount of IV can be collated. In
the end, the attacker would have enough information available on open frames.
5. WEP uses a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) for the data integrity checking.
CRC is a type of hash function that produces a small, fixed number of bits called
checksum to protect the file header against corruption such as noise during trans-
mission. This checksum is very useful in detecting errors after transmission or
storage especially for compressed data and Wireless data transmissions. When
data is transmitted, the sender would calculate a CRC and this is later verified by
the receiver that there is no changes on the header during transit. Even though
the data may be encrypted by the RC4 cipher, CRCs are not cryptographically se-
cure. Meaning it can only check for errors but not prevent transparently modified
frames if done so by attackers.
6. Section 2.5 had briefly explained framing in Wireless data transmission and WEP
encryption/decryption in Section 4.1. Frames are particularly decrypted in the
AP. Attackers can trick APs that would decrypt any received frames encrypted
by WEP and retransmit it to the attacker’s station. At this point, the AP would
use the attacker’s key instead for WEP encryption on the frame.
Although the RC4 is accepted as a strong cryptographic cipher, every security vulner-
ability and weakness is always the main target of hackers Thus, the need to improve
on WEP security mechanism in all aspects.
RADIUS server has also been found to have a set of weaknesses which include both
weaknesses in the protocol itself; and possible poor client or security policy implemen-
tation (Vladimirov et al. 2004). The UDP protocol in RADIUS is a known weakness
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that is highly susceptible to ’forging’ and ’spoofing’.
In more detail, the RADIUS server has the following vulnerabilities:
Response Authenticator Attack Response Authenticator is mainly a MD5-based
hash. If attackers can observe valid Access-Request, Access-Accept or Access-
Reject packet sequences, the attacker can then launch an exhaustive offline attack
on the shared secret. When computing this MD5 hash for (Code + ID + Length
+ RequestAuth + Attributes), the attacker can retrieve the compiling parts of
the Authenticator. Finally, the attacker can continue for each shared secret guess.
Password Attribute-Based Shared Secret Attack Attackers can gain informa-
tion about the shared secret simply by monitoring authentication attempts by
users. If an attacker can authenticate with a known password and then capture
the Access-Request packet, the attacker can then crack the User-Password at-
tribute. By this time, the Request Authenticator is known and consequently the
attacker can launch an offline brute-force attack against the shared secret.
User Password-Based Attack This is similar to the attack above. If the attacker
knows the shared secret, he or she can modify and replay captured Access-Request
packets. Moreover, if the server does not enforce a user-based authentication limit,
the attacker can perform an exhaustive online search for the correct user password
easily. This however can be rectified by strong data authentication scheme in the
Access-Request packet.
Request Authenticator-Based Attacks In RADIUS, the Request Authenticator
must be unique and nonpredictable since RADIUS packets rely on the forma-
tion of the Request Authenticator field. However, the protocol specifications
of RADIUS does not highlight the importance of Authenticator generation and
consequently, poor Request Authenticator is generated. PRNG is part of the
cryptography in the protocol and when values are repeated or has short cycle,
the protocol itself becomes inefficient to secure the network.
Replay of Server Responses By ’sniffing’ and intercepting server/client traffic, the
attacker can generate his or her own database of Request Authenticators, identi-
fiers and associated server responses. The attacker can then impersonate as the
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server when intercept a request that matches information in the database entries.
This attacker can then replay any previously observed server response and even
a valid-looking Access-Accept server response. Finally, the attacker can actually
authenticate the client without proper credentials.
Shared Secret Issues RADIUS permits the use of the same shared secret by multiple
clients. Obviously, when sharing passwords, many machines are compromised if
an attack happens.
VPN devices are known to be fault intolerable and VPNs have both software or hard-
ware initiated problems (Campbell et al. 2003). Software solutions poses the trouble of
processing many connections simultaneously on a large network. On the other hand,
hardware solution can solve this issue but at a higher cost as opposed to the much
cheaper alternative of software solution. VPN is a complex security mechanism thus it
is directly related to the increase of project costs.
4.2.2 Configuration Weaknesses
It is possible to misconfigure network security services. (Campbell et al. 2003). In
unsecured accounts, critical user account information such as usernames and passwords
may be transmitted across the network causing the network to be exposed to ’sniffers’.
In addition, system accounts with easily guessed passwords may cause the same problem
of exposing the network to attacks. ’Hackers’ have come up with attacks through
hostile Java applets thus misconfiguring Internet services for example, turning on Java
and JavaScript in web browsers, may leave the network vulnerable. Many computer
products have unsecured default settings and users may not change the settings upon
using the devices or programs regardless of having the knowledge to do so or not. This
would also leave the network vulnerable to attacks and unauthorised use of the network.
On the other hand, when changing the unsecured default settings, users or network
administrators could easily misconfigure network equipments and leave large security
holes. Dangerous software applications such as trojan horse programs, vandals and
viruses can be very destructive to networks as a user that is affected can experience
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data being deleted without his or her knowledge. Anonymous mail copies may be sent
to email address lists, files and computer systems may be destroyed and finally affecting
other computers on the network.
4.2.3 Policy Weaknesses
Security problems can be caused by implementing weak security policy (Campbell
et al. 2003). Policies provide clear guidelines that administrators and users can abide
by but it cannot be consistently applied with lack of written security policy. Further-
more, security policies may be ineffective due to politics where political battles and staff
conflicts occur. In enterprises, high turnover may cause vulnerability to the network
security because lack of continuity in enforcing security policies to the network. As men-
tioned repeatedly in this research project, concise access controls that are not applied
for instance, using default passwords or choosing poor and easily cracked passkeys can
allow unauthorised access to the network (Campbell et al. 2003). Software and hard-
ware installation changes that do not follow policy can leave large security holes. In
addition, improper security can cause many more problems to companies as attacks
and unauthorised access may waste company resources and expose the company to le-
gal action. When attacks actually occur, it may cause panic and confusion to network
administrators and users since disaster recovery plan is nonexistent. Policy weakness
on the RADIUS server can also cause problems and it has been addressed earlier.
4.2.4 Human Error
Human error or user error is one of the major causes to network breaching, even when
there is good intentions in trying to secure a network (Campbell et al. 2003). When
errors occur without the knowledge of the well-intentioned administrator or user, it
often can cause major harm to the network and as previous sections have revealed, at-
tacks on the network can be highly destructive. Authentication and encryption security
protocols can be implemented with hard to guess passwords but security is considered
to be breached as soon as the administrator or user tells any confidential information,
especially passwords, to an unauthorised person. This kind of act, unsuspecting users
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giving away passwords to preying professional ’hackers’ and criminals, is becoming
common. The different ways of unauthorised access to networks:
• Accidental destruction such as accidently modifying or deleting important data
by a network user.
• Ignoring the importance of Wireless network security, includes inadequate aware-
ness, lack of security guidelines and documentation and lack of knowledge.
• Extreme workload as having too many or too few network administrator.
• Dishonesty such as fraud and theft frequently happens and in entreprises, embez-
zlement and corporate information may be sold.
• A disgruntled employee that has been fired or laid off may have ill feelings towards
the company. He or she may attack the network using their knowledge of the
network security as an act of revenge.
• Attackers may use impersonation of network users to gain important information
from administrators.
• In addition to selling corporate information by current or laid off employees,
’snoopers’ may illegally obtain such information and take part in corporate espi-
onage.
4.3 WLAN Security Performance
There have been many Wireless network performance tests that does not involve net-
work security (Shaw 2003). From a single aspect, the Wireless range, tests reveals
many factors affecting the quality and performance of the Wireless network. Among
the factors are hardware location (i.e. distance between Wireless devices), physical
environment (i.e. traveling radio signals reach farther distance when there are less
physical obstructions such as walls, metals and concrete) and interference.
When investigating WLAN security performance, it is best to consider many different
aspects surrounding the IEEE 802.11 standard since it addresses specific issues relating
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to PHY layer optimisations, MAC layer enhancements, security definitions and ven-
dor interoperability as mentioned in earlier chapters. Many existing work on WLAN
networks have focussed on the security vulnerabilities and these previous studies have
tested and evaluated the security performance of one particular IEEE 802.11b standard
Wireless devices. Baghaei & Hunt (2004) has completed a research project into the
effect of multiple security mechanisms on the performance of multi-client congested
and uncongested networks using different layers of security model. This approach was
taken based upon a single server-client and basic traffic model from other similar re-
search projects. It assessed the interaction between different security layers and their
effects on performance on the network.
The results, many factors affect network performance and some of these interact with
each other to provide overall operating performance. These results can vary depend-
ing on the choice of hardware devices, software application and network topology
design (Baghaei 2003). Some of the major performance measurements include re-
sponse time, throughput, coverage area, mobility, bandwidth, latency and radio signal
strength. Response time and throughput were measured in depth to provide a com-
prehensive view of the network security performance. The research referred here also
evaluated the performance effect of different communication protocols, TCP and UDP
packet size distributions on secure Wireless networks. The paper further revealed the
advantages of the Wireless network study conducted focussing on finding ways in which
to configure Wireless networks such that it can meet security requirements. From the
comprehensive tests conducted by the project, it was reported that in general, the
stronger and more complex security mechanism implemented, the poorer the network
performance. However, when implementing simple security layers such as MAC au-
thentication and WEP encryption for a single client, it had little performance impact
but still provided adequate security. On the other hand, a network with multiple clients
and congested traffic degrades the performance significantly even when a simple WEP
authentication and encryption method was applied. Following are results obtained from
the tests performed by Baghaei (2003).
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Figure 4.4: Throughput of TCP and UDP traffic in an uncongested Wireless network
(adapted from (Baghaei 2003)).
Figure 4.5: Throughput of TCP and UDP traffic in an congested Wireless network (adapted
from (Baghaei 2003)).
Figure 4.6: Response Time (adapted from (Baghaei 2003)).
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4.4 Chapter Summary
Security is one of the major issue in WLAN. This chapter has discussed current WLAN
security and their known problems. Much effort has been given into enhancing or replac-
ing weak security mechanisms. Finally, this chapter outlined the security performance
of WLAN from past projects.
Chapter 5
Project Methodology
This project is currently sponsored by the Early Career Researcher Program (ECRP)
of Faculty of Engineering and Surveying in USQ Toowoomba campus. Most materials
have been kindly provided by the project supervisor, Dr. Hong Zhou. The following
sections present in more detail the components acquired for the project.
5.1 Hardware Selection
Figure 5.1 shows the AP device to be used extensively in this research project. The
Figure 5.1: NETGEAR 54 Mbps Wireless Router with 4-port 10/100 Mbps switch
WGR614v2.
key features of this AP are:
• Speeds of 802.11g - up to 5x faster than 802.11b.
5.1 Hardware Selection 62
• 10/100 Mbps on WAN.
• Double Firewall - Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) & Network Address Transla-
tion (NAT).
• Smart WizardTMautomatically detects Internet Service Provider (ISP) settings
and walks you through installation.
• Compatible with 802.11b devices and 802.11g devices.
• Shares broadband Internet access to every PC in your home.
• Wi-Fi Protected Access Pre-Shared Key (WPA-PSK).
• Up to 128-bit WEP encryption.
• VPN pass-through support.
• MAC address authentication.
Figure 5.2 shows the Desktop device to be used in this research project as a server or
a Wireless client. Key features of the Desktop:
Figure 5.2: Dell Desktop PC.
• Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition OS.
• On-board Ethernet.
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Figure 5.3 shows the Wireless network card fitted in the Desktop shown in Figure 5.2.
This NIC provides Wireless network capabilities to the Desktop. The key features:
Figure 5.3: BELKIN High-Speed Wireless G Desktop Network Card.
• Adds 802.11g Wireless capabilities to any desktop computer, for faster Wireless
networking available for home or office.
• Works with all 802.11b Wireless devices.
• Fits any standard 32-bit Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) expansion
slot.
• Provides 3 times the Wireless range of 802.11a clients.
• Offers interoperability with all 802.11b 2.4GHz Wireless devices.
• Features Wireless 64- and 128-bit WEP encryption.
• Allows you to use Turbo Mode and network at 54Mbps, the highest data rate for
all 802.11g clients.
• Works with Windows R©2000, Me, and XP.
• Comes with a Belkin Lifetime Warranty.
5.1 Hardware Selection 64
Figure 5.4 shows the privately owned Laptop mainly used as a Wireless client in the
experiments of this research project. The key features:
Figure 5.4: HP Pavilion DV1020AP Laptop PC with Wireless capabilities - privately
owned.
• approximately 2kg weight.
• Random Access Memory (RAM) 478MB double-data-rate synchronous dynamic
random access memory (DDR SDRAM) shared.
• Intel Centrino Mobile Technology, Intel Pentium M processor 1.60GHz, Intel
855GM Chipset, Intel Pro Wireless 2100 WLAN Mini PCI 802.11b.
• Graphics Intel internal/integrated 64MB shared memory.
• Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) Panel size 14.0” Thin-film Transistor Wide eX-
tended Graphics Array (TFTWXGA) high definition widescreen with 15:9 aspect
ratio.
• Hard Drive 60GB.
• Optical drive DVD/CD-RW Combo Drive.
• Integrated 10/100 Base TX LAN RJ-45 with High Speed 56K Modem RJ-11.
• 6 in 1 integrated digital media reader slot.
• 3 USB slots, VGA x 1, TV out x 1, Audio in/out, Firewire 1394 x 1.
• Microsoft Windows XP Home pre-loaded software.
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Figure 5.5 shows the privately owned PDA mainly used as a Wireless client for small
applications. Among the key features of the PDA:
Figure 5.5: HP iPAQ RX3417 Personal Digital Assistant with built-in Wireless - privately
owned.
• Operating System Windows Mobile 2003.
• RAM 92MB.
• Screen 240 W x 320 H.
• Storage 4-bit SDIO and 4-bit SD/MMC.
• Battery - removeable/rechargeable 920 mAh Lithium-Ion.
• Connectivity 1.1 compliant Bluetooth, 1-22 pin connector, Infrared Port, Inte-
grated WLAN 802.11b.
5.2 Software Selection
Traffic Generator
IPTraffic that includes WinPcap 3.1 (installed together with IPTraffic).
IPTraffic was chosen as it has beneficial features as pointed out by Baghaei (2003):
• It is suitable for experimenting wired and Wireless networks.
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• It is able to generate, receive, capture and replay IP traffic and consequently
measure performance and QoS over IP networks.
• It is capable of overloading a network.
• IPTraffic has the flexibility for users to change the size and inter-packet delay.
• Users are also allowed to select the traffic generation algorithm.
• It can manage a number of simultaneous IP connections.
• Runs on Windows platforms.
Traffic Capture
Ethereal can capture live network statistics. Thus, giving a depth look into the traffic
flow within a network. The results contain information on Wireless transmission Frame
Control.
802.1x Security Mechanism Configuration Software
FreeRADIUS
FreeRADIUS is an open source code RADIUS server program that handles the imple-
mentation of 802.1x security mechanism for networks.
5.3 Testbed Design
Testbed can be defined as a place with equipments for experimentations under real
working conditions. These may include testing engines or machineries or even computer
programs and computer devices.
There are numerous steps involved in designing a WLAN (Wheat et al. 2001). The six
major phases to a sound design method:
1. Conducting preliminary investigation regarding necessary changes.
2. Performing analysis of existing network environment.
3. Create design.
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4. Finalise design.
5. Implement design.
6. Create necessary documentation that will act as crucial tool for troubleshoot.
5.3.1 Preliminary investigation
According to Wheat et al. (2001), the who, what, where, when and why of the network
have to be identified in this preliminary investigation. This Testbed will be used mainly
for experiments to address the objectives of this research project. Therefore, it does not
include any other users nor the public involvement. The environment of the Testbed
is simply, all devices are indoors and confined in the Electronic Lab room. The time
experimenting with this Testbed is only limited until the completion of the Research
Project Part 1 and Part 2 courses in USQ. There are no current networks exist therefore,
it will be a new model implementation.
5.3.2 Analysis of existing network environment
As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, there are no existing network environment. However,
the reference network will be the USQ WLAN on-campus. Basic information of USQ
WLAN configuration has been provided in Section 3.4.
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5.3.3 Create design
The design for the Wireless LAN Testbed for this research project is shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Topology design of desired Wireless LAN Testbed.
This design includes all hardware acquired in this research project. It also utilises the
common ’Star Topology’ which is predominantly an infrastructure network configura-
tion.
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5.3.4 Finalise design
The resultant Testbed setup differs from the desired hardware configuration as shown
in the Figure 5.6 in Section 5.3.3. This is due to unavailability of main resources (i.e.
the Internet) and difficulty to acquire extensive hardware resources for multiple client
environment. Figure 5.7 shows the setup used for the experiments of this research
project.
Figure 5.7: Experimental setup.
Chapter 6
Experiments
6.1 Aim
The aim of this research project is to proof the instability and vulnerabilities of WLAN
security performance over existing technologies. Many factors have been proven to af-
fect the network performance and results vary depending on the choice of hardware,
software and network configuration (Wong 2003). Measuring the performance of a net-
work may include Response Time, Throughput, Coverage area, Mobility, Bandwidth,
Latency and Radio signal strength. In this research project, the effects of differ-
ent security mechanisms over a congested and uncongested Wireless LAN
Testbed and the impact of security mechanism over different WLAN traf-
fic types are addressed in particular. In doing so, several measurable and observable
factors are considered:
Response time is the total time taken between initiating the data transfer and traffic
to actually start flowing. This includes dial-up connection establishment and
security negotiation time.
Throughput the total number of data transmitted over the network in a certain time
(i.e. Response Time).
Traffic TCP and UDP traffic types, congested and uncongested traffics.
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This is very similar to wired connection but, taking into account that Wireless tech-
nology or particularly Wireless enabling devices such as Wireless router have to adhere
to certain standards that dictates the performance. Many other external factors also
have significant effects on the performance of WLAN but can be ignored for the simple
experiments described in this chapter.
6.2 Procedures
Defining Security Layers
As the major part of this research project is to compare the performance of the network
over different security mechanisms. Therefore, all possible security protocols that are
supported by the acquired devices are chosen as outlined below:
1. no security
2. open authentication with 64-bit WEP encryption
3. open authentication with 128-bit WEP encryption
4. shared key authentication with 64-bit WEP encryption
5. shared key authentication with 128-bit WEP encryption
6. WPA-PSK (TKIP) Wireless security
7. MAC address filtering
The configuration of these security setups are shown in Appendix C for both AP and
the end-user.
Wireless Traffic
As mentioned in Section 6.1, this research project is also interested in looking at the
effects of security mechanisms over congested and uncongested traffics. As well as the
different types of traffics, particularly TCP and UDP traffics. Figure 6.1 shows the
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parameters configured in IPTraffic for experiments over TCP traffic and Figure 6.2 for
experiments over UDP traffic. Based on Baghaei (2003), the packet contents chosen
are to be random from hex 41-7A and the packet length is varied from 40 bytes to 1500
bytes. The packet numbers are chosen to be 10000 for uncongested traffic, 43000 for
congested traffic and 60000 for experiments with very high bandwidth (when 802.11g
support is enabled in the AP).
Figure 6.1: IP generator parameters for TCP traffic.
Transmission speed was set to depict congested traffic and uncongested traffic at 12Mbps
and 200kbps respectively for TCP traffic. Similarly with UDP traffic, 12Mbps and
100kbps for congested and uncongested traffics respectively. Since the AP and the
Desktop are IEEE 802.11g standard devices, experiments with outgoing bandwidth
of 54Mbps were also performed. However, it is not entirely relevant to designing the
initial Testbed based on the implementation of WLAN in USQ that only supports
802.11b standard transmission. Furthermore, the Laptop device acquired in this re-
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Figure 6.2: IP generator parameters for UDP traffic.
search project only supports 802.11b transmission therefore would significantly affect
the performance of a LAN traffic of 54Mbps (Bing 1999).
The Ethereal software is used to measure and analyse in more detail of the traffic flowing
through the Wireless LAN Testbed. In particular, the measurements were taken from
the wired side of the Testbed.
WLAN Configuration
The experiments were conducted using the following configuration (based on the design
illustrated in Section 5.3). Figure 6.3 shows the IP addresses of each device used in the
experiments.
For further clarification, the Desktop and Laptop are connected directly to the Wire-
less AP using Wireless and wired modes. Initial experiment is to have data traffic
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Figure 6.3: WLAN configuration.
flowing from Laptop and back passing through the AP. This experiment is repeated
with the Desktop. Next, the experiment above has been repeated with the Desktop
PC connected by cable to the AP and Laptop is connected Wireless to the AP. It was
decided that Windows-based operating systems are used in the final experiments of
this research project. The reason being is that the softwares acquired only support
Windows-based platforms.
6.3 Results
The results follow the experiments on the effects of the seven security layers on the
Wireless LAN Testbed performance described in Section 6.2. Performance measures
were gathered after running through each security layer experiments and compared after
the completion of all experiments. This is simply done by referring to data collected
into log files generated by both IPTraffic and Ethereal. The analysis of the results were
taken based on the mean at 95% confidence interval.
Much emphasis has been given to TCP connections since many applications rely on
this connection and applications using UDP type connection is minimal. The graphs
in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 shows the response time of the network over both un-
congested TCP and uncongested UDP traffics. When taking the response time of the
Testbed at no security as reference, the response time for security mechanism 2(open
authentication with 64-bit WEP encryption) increased by 4% and 9% for TCP
and UDP traffic respectively. The Testbed response times when security mechanisms
3, 4, 5 and 6 were applied increased at a lower margin, by 1% (on average) for TCP
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and UDP traffic. Finally, there is only less than 1% increase in the response time of
the network when MAC address filtering was applied. It is evident that security mech-
anisms other than no security layer, takes a substantially longer time to establish a
connection and transfer data.
Figure 6.4: Response Time of Wireless LAN Testbed over uncongested TCP traffic.
Figure 6.5: Response Time of Wireless LAN Testbed over uncongested UDP traffic.
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The graphs in Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 shows the traffic throughput of the Testbed,
when each chosen security layers were implemented over both uncongested TCP and
uncongested UDP traffics. It is clearly shown that the throughput decreases as stronger
security is applied. There are approximately 1% difference between the performance
of the Testbed with no security and the performance of the Testbed with security
mechanisms 2 to 7 implementations. This figure has been rounded up since the exact
figures were less than 10µs. This also applies to Testbed performance over UDP traffic
with decrease of 1% and the standard deviation of 0.20 ms.
Figure 6.6: Throughput of Wireless LAN Testbed over uncongested TCP traffic.
Figure 6.7: Throughput of Wireless LAN Testbed over uncongested UDP traffic.
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Figures 6.8 and 6.9 shows the activities of Wireless transmission in a network from
IPTraffic. It includes the speed, throughput and amount of transmitted packets. These
statistics are exported into a simple .csv file.
Figure 6.8: IP traffic Generator.
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Figure 6.9: IP traffic Answering.
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In a congested traffic, the results of the response time and throughput when security
mechanisms are implemented over TCP traffic are shown in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11
respectively. The response time at security layers 2 to 7 are approximately 1.02% more
than the no security layer 1. The TCP throughput however has a mean of 441.42
KBps and standard deviation of 4.11 KBps. The performance of the Testbed with
implementation of security layers with higher encryption bits, WEP and WPA, display
a significant decrease with over 4 KBps to 6 KBps less than the average value.
Figure 6.10: Response Time of Wireless LAN Testbed over congested TCP traffic.
Figure 6.11: Throughput of Wireless LAN Testbed over congested TCP traffic.
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Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13 shows the Wireless LAN Testbed performance when 802.11g
mode was activated on the AP. They show the significant decrease in performance since
the traffic is to flow from a 802.11g device with 54Mbps bandwidth support into a
device with much smaller bandwidth of 11Mbps (802.11b standard). As an analogy,
the network traffic flow had a ’bottle-neck’ effect.
Figure 6.12: Response Time of Wireless LAN Testbed over 802.11g TCP traffic.
Figure 6.13: Throughput of Wireless LAN Testbed over 802.11g TCP traffic.
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A sample of the traffic captured by Ethereal is shown in Figure 6.14.
Figure 6.14: TCP traffic captured by Ethereal.
As shown in the preceding graphs, the performance of the Wireless LAN Testbed de-
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creases when stronger security mechanisms are implemented. This clearly confirms the
general trend of Security Performance of a Wireless LAN, as found by Baghaei (2003)
and Wong (2003). Moreover, the performance is significantly slower when traffic is
congested.
6.4 Discussion
The Wireless LAN Testbed experiment results observed in Section 6.3 showed a signifi-
cant decrease in performance when WEP authentication and longer bit encryption was
applied. A number of factors can be contributing to this as revealed by Gast (2002) and
Bing (2001b). WEP and WPA uses RC4 stream cipher to encrypt data before trans-
mission as explained in Section 4.1. Chapter 2 earlier mentioned that data transmission
with WEP encryption would enable the WEP bit in the Frame Control and increases
the data payload by eight bytes. In its frame transmission, the additional bytes consists
of four bytes for the IV header and the other four bytes used for the Integrity Check
Value (ICV) trailer. The packet will simply be dropped by the AP because of the extra
length and there is not enough bandwidth to accommodate it consequently decreases
the network performance in a congested traffic.
Furthermore, the comparison between the network performance over TCP and UDP
traffics is substantial. In regards to TCP being a connection oriented and UDP is a
connection-less environment, the drop rate of packets in a congested traffic leads to
poor network performance in both cases. However the performance of TCP should be
much lower than UDP since it has a congestion control mechanism. This mechanism
detects packet drops in a congested traffic as it will adjust the behaviour of data flow
in the network implementing sliding window, a slow-start algorithm, the congestion
avoidance algorithm, the fast retransmit or fast recovery algorithms (Geier 2005a).
6.4.1 Limitations
There are several limitations that has been detected in the experiments of this research
project. The resultant Testbed (as seen in Section 5.3.4) does not simulate a real world
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network. Firstly, the experiments have been conducted in a confined space without
interruption from external factors such as interference from other radio frequency or
weather conditions. Moreover, the devices involved in the experiments are located close
to each other. Thus, able to provide maximum network performance in contrast to a
real enterprise network implementation, where physical interference exist such as walls.
Next, the Testbed only consist a single client. The purpose of networking is to provide
service to multiple clients and in an enterprise, this may be large numbers ranging
from hundreds to thousands. Even though the experiments of this research project
have been successful in proving the instability of Wireless LAN Security Performance,
the results may be far worse in the real world WLAN. Enterprises for example, USQ,
tend to implement a combination of many different security mechanisms together in
order to have the optimum network security.
Lastly, the experiments do not include all security possibilities in Wireless networks
due to hardware implementation. It also does not include security performance testings
on ad-hoc networks. The experiments have been mainly focused on 802.11b and the
experiments on 802.11g was minimal. There are many other security mechanisms that
would be significant in security performance experiment such as VPN.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Further Work
7.1 Achievement of Project Objectives
The following objectives have been addressed:
WLAN security performance issue Proof of the WLAN security performance short-
comings over existing technologies has been provided in Chapter 6.
Historical risk assessment Chapter 1 presented a summary of the advantages and
disadvantages of Wireless technology.
Current security technologies review Chapter 4 showed the many Wireless secu-
rity technologies, the problems and effects on Wireless performance according to
past projects.
7.2 Recommendations
In many research projects that involve experiments and proving that current technolo-
gies are insufficient to the needs of users today, potential solutions are highly recom-
mended. In this research project, the recommendations are made based on the exper-
iments and results (see previous Chapter 6) and potential security solution is thought
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to be the better, if not the best, option in securing the Wireless network for enterprises.
802.1x has been widely chosen as the security policy by many enterprises as it ad-
dresses the weakness of WEP before the release of later security protocols such as
WPA and 802.11i (WPA2). 802.1x is a port-based authentication method that uses
a dynamic key distribution, supplied by randomly generating two sets of keys (Bing
2001a, Vladimirov et al. 2004, IEEE Computer Society 2001b, Interlink Networks 2002).
The first set of keys is called the session or pairwise keys and it is unique for every time
a client is connecting to an AP. This is advantageous as opposed to WEP since WEP
authentication uses only one key for all sessions. The second set of keys is called group
or groupwise keys that is shared among all in the network and used for encryption.
Another differing aspect of 802.1x to WEP is that 802.1x has a fixed 128 bits key
length. The Pairwise Master Key (PMK) creates the session key for every client, it is
distributed from the RADIUS server and 256 bits long. Similarly, the groupwise master
key (GMK) creates the groupwise key for participating devices in the network. When
deriving the two sets of keys, the PMK and GMK is used in the procedure of four Ex-
tensible Authentication Protocol (EAPOL or EAP) handshake keys, also referred to as
the pairwise transient key. 802.1x authentication processes are illustrated in Figure 7.1.
There are many different EAP types:
• EAP-MD5 is the first EAP type to be developed and it is the lowest level of
EAP support. It is a duplication of Challenge-handshake authentication protocol
(CHAP) which is used by Point to Point Protocol (PPP) servers to authenticate
a remote user connecting to an Internet access provider. Thus, EAP-MD5 does
not support dynamic WEP key distribution and it is very vulnerable to man-in-
the-middle attacks described in Chapter 4.
• EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security) is based on the SSLv3 protocol that incor-
porates a certificate-based authority. It is the most supported and deployed EAP
method because of its invincibility against attacks.
• EAP-LEAP (Lightweight EAP or EAP-Cisco Wireless) is a proprietary EAP
type by Cisco Systems. It is a password-based authentication scheme and it
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Figure 7.1: EAP Frame Exchange, authentication steps in an EAP security mechanism.
(adapted from (ManageEngine 2006)).
gained much popularity because it is the first and only password-based EAP
protocol. The functioning of EAP is simply that it is a straightforward challenge-
password hash exchange. Firstly, the authentication server sends a challenge text
to the client. The client then has to return a hashed password along with the
challenge string. Being a password-based authentication method, the strength
of this security method lies in the user as the password choice is a major factor
and it is vulnerable to dictionary and brute-forcing attacks that is absent in
EAP-TLS, a certificate-based EAP type.
• EAP-PEAP (Protected EAP) and EAP-TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Secu-
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rity EAP) are the least common but still strong EAP choices. Strong support
by manufacturers such as Microsoft and Cisco, might see these protocols to be
implemented in more network systems.
Previous Wireless security standards are classified as traditional security network (TDN)
but 802.11i is sometimes referred to as Robust Security Network (RSN) (Vladimirov
et al. 2004). It is developed to be a new Wireless security standard and completely
replace the legacy WEP. This was proposed at the end of 2003 but when 802.11i was
not yet finished, WPA emerged that implemented part of 802.11i before its final release
that is called WPA2. WPA has similar technical characteristics as 802.11i but with
the exclusion of secure ad-hoc networking, secure fast-handoff, secure deauthentication
and deassociation and finally the use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryp-
tion algorithm. RC4 cipher encryption method is still a major feature in WPA and this
security mechanism only serves infrastructure networks (IEEE Computer Society 2004).
7.3 Further Work
A newly enhanced and secured Testbed would be designed and tested based on the
research (see Chapter 4), testings and findings (see Chapter 6) of this research project.
This is also the second major objective which has been omitted due to time constraints.
The new Testbed would incorporate existing security enhancements used in the indus-
try today, namely the 802.1x standard. Appendix C include the configuration files for
implementing the 802.1x security mechanism. It is taken from the FreeRADIUS soft-
ware that administers this 802.1x network security. New prospective security solutions
could also be implemented if gained full access to current RC4, RC6 or even other AES
encryption algorithms.
Furthermore, Vladimirov et al. (2004) is a main source outlining the methods to ’hack’
and ’war drive’ Wireless networks. It also includes various methods of ’snooping’,
’sniffing’ and ’spoofing’ Wireless networks and Wireless devices. These activities can
satisfy the minor objective of investigating the Wireless security challenges. As this
issue is only related to security and not security performance of a Wireless LAN, it was
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omitted from the original major objective.
7.4 Conclusions
Wireless technology is becoming very common and the technology is ever growing
because of its convenience. Many home users and even enterprises such as the USQ are
integrating Wireless into their network infrastructure. It is shown in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 of the vast development in Wireless standards and Wireless networking.
However, the performance and security of WLAN is often a major concern. Wire-
less devices with different standards would perform differently with each other. Thus,
the design of the Testbed for this research project includes various different devices
with different standards. In parallel to the emergence of many IEEE 802.11 Wireless
standards, the development of enhancing Wireless security must also be acknowledged.
Since many current security mechanisms are known to be unstable and vulnerable, the
efforts to rectify this issue has been very positive. They are a range of security proto-
cols in the market today and many devices can implement a combination of security
mechanisms, such as MAC address filtering, WEP, WPA and even WPA2 in newer
devices.
Furthermore, different security mechanisms would have different effects on the network
when applied. It is demonstrated in this research project that current Wireless security
protocols may provide good network protection but causes a degradation in the per-
formance. On the other hand, the research into 802.1x and 802.11i found claims that
these standards appear to be far better standards than the previous security protocols.
In conjunction, they would complement future high performing Wireless standards.
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Appendix B
Radio Frequency Signals
Radio spectrum is a main resource where Wireless devices have to operate on. Wire-
less devices are constrained to utilise certain frequency bands only (Gast 2002, Wheat
et al. 2001). Each band has particular bandwidth and this has been classified to be the
measure of data capacity that can flow through. Based on mathematical properties,
information theory and signal processing, bigger bandwidth slices can be used to trans-
mit much more data than smaller bandwidth slots. For example, an analog mobile
telephony channel only requires 20kHz bandwidth whereas more complex Television
signals needs larger bandwidth of about 6MHz for operation.
The radio spectrum is highly controlled by regulatory bodies through licensing pro-
cesses. Consequently, a range of different frequency bands are allocated and signifi-
cantly, the ISM bands are specified. ISM is the abbreviation of industrial, scientific
and medical. The ISM bands are set aside for devices that are related to industrial
or scientific processes and also for devices that are used by medical equipments. ISM
bands are among a range of frequency bands specified to prevent overlapping between
different applications that uses the commonly available radio spectrum in the air. ISM
bands are also licence-free. For example, microwave ovens are ISM-band devices which
operates in the 2.4GHz ISM band. IEEE 802.11 devices also operates over ISM bands
particularly the S-band ISM.
Figure B.1 and Figure B.2 are snipets of the radio spectrum allocated to ensure in-
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teroperability of different Wireless devices and prevent overlapping between different
applications that uses the radio spectrum.
Figure B.1: Super High Frequency (SHF) region. Adapted from Australian radiofrequency
spectrum allocations chart
Figure B.2: Ultra High Frequency (UHF) region. Adapted from Australian radiofrequency
spectrum allocations chart
In the United States of America, the emission of Radio Frequency (RF) signals from
devices is governed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (Olexa 2005,
Wheat et al. 2001). Manufacturers have to adhere to the Part 15 rules that administers
power output, equipment and antenna configurations that can be used in the unlicensed
bands, the ISM bands mentioned earlier.
In more detail, RF data communication involves two main component, the transmitter
and receiver, as seen in Figure B.3 and Figure B.4 (Olexa 2005, Wheat et al. 2001).
Firstly at the transmitter, RF base signal would be generated at the desired operating
frequency. For example, signal with 2.4GHz frequency or 5GHz frequency signal for
802.11a or 802.11b respectively. The oscillator performs this task by using amplification,
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feedback and resonance principles. Essentially, the oscillator is an amplifier that has
a positive feedback (i.e. some of its output signal transferred back to the input).
This would soon make the amplifier stabilise around the resonant frequency of the
components in the amplifier and the feedback loop which in turn causes resonance.
Resonance is the electrical and magnetic vibration of the AC signal. The synthesiser
is used to remove many of the oscillator design complexities and reduces the cost of
frequency generation substantially. The next block is the power amplifier and the
function in Wireless data transfer has been explained in Chapter 2. The antenna is
normally connected to the transmitter and receiver by a coaxial cable or often called
coax. Antennas come in various shapes and sizes but the perfect antenna is known as
the isotropic radiator. Isotropic radiator antennas generate a perfect sphere of energy
that surrounds it and of equal intensity in all directions. However, it is only theoretical
and does not exist in practical. The dipole and isotrope are omnidirectional antennas
that are commonly used in transmitters and receivers next to directional antennas.
Figure B.3: Transmitter block diagram. Adapted from (Olexa 2005)
In addition to amplifying the transmitted signal, a filter is necessary in a receiver
module since RF signal that has traveled through the atmosphere would be attenuated
and polluted with noise or unwanted signals from other sources. Bandpass filters are
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Figure B.4: Receiver block diagram. Adapted from (Olexa 2005)
primarily used for this purpose to remove energy that is outside the bandwidth. Finally,
the RF amplifier is a weak-signal amplifier, used to amplify extremely small input
signals that arrive at the Receiver.
Appendix C
Configurations
Figure C.1: Client open.
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Figure C.2: Laptop open.
Figure C.3: Laptop open WEP 64bit.
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Figure C.4: Laptop open WEP 128bit.
Figure C.5: Laptop shared WEP 64bit.
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Figure C.6: Laptop shared WEP 128bit.
Figure C.7: Laptop WEP.
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Figure C.8: Laptop WPA.
Figure C.9: Laptop WPA-PSK (TKIP).
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Figure C.10: Netgear Advanced Setting.
Figure C.11: Netgear AP open.
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Figure C.12: Netgear Attached Devices Wireless cable Netgear wireless Laptop.
Figure C.13: Netgear MAC access.
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Figure C.14: Netgear MAC access setup.
Appendix D
FreeRADIUS Configuration Files
Includes clients.conf, eap.conf, radiusd.conf and users configuration files for
implementing 802.1x security mechanism from FreeRADIUS server program.
D.1 The radiusd.conf FreeRADIUS configuration file
Listing D.1: FreeRADIUS 802.1x execution codes.
##
## rad iu sd . con f −− FreeRADIUS s e r v e r c o n f i g u r a t i o n f i l e .
##
## h t t p ://www. f r e e r a d i u s . org /
## $ Id : r ad i u sd . con f . in , v 1 . 1 8 8 . 2 . 3 2005/02/07 19 : 52 : 05 a land Exp $
##
# The l o c a t i o n o f o t h e r c o n f i g f i l e s and
# l o g f i l e s are d e c l a r e d in t h i s f i l e
#
# Also g en e r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n f o r modules can be done
# in t h i s f i l e , i t i s e x po r t e d th rough the API to
# modules t h a t ask f o r i t .
#
# The c o n f i g u r a t i o n v a r i a b l e s d e f i n e d here are o f t h e form ${ f oo }
# They are l o c a l t o t h i s f i l e , and do not change from r e q u e s t to
# r e q u e s t .
#
# The per−r e q u e s t v a r i a b l e s are o f t h e form %{At t r i b u t e−Name} , and
# are taken from the v a l u e s o f t h e a t t r i b u t e in t h e incoming
# r e q u e s t . See ’ doc / v a r i a b l e s . t x t ’ f o r more in f o rma t i on .
p r e f i x = . .
e x e c p r e f i x = ${ p r e f i x }
s y s c on f d i r = ${ p r e f i x }/ etc
l o c a l s t a t e d i r = ${ p r e f i x }/var
sb i nd i r = ${ e x e c p r e f i x }/ bin
l o g d i r = ${ l o c a l s t a t e d i r }/ log/ rad ius
raddbdir = ${ s y s c on f d i r }/raddb
c e r t s d i r = ${ s y s c on f d i r }/raddb/ c e r t s /FreeRADIUS . net /DemoCerts
r adac c td i r = ${ l o g d i r }/ radacct
# Locat ion o f c o n f i g and l o g f i l e s .
c on fd i r = ${ raddbdir}
run d i r = ${ l o c a l s t a t e d i r }/ run/ radiusd
#
# The l o g g i n g messages f o r t h e s e r v e r are appended to t h e
# t a i l o f t h i s f i l e .
#
l o g f i l e = ${ l o g d i r }/ rad ius . log
#
# l i b d i r : Where to f i n d th e r lm ∗ modules .
#
# This s hou l d be a u t oma t i c a l l y s e t a t c o n f i g u r a t i o n t ime .
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#
# I f t h e s e r v e r b u i l d s and i n s t a l l s , bu t f a i l s a t e x e c u t i on t ime
# wi th an ’ unde f ined symbol ’ error , then you can use t h e l i b d i r
# d i r e c t i v e to work around the prob lem .
#
# The cause i s u s u a l l y t h a t a l i b r a r y has been i n s t a l l e d on your
# system in a p l a c e where t h e dynamic l i n k e r CANNOT f i n d i t . When
# ex e c u t i n g as roo t ( or ano ther user ) , your p e r s ona l environment MAY
# be s e t up to a l l ow the dynamic l i n k e r to f i n d t h e l i b r a r y . When
# ex e c u t i n g as a daemon , FreeRADIUS MAY NOT have th e same
# p e r s o n a l i z e d c o n f i g u r a t i o n .
#
# To work around the problem , f i n d out which l i b r a r y con t a i n s t h a t symbol ,
# and add the d i r e c t o r y c on t a i n i n g t h a t l i b r a r y to t h e end o f ’ l i b d i r ’ ,
# wi th a co lon s e p a r a t i n g t h e d i r e c t o r y names . NO space s are a l l owed .
#
# e . g . l i b d i r = / usr / l o c a l / l i b : / op t / package / l i b
#
# You can a l s o t r y s e t t i n g t h e LD LIBRARY PATH environment v a r i a b l e
# in a s c r i p t which s t a r t s t h e s e r v e r .
#
# I f t h a t does not work , then you can re−c on f i g u r e and re−b u i l d t h e
# s e r v e r to NOT use shared l i b r a r i e s , v i a :
#
# ./ c on f i g u r e −−d i s a b l e−shared
# make
# make i n s t a l l
#
l i b d i r = ${ e x e c p r e f i x }/ l i b
# p i d f i l e : Where to p l a c e t h e PID o f t h e RADIUS s e r v e r .
#
# The s e r v e r may be s i g n a l l e d wh i l e i t ’ s running by us ing t h i s
# f i l e .
#
# This f i l e i s w r i t t e n when ONLY running in daemon mode .
#
# e . g . : k i l l −HUP ‘ ca t / var / run/ rad i u sd / rad i u sd . pid ‘
#
p i d f i l e = ${ run d i r }/ radiusd . pid
# user / group : The name ( or #number ) o f t h e user / group to run rad i u sd as .
#
# I f t h e s e are commented out , t h e s e r v e r w i l l run as t h e user / group
# t h a t s t a r t e d i t . In order to change to a d i f f e r e n t user / group , you
# MUST be roo t ( or have roo t p r i v l e g e s ) to s t a r t t h e s e r v e r .
#
# We STRONGLY recommend t h a t you run the s e r v e r w i th as few pe rmi s s i on s
# as p o s s i b l e . That i s , i f you ’ re not u s ing shadow passwords , t h e
# user and group i t ems be low shou l d be s e t to ’ nobody ’ .
#
# On SCO (ODT 3) use ” user = nouser ” and ” group = nogroup ” .
#
# NOTE t h a t some k e r n e l s r e f u s e to s e t g i d ( group ) when the va l u e o f
# ( uns igned ) group i s above 60000; don ’ t use group nobody on t h e s e sys t ems !
#
# On sys tems wi th shadow passwords , you might have to s e t ’ group = shadow ’
# f o r t h e s e r v e r to be a b l e to read the shadow password f i l e . I f you can
# au t h e n t i c a t e u s e r s wh i l e in debug mode , bu t not in daemon mode , i t may be
# t h a t t h e debugg ing mode s e r v e r i s running as a user t h a t can read the
# shadow in fo , and the user l i s t e d be low can not .
#
#user = nobody
#group = nobody
# max r e que s t t ime : The maximum time ( in seconds ) to hand l e a r e q u e s t .
#
# Reques t s which t a k e more t ime than t h i s to p r o c e s s may be k i l l e d , and
# a REJECT message i s r e t u rned .
#
# WARNING: I f you no t i c e t h a t r e q u e s t s t a k e a l ong t ime to be handled ,
# then t h i s MAY INDICATE a bug in th e s e r ve r , in one o f t h e modules
# used to hand l e a r e que s t , OR in your l o c a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n .
#
# This prob lem i s most o f t e n seen when us ing an SQL da taba s e . I f i t t a k e s
# more than a second or two to r e c e i v e an answer from the SQL database ,
# then i t p r o b a b l y means t h a t you haven ’ t indexed th e da ta ba s e . See your
# SQL s e r v e r documentat ion f o r more in f o rma t i on .
#
# Use f u l range o f v a l u e s : 5 to 120
#
max request t ime = 30
# d e l e t e b l o c k e d r e q u e s t s : I f t h e r e q u e s t t a k e s MORE THAN ’ max r e que s t t ime ’
# to be handled , then maybe t h e s e r v e r shou l d d e l e t e i t .
#
# I f you ’ re running in threaded , or t h r ead poo l mode , t h i s s e t t i n g
# shou l d p r o b a b l y be ’ no ’ . S e t t i n g i t t o ’ yes ’ when us ing a th r eaded
# s e r v e r MAY cause t h e s e r v e r to crash !
#
d e l e t e b l o c k ed r e qu e s t s = no
# c l e anup d e l a y : The t ime to wa i t ( in seconds ) b e f o r e c l e a n i n g up
# a r e p l y which was s en t to t h e NAS.
#
# The RADIUS r e q u e s t i s norma l l y cached i n t e r n a l l y f o r a s h o r t p e r i o d
# o f time , a f t e r t h e r e p l y i s s en t to t h e NAS. The r e p l y pac k e t may be
# l o s t in t h e network , and the NAS w i l l not s ee i t . The NAS w i l l then
# re−send the r e que s t , and the s e r v e r w i l l respond q u i c k l y w i th t h e
# cached r e p l y .
#
# I f t h i s v a l u e i s s e t too low , then d u p l i c a t e r e q u e s t s from the NAS
# MAY NOT be de t e c t e d , and w i l l i n s t e a d be hand led as s e p e r a t e r e q u e s t s .
#
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# I f t h i s v a l u e i s s e t too high , then the s e r v e r w i l l cache too many
# re qu e s t s , and some new r e q u e s t s may g e t b l o c k e d . ( See ’ max re que s t s ’ . )
#
# Use f u l range o f v a l u e s : 2 to 10
#
c l eanup de lay = 5
# max reque s t s : The maximum number o f r e q u e s t s which t h e s e r v e r keeps
# t r a c k o f . This s hou l d be 256 mu l t i p l i e d by t h e number o f c l i e n t s .
# e . g . With 4 c l i e n t s , t h i s number shou l d be 1024 .
#
# I f t h i s number i s too low , then when the s e r v e r becomes busy ,
# i t w i l l not respond to any new r e qu e s t s , u n t i l t h e ’ c l e a nu p d e l a y ’
# time has passed , and i t has removed th e o l d r e q u e s t s .
#
# I f t h i s number i s s e t too high , then the s e r v e r w i l l use a b i t more
# memory f o r no r e a l b e n e f i t .
#
# I f you aren ’ t sure what i t s hou l d be s e t to , i t ’ s b e t t e r to s e t i t
# too h i gh than too low . S e t t i n g i t t o 1000 per c l i e n t i s p r o b a b l y
# the h i g h e s t i t s hou l d be .
#
# Use f u l range o f v a l u e s : 256 to i n f i n i t y
#
max requests = 1024
# b ind a d d r e s s : Make t he s e r v e r l i s t e n on a p a r t i c u l a r IP address , and
# send r e p l i e s out from t h a t add r e s s . This d i r e c t i v e i s most u s e f u l
# f o r machines w i th mu l t i p l e IP add r e s s e s on one i n t e r f a c e .
#
# I t can e i t h e r con ta in ”∗” , or an IP address , or a f u l l y q u a l i f i e d
# In t e r n e t domain name . The d e f a u l t i s ”∗”
#
# As o f 1 . 0 , you can a l s o use t h e ” l i s t e n ” d i r e c t i v e . See be low f o r
# more in f o rma t i on .
#
b ind addres s = ∗
# por t : A l lows you to b ind FreeRADIUS to a s p e c i f i c po r t .
#
# The d e f a u l t po r t t h a t most NAS boxe s use i s 1645 , which i s h i s t o r i c a l .
# RFC 2138 d e f i n e s 1812 to be t h e new por t . Many new s e r v e r s and
# NAS boxes use 1812 , which can c r e a t e i n t e r o p e r a b i l i t y prob lems .
#
# The por t i s d e f i n e d here to be 0 so t h a t t h e s e r v e r w i l l p i c k up
# the machine ’ s l o c a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n f o r t h e r ad i u s port , as d e f i n e d
# in / e t c / s e r v i c e s .
#
# I f you want to use t h e d e f a u l t RADIUS por t as d e f i n e d on your se r ve r ,
# ( u s u a l l y th rough ’ grep r ad i u s / e t c / s e r v i c e s ’ ) s e t t h i s to 0 ( z e ro ) .
#
# A por t g i v en on the command− l i n e v i a ’−p ’ over−r i d e s t h i s one .
#
# As o f 1 . 0 , you can a l s o use t h e ” l i s t e n ” d i r e c t i v e . See be low f o r
# more in f o rma t i on .
#
port = 0
#
# By d e f a u l t , t h e s e r v e r use s ” b i n d a d d r e s s ” to l i s t e n to a l l IP ’ s
# on a machine , or j u s t one IP . The ” po r t ” c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s used
# to s e l e c t t h e a u t h e n t i c a t i o n po r t used when l i s t e n i n g on t ho s e
# add r e s s e s .
#
# I f you want t h e s e r v e r to l i s t e n on a d d i t i o n a l addre s s e s , you can
# use th e ” l i s t e n ” s e c t i o n . A sample s e c t i o n ( commented out ) i s i n c l u d e d
# be low . This ” l i s t e n ” s e c t i o n d u p l i c a t e s t h e f u n c t i o n a l i t y o f t h e
# ” b i n d a d d r e s s ” and ” po r t ” c o n f i g u r a t i o n en t r i e s , bu t i t on l y l i s t e n s
# f o r a u t h e n t i c a t i o n pa c k e t s .
#
# I f you comment out t h e ” b i n d a d d r e s s ” and ” po r t ” c o n f i g u r a t i o n en t r i e s ,
# then i t becomes p o s s i b l e to make th e s e r v e r a c c ep t on l y account ing ,
# or a u t h e n t i c a t i o n pa c k e t s . Pr e v i ou s l y , i t a lways l i s t e n e d f o r bo th
# t yp e s o f packe t s , and i t was impo s s i b l e to make i t l i s t e n f o r on l y
# one t ype o f pac k e t .
#
#l i s t e n {
# IP addre s s on which to l i s t e n .
# Al lowed v a l u e s are :
# do t t e d quad ( 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 )
# hostname ( r ad i u s . example . com)
# w i l d c a r d (∗ )
# ipaddr = ∗
# Port on which to l i s t e n .
# Al lowed v a l u e s are :
# i n t e g e r po r t number (1812)
# 0 means ” use / e t c / s e r v i c e s f o r t h e proper po r t ”
# por t = 0
# Type o f p a c k e t s to l i s t e n f o r .
# Al lowed v a l u e s are :
# auth l i s t e n f o r a u t h e n t i c a t i o n pa c k e t s
# acc t l i s t e n f o r accoun t ing pa c k e t s
#
# type = auth
#}
# hos tname lookups : Log th e names o f c l i e n t s or j u s t t h e i r IP add r e s s e s
# e . g . , www. f r e e r a d i u s . org ( on ) or 206 . 47 . 2 7 . 2 32 ( o f f ) .
#
# The d e f a u l t i s ’ o f f ’ b ecause i t would be o v e r a l l b e t t e r f o r t h e ne t
# i f p eop l e had to knowing l y turn t h i s f e a t u r e on , s i n c e e n a b l i n g i t
# means t h a t each c l i e n t r e q u e s t w i l l r e s u l t in AT LEAST one lookup
# r e q u e s t to t h e nameserver . Enab l ing hos tname lookups w i l l a l s o
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# mean t h a t your s e r v e r may s t op randomly f o r 30 seconds from time
# to time , i f t h e DNS r e q u e s t s t a k e too l ong .
#
# Turning hostname l oo kup s o f f a l s o means t h a t t h e s e r v e r won ’ t b l o c k
# f o r 30 seconds , i f i t s e e s an IP addre s s which has no name a s s o c i a t e d
# wi th i t .
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
#
hostname lookups = no
# Core dumps are a bad t h i n g . This s hou l d on l y be s e t to ’ yes ’
# i f you ’ re debugg ing a prob lem wi th t h e s e r v e r .
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
#
al low core dumps = no
# Regu lar e x p r e s s i o n s
#
# These i t ems are s e t a t c o n f i g u r e t ime . I f t h ey ’ re s e t t o ” yes ” ,
# then s e t t i n g them to ”no” tu rn s o f f r e g u l a r e x p r e s s i o n suppor t .
#
# I f t h ey ’ re s e t to ”no” a t c on f i g u r e time , then s e t t i n g them to ” yes ”
# WILL NOT WORK. I t w i l l g i v e you an e r r o r .
#
r e g u l a r e xp r e s s i o n s = yes
ex t ended expre s s i on s = yes
# Log the f u l l User−Name a t t r i b u t e , as i t was found in th e r e q u e s t .
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
#
l og s t r ipped names = yes
# Log a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u e s t s to t h e l o g f i l e .
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
#
l og auth = yes
# Log passwords w i th t h e a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u e s t s .
# l o g a u t h b a d p a s s − l o g s password i f i t ’ s r e j e c t e d
# l o g a u t h g o o d p a s s − l o g s password i f i t ’ s c o r r e c t
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
#
l og auth badpass = yes
log auth goodpass = yes
# u s e r c o l l i d e : Turn ”username c o l l i s i o n ” code on and o f f . See t h e
# ”doc / dup l i c a t e−u s e r s ” f i l e
#
# WARNING
# ! ! ! ! ! ! ! S e t t i n g t h i s to ” yes ” may r e s u l t in t h e s e r v e r b ehav ing
# ! ! ! ! ! ! ! s t r a n g e l y . The ”username c o l l i s i o n ” code w i l l ONLY work
# ! ! ! ! ! ! ! w i t h c l e a r−t e x t passwords . Even then , i t may not do what
# ! ! ! ! ! ! ! you want , or what you e x p e c t .
# ! ! ! ! ! ! !
# ! ! ! ! ! ! ! We STRONGLY RECOMMEND th a t you do not use t h i s f e a t u r e ,
# ! ! ! ! ! ! ! and t h a t you f i n d ano ther way o f a c h e i v i n g t h e same goa l .
# ! ! ! ! ! ! !
# ! ! ! ! ! ! ! e , g . module f a i l −over . See ’ doc / c o n f i g u r a b l e f a i l o v e r ’
# WARNING
#
u s e r c o l l i d e = no
# lowe r u s e r / l ow e r p a s s :
# Lower case t h e username/ password ” b e f o r e ” or ” a f t e r ”
# a t t emp t i n g to a u t h e n t i c a t e .
#
# I f ” b e f o r e ” , t h e s e r v e r w i l l f i r s t modi fy t h e r e q u e s t and then t r y
# to auth t h e user . I f ” a f t e r ” , t h e s e r v e r w i l l f i r s t auth us ing t h e
# va l u e s p ro v i d ed by t h e user . I f t h a t f a i l s i t w i l l r e p r o c e s s t h e
# r e q u e s t a f t e r mod i f y ing i t as you s p e c i f y be low .
#
# This i s as c l o s e as we can g e t to case i n s e n s i t i v i t y . I t i s t h e
# admin ’ s j o b to ensure t h a t t h e username on the auth db s i d e i s
# ∗ a l s o ∗ l owe r ca s e to make t h i s work
#
# De f au l t i s ’ no ’ ( don ’ t l owe r ca s e v a l u e s )
# Va l id v a l u e s = ” b e f o r e ” / ” a f t e r ” / ”no”
#
l owe r u s e r = no
l ower pas s = no
# nospace u s e r / no space pa s s :
#
# Some us e r s l i k e to en t e r space s in t h e i r username or password
# i n c o r r e c t l y . To save y o u r s e l f t h e t e c h suppor t c a l l , you can
# e l im i n a t e t h o s e space s here :
#
# De f au l t i s ’ no ’ ( don ’ t remove space s )
# Va l id v a l u e s = ” b e f o r e ” / ” a f t e r ” / ”no” ( e x p l a n a t i o n above )
#
nospace use r = no
nospace pass = no
# The program to e x e cu t e to do concurrency check s .
checkrad = ${ s b i nd i r }/ checkrad
# SECURITY CONFIGURATION
#
# There may be mu l t i p l e methods o f a t t a c k i n g on the s e r v e r . This
# s e c t i o n ho l d s t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n i t ems which minimize t h e impact
# o f t h o s e a t t a c k s
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#
s e c u r i t y {
#
# max a t t r i b u t e s : The maximum number o f a t t r i b u t e s
# pe rmi t t e d in a RADIUS pack e t . Packe t s which have MORE
# than t h i s number o f a t t r i b u t e s in them w i l l be dropped .
#
# I f t h i s number i s s e t too low , then no RADIUS pac k e t s
# w i l l be a c c ep t ed .
#
# I f t h i s number i s s e t too high , then an a t t a c k e r may be
# a b l e to send a sma l l number o f p a c k e t s which w i l l cause
# the s e r v e r to use a l l a v a i l a b l e memory on the machine .
#
# S e t t i n g t h i s number to 0 means ” a l l ow any number o f a t t r i b u t e s ”
max att r ibutes = 200
#
# d e l a y e d r e j e c t : When send ing an Access−Rejec t , i t can be
# de l a y ed f o r a few seconds . This may h e l p s low down a DoS
# a t t a c k . I t a l s o h e l p s to s low down peop l e t r y i n g to bru te−f o r c e
# crack a u s e r s password .
#
# S e t t i n g t h i s number to 0 means ” send r e j e c t s immed ia te l y ”
#
# I f t h i s number i s s e t h i g h e r than ’ c l e a nup d e l a y ’ , then th e
# r e j e c t s w i l l be s en t a t ’ c l e a nu p d e l a y ’ time , when the r e q u e s t
# i s d e l e t e d from the i n t e r n a l cache o f r e q u e s t s .
#
# Use f u l ranges : 1 to 5
r e j e c t d e l a y = 1
#
# s t a t u s s e r v e r : Whether or not t h e s e r v e r w i l l respond
# to Sta tus−Serve r r e q u e s t s .
#
# Normal ly t h i s s hou l d be s e t to ”no ” , because t h ey ’ re u s e l e s s .
# See : h t t p ://www. f r e e r a d i u s . org / r f c / r f c2865 . html#Keep−A l i v e s
#
# However , c e r t a i n NAS boxe s may r e q u i r e them .
#
# When sen t a S ta tus−Serve r message , t h e s e r v e r re sponds w i th
# an Access−Accept packe t , c on t a i n i n g a Reply−Message a t t r i b u t e ,
# which i s a s t r i n g d e s c r i b i n g how long t he s e r v e r has been
# running .
#
s t a t u s s e r v e r = no
}
# PROXY CONFIGURATION
#
# p r o x y r e q u e s t s : Turns p roxy ing o f RADIUS r e q u e s t s on or o f f .
#
# The s e r v e r has p roxy ing turned on by d e f a u l t . I f your sys tem i s NOT
# s e t up to proxy r e q u e s t s to ano ther s e r ve r , then you can turn proxy ing
# o f f here . This w i l l save a sma l l amount o f r e s ou r c e s on the s e r v e r .
#
# I f you have p roxy ing turned o f f , and your c o n f i g u r a t i o n f i l e s say
# to proxy a r e que s t , then an e r r o r message w i l l be l o g g e d .
#
# To d i s a b l e proxy ing , change t h e ” yes ” to ”no ” , and comment t h e
# $INCLUDE l i n e .
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
#
proxy reque s t s = yes
$INCLUDE ${ c on fd i r }/proxy . conf
# CLIENTS CONFIGURATION
#
# C l i e n t c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s d e f i n e d in ” c l i e n t s . con f ” .
#
# The ’ c l i e n t s . con f ’ f i l e c on t a i n s a l l o f t h e in f o rma t i on from the o l d
# ’ c l i e n t s ’ and ’ n a s l i s t ’ c o n f i g u r a t i o n f i l e s . We recommend t h a t you
# do NOT use ’ c l i e n t ’ s or ’ n a s l i s t ’ , a l t h ou gh they are s t i l l
# suppor t ed .
#
# Anything l i s t e d in ’ c l i e n t s . con f ’ w i l l t a k e precedence over t h e
# in f o rma t i on from the o ld−s t y l e c o n f i g u r a t i o n f i l e s .
#
$INCLUDE ${ c on fd i r }/ c l i e n t s . conf
# SNMP CONFIGURATION
#
# Snmp c on f i g u r a t i o n i s on l y v a l i d i f SNMP suppor t was enab l e d
# at compi l e t ime .
#
# To enab l e SNMP que ry ing o f t h e s e r v e r , s e t t h e v a l u e o f t h e
# ’ snmp ’ a t t r i b u t e to ’ yes ’
#
snmp = no
$INCLUDE ${ c on fd i r }/snmp . conf
# THREAD POOL CONFIGURATION
#
# The th r ead poo l i s a long− l i v e d group o f t h r e ad s which
# tak e tu rn s ( round−ro b in ) hand l i n g any incoming r e q u e s t s .
#
# You p r o b a b l y want to have a few spare t h r e ad s around ,
# so t h a t high−l o ad s i t u a t i o n s can be hand led immed ia t e l y . I f you
# don ’ t have any spare threads , then the r e q u e s t hand l i n g w i l l
# be de l a y ed wh i l e a new th r ead i s c rea t ed , and added to t h e poo l .
#
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# You p r o b a b l y don ’ t want too many spare t h r e ad s around ,
# o t h e rw i s e t h ey ’ l l be s i t t i n g t h e r e t a k i n g up re source s , and
# not do ing any th ing p r o du c t i v e .
#
# The numbers g i v en be low shou l d be adequa te f o r most s i t u a t i o n s .
#
thread pool {
# Number o f s e r v e r s to s t a r t i n i t i a l l y −−− s hou l d be a r e a s ona b l e
# b a l l p a r k f i g u r e .
s t a r t s e r v e r s = 5
# Limit on the t o t a l number o f s e r v e r s running .
#
# I f t h i s l i m i t i s e v e r reached , c l i e n t s w i l l be LOCKED OUT, so i t
# shou l d NOT BE SET TOO LOW. I t i s i n t ended mainly as a brake to
# keep a runaway s e r v e r from t a k i n g t h e sys tem wi th i t as i t s p i r a l s
# down . . .
#
# You may f i n d t h a t t h e s e r v e r i s r e g u l a r l y r ea ch ing t h e
# ’ max se rve r s ’ number o f th reads , and t h a t i n c r e a s i n g
# ’ max se rve r s ’ doesn ’ t seem to make much d i f f e r e n c e .
#
# I f t h i s i s t h e case , then the prob lem i s MOST LIKELY t h a t
# your back−end da t a b a s e s are t a k i n g too l ong to respond , and
# are p r e v en t i n g t h e s e r v e r from respond ing in a t ime l y manner .
#
# The s o l u t i o n i s NOT do keep i n c r e a s i n g t h e ’ max se r ve r s ’
# va lue , bu t i n s t e a d to f i x t h e und e r l y i n g cause o f t h e
# prob lem : s low database , or ’ hos tname lookups=yes ’ .
#
# For more in format ion , s ee ’ max r e que s t t ime ’ , above .
#
max servers = 32
# Server−poo l s i z e r e g u l a t i o n . Rather than making you gue s s
# how many s e r v e r s you need , FreeRADIUS dynamica l l y adap t s to
# the l oad i t sees , t h a t i s , i t t r i e s to mainta in enough
# s e r v e r s to hand l e t h e cu r r en t load , p l u s a few spare
# s e r v e r s to hand l e t r a n s i e n t l oad s p i k e s .
#
# I t does t h i s by p e r i o d i c a l l y c h e c k i n g how many s e r v e r s are
# wa i t i n g f o r a r e q u e s t . I f t h e r e are f ewer than
# min spa r e s e r v e r s , i t c r e a t e s a new spare . I f t h e r e are
# more than max spa r e s e r v e r s , some o f t h e s pa r e s d i e o f f .
# The d e f a u l t v a l u e s are p r o b a b l y OK f o r most s i t e s .
#
min spa r e s e rv e r s = 3
max spare se rve r s = 10
# There may be memory l e a k s or r e s ou r c e a l l o c a t i o n prob lems wi th
# the s e r v e r . I f so , s e t t h i s v a l u e to 300 or so , so t h a t t h e
# r e s ou r c e s w i l l be c l e aned up p e r i o d i c a l l y .
#
# This s hou l d on l y be nec e s sa r y i f t h e r e are s e r i o u s bugs in t h e
# s e r v e r which have not y e t been f i x e d .
#
# ’0 ’ i s a s p e c i a l v a l u e meaning ’ i n f i n i t y ’ , or ’ t h e s e r v e r s never
# e x i t ’
max reque s t s pe r s e rv e r = 0
}
# MODULE CONFIGURATION
#
# The names and c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f each module i s l o c a t e d in t h i s s e c t i o n .
#
# Af t e r t h e modules are d e f i n e d here , t h ey may be r e f e r r e d to by name ,
# in o t h e r s e c t i o n s o f t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n f i l e .
#
modules {
#
# Each module has a c o n f i g u r a t i o n as f o l l o w s :
#
# name [ i n s t an c e ] {
# con f i g i t em = va l u e
# . . .
# }
#
# The ’name ’ i s used to l oad th e ’ rlm name ’ l i b r a r y
# which implements t h e f u n c t i o n a l i t y o f t h e module .
#
# The ’ i n s t an c e ’ i s o p t i o n a l . To have two d i f f e r e n t i n s t a n c e s
# o f a module , i t f i r s t must be r e f e r r e d to by ’name ’ .
# The d i f f e r e n t c o p i e s o f t h e module are then c r e a t e d by
# i n v e n t i n g two ’ i n s t an c e ’ names , e . g . ’ i n s t an c e1 ’ and ’ i n s t an c e2 ’
#
# The i n s t an c e names can then be used in l a t e r c o n f i g u r a t i o n
# INSTEAD o f t h e o r i g i n a l ’name ’ . See t h e ’ radutmp ’ c o n f i g u r a t i o n
# be low f o r an example .
#
# PAP module to a u t h e n t i c a t e u s e r s based on t h e i r s t o r e d password
#
# Suppor t s mu l t i p l e en c r yp t i on schemes
# c l e a r : C lear t e x t
# c r yp t : Unix c r y p t
# md5 : MD5 ecn r yp t i on
# sha1 : SHA1 enc r yp t i on .
# DEFAULT: c r y p t
pap {
encrypt ion scheme = crypt
}
# CHAP module
#
# To au t h e n t i c a t e r e q u e s t s c on t a i n i n g a CHAP−Password a t t r i b u t e .
#
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chap {
authtype = CHAP
}
# P lu g g a b l e Au t h en t i c a t i on Modules
#
# For Linux , s ee :
# h t t p ://www. k e r n e l . org /pub/ l i n u x / l i b s /pam/ index . html
#
# WARNING: On many systems , t h e system PAM l i b r a r i e s have
# memory l e a k s ! We STRONGLY SUGGEST t h a t you do not
# use PAM fo r au t h en t i c a t i o n , due to t h o s e memory l e a k s .
#
pam {
#
# The name to use f o r PAM au t h e n t i c a t i o n .
# PAM l o o k s in / e t c /pam . d/ ${pam auth name}
# fo r i t ’ s c o n f i g u r a t i o n . See ’ r edha t / rad iusd−pam ’
# f o r a sample PAM con f i g u r a t i o n f i l e .
#
# Note t h a t any Pam−Auth a t t r i b u t e s e t in t h e ’ a u t h o r i z e ’
# s e c t i o n w i l l over−r i d e t h i s one .
#
pam auth = radiusd
}
# Unix / e t c / passwd s t y l e a u t h e n t i c a t i o n
#
unix {
#
# Cache / e t c /passwd , / e t c /shadow , and / e t c / group
#
# The d e f a u l t i s t o NOT cache them .
#
# For FreeBSD and NetBSD , you do NOT want to enab l e
# the cache , as i t ’ s password l oo kup s are done v i a a
# database , so s e t t h i s v a l u e to ’ no ’ .
#
# Some sys tems ( e . g . RedHat Linux w i th pam pwbd ) can
# tak e ∗ seconds ∗ t o check a password , when th passwd
# f i l e c on t a i n i n g 1000 ’ s o f e n t r i e s . For t h o s e systems ,
# you shou l d s e t t h e cache va l u e to ’ yes ’ , and s e t
# the l o c a t i o n s o f t h e ’ passwd ’ , ’ shadow ’ , and ’ group ’
# f i l e s , be low .
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
cache = no
# Reload the cache eve ry 600 seconds (10mins ) . 0 to d i s a b l e .
cache r e l oad = 600
#
# Def ine t h e l o c a t i o n s o f t h e normal passwd , shadow , and
# group f i l e s .
#
# ’ shadow ’ i s commented out by d e f a u l t , b ecause not a l l
# sys tems have shadow passwords .
#
# To f o r c e t h e module to use t h e sys tem password f unc t i on s ,
# i n s t e a d o f r ead ing t h e f i l e s , l e a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g e n t r i e s
# commented out .
#
# This i s r e q u i r e d f o r some systems , l i k e FreeBSD ,
# and Mac OSX.
#
# passwd = / e t c / passwd
# shadow = / e t c / shadow
# group = / e t c / group
#
# The l o c a t i o n o f t h e ”wtmp” f i l e .
# This s hou l d be moved to i t ’ s own module soon .
#
# The on ly use f o r ’ r a d l a s t ’ . I f you don ’ t use
# ’ r a d l a s t ’ , then you can comment out t h i s i tem .
#
radwtmp = ${ l o g d i r }/radwtmp
}
# Ex t e n s i b l e Au t h en t i c a t i on Pro t o co l
#
# For a l l EAP r e l a t e d a u t h e n t i c a t i o n s .
# Now in ano ther f i l e , b ecause i t i s ve ry l a r g e .
#
$INCLUDE ${ c on fd i r }/eap . conf
# Mic ro so f t CHAP au t h e n t i c a t i o n
#
# This module s uppo r t s MS−CHAP and MS−CHAPv2 a u t h e n t i c a t i o n .
# I t a l s o e n f o r c e s t h e SMB−Account−Ct r l a t t r i b u t e .
#
mschap {
#
# As o f 0 . 9 , t h e mschap module does NOT suppor t
# read ing from / e t c / smbpasswd .
#
# I f you are u s ing / e t c / smbpasswd , s ee t h e ’ passwd ’
# module f o r an example o f how to use / e t c / smbpasswd
# au th t yp e va lue , i f p re sen t , w i l l be used
# to o v e rw r i t e ( or add ) Auth−Type dur ing
# au t h o r i z a t i o n . Normal ly s hou l d be MS−CHAP
authtype = MS−CHAP
# i f use mppe i s not s e t t o no mschap w i l l
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# add MS−CHAP−MPPE−Keys f o r MS−CHAPv1 and
# MS−MPPE−Recv−Key/MS−MPPE−Send−Key f o r MS−CHAPv2
#
#use mppe = no
# i f mppe i s enab l e d r e q u i r e e n c r y p t i o n makes
# enc r yp t i on moderate
#
#r e q u i r e e n c r y p t i o n = yes
# r e q u i r e s t r o n g a lways r e q u i r e s 128 b i t key
# enc r yp t i on
#
#r e q u i r e s t r o n g = yes
# Windows sends us a username in th e form o f
# DOMAIN\user , bu t sends t h e c h a l l e n g e re sponse
# based on on ly t h e user po r t i on . This hack
# c o r r e c t s f o r t h a t i n c o r r e c t b e ha v i o r .
#
#wi th n tdoma in hack = no
# The module can perform au t h e n t i c a t i o n i t s e l f , OR
# use a Windows Domain Con t r o l l e r . This c o n f i g u r a t i o n
# d i r e c t i v e t e l l s t h e module to c a l l t h e n t lm au th
# program , which w i l l do t h e au t h en t i c a t i o n , and r e t u rn
# the NT−Key . Note t h a t you MUST have ” winb indd ” and
# ”nmbd” running on the l o c a l machine f o r n t lm au th
# to work . See t h e n t lm au th program documentat ion
# f o r d e t a i l s .
#
# Be VERY c a r e f u l when e d i t i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e !
#
#nt lm au th = . . .
#”/ path / to / n t lm au th −−r e que s t−nt−key . . .
#−−username=%{St r i pped−User−Name:−%{User−Name:−None}} . . .
#−−c h a l l e n g e=%{mschap : Cha l l eng e :−00} . . .
#−−nt−r e sponse=%{mschap :NT−Response :−00}”
}
# L i g h tw e i g h t D i r e c t o r y Access Pro t o co l (LDAP)
#
# This module d e f i n i t i o n a l l ow s you to use LDAP f o r
# au t h o r i z a t i o n and a u t h e n t i c a t i o n (Auth−Type := LDAP)
#
# See doc / r lm l dap f o r d e s c r i p t i o n o f c o n f i g u r a t i o n op t i on s
# and sample a u t h o r i z e {} and a u t h e n t i c a t e {} b l o c k s
ldap {
s e r v e r = ” ldap . your . domain”
# i d e n t i t y = ”cn=admin , o=My Org , c=UA”
# password = mypass
basedn = ”o=My Org , c=UA”
f i l t e r = ” ( uid=%{Stripped−User−Name:−%{User−Name}}) ”
# b a s e f i l t e r = ”( o b j e c t c l a s s=r a d i u s p r o f i l e )”
# s e t t h i s to ’ yes ’ t o use TLS encryp t ed connec t i on s
# to the LDAP da taba s e by us ing t h e StartTLS ex t ended
# ope ra t i on .
# The StartTLS ope r a t i on i s supposed to be used w i th normal
# ldap connec t i on s i n s t e a d o f u s ing l d a p s ( po r t 689) connec t i on s
s t a r t t l s = no
# t l s c a c e r t f i l e = / path / to / c a c e r t . pem
# t l s c a c e r t d i r = / path / to / ca/ d i r /
# t l s c e r t f i l e = / path / to / r ad i u s . c r t
# t l s k e y f i l e = / path / to / r ad i u s . key
# t l s r a n d f i l e = / path / to / rnd
# t l s r e q u i r e c e r t = ”demand”
# d e f a u l t p r o f i l e = ”cn=r a d p r o f i l e , ou=d ia lup , o=My Org , c=UA”
# p r o f i l e a t t r i b u t e = ” rad i u sP ro f i l eDn ”
a c c e s s a t t r = ” dia lupAccess ”
# Mapping o f RADIUS d i c t i o n a r y a t t r i b u t e s to LDAP
# d i r e c t o r y a t t r i b u t e s .
dict ionary mapping = ${ raddbdir }/ ldap . attrmap
ldap connect ions number = 5
#
# NOTICE: The pas sword header d i r e c t i v e i s NOT case i n s e n s i t i v e
#
# password header = ”{ c l e a r }”
#
# Set :
# p a s sw o r d a t t r i b u t e = nspmPassword
#
# to g e t t h e user ’ s password from a Nov e l l eD i r e c t o r y
# backend . This w i l l work ∗ on ly i f ∗ freeRADIUS i s
# con f i g u r e d to b u i l d w i th −−with−e d i r op t i on .
#
#
# The s e r v e r can u s u a l l y f i g u r e t h i s out on i t s own , and p u l l
# the c o r r e c t User−Password or NT−Password from the da ta ba s e .
#
# Note t h a t NT−Passwords MUST be s t o r e d as a 32− d i g i t hex
# s t r i n g , and MUST s t a r t o f f w i t h ”0 x ” , such as :
#
# 0 x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
#
# Without t h e l e a d i n g ”0 x ” , NT−Passwords w i l l not work .
# This goes f o r NT−Passwords s t o r e d in SQL, too .
#
# pa s sw o r d a t t r i b u t e = userPassword
#
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# Un−comment t h e f o l l o w i n g to d i s a b l e Nov e l l eD i r e c t o r y account
# p o l i c y check and i n t r u d e r d e t e c t i o n . This w i l l work ∗ on ly i f ∗
# FreeRADIUS i s c on f i g u r e d to b u i l d w i th −−with−e d i r op t i on .
#
# e d i r a c c o u n t p o l i c y c h e c k=no
#
# groupname a t t r i b u t e = cn
# g r ou pmemb e r s h i p f i l t e r = ”( | (&( o b j e c t C l a s s=GroupOfNames ) . . .
#(member=%{Ldap−UserDn }))(&( o b j e c t C l a s s=GroupOfUniqueNames ) . . .
#( uniquemember=%{Ldap−UserDn } ) ) )”
# g roupmembe r s h i p a t t r i b u t e = radiusGroupName
timeout = 4
t ime l im i t = 3
net t imeout = 1
# compare check i t ems = yes
# d o x l a t = yes
# a c c e s s a t t r u s e d f o r a l l o w = yes
}
# passwd module a l l ow s to do a u t h o r i z a t i o n v i a any passwd− l i k e
# f i l e and to e x t r a c t any a t t r i b u t e s from t h e s e modules
#
# parameters are :
# f i l ename − path to f i l e name
# format − format f o r f i l e name record . This parameters
# c o r r e l a t e s r ecord in t h e passwd f i l e and RADIUS
# a t t r i b u t e s .
#
# F i e l d marked as ’∗ ’ i s key f i e l d . That i s , t h e parameter
# wi th t h i s name from the r e q u e s t i s used to s ea rch f o r
# the record from passwd f i l e
# A t t r i b u t e marked as ’= ’ i s added to r e p l y i tm e s i n s t e a d
# o f d e f a u l t c o n f i g u r e i tm e s
# A t t r i b u t e marked as ’˜ ’ i s added to r e q u e s t i t em s
#
# F i e l d marked as ’ , ’ may con ta in a comma sepa ra t e d l i s t
# o f a t t r i b u t e s .
# au th t yp e − i f r e cord found t h i s Auth−Type i s used to a u t h e n t i c a t e
# user
# ha s h s i z e − h a s h t a b l e s i z e . I f 0 or not s p e c i f i e d r e co rd s are not
# s t o r e d in memory and f i l e i s red on eve ry r e q u e s t .
# a l l o wmu l t i p l e k e y s − i f few r e co rd s f o r eve ry key are a l l owed
# i g n o r e n i s l i k e − i g no r e NIS−r e l a t e d r e co rd s
# d e l im i t e r − symbol to use as a f i e l d s e p a r a t o r in passwd f i l e ,
# f o r format ’ : ’ symbol i s a lways used . ’\0 ’ , ’\n ’ are
# not a l l owed
#
# An example c o n f i g u r a t i o n f o r u s ing / e t c / smbpasswd .
#
#passwd e tc smbpasswd {
# f i l ename = / e t c / smbpasswd
# format = ”∗User−Name : :LM−Password :NT−Password :SMB−Account−CTRL−TEXT: : ”
# au th t yp e = MS−CHAP
# ha s h s i z e = 100
# i g n o r e n i s l i k e = no
# a l l o wmu l t i p l e k e y s = no
#}
# Simi l a r c on f i g u r a t i o n , f o r t h e / e t c / group f i l e . Adds a Group−Name
# a t t r i b u t e f o r eve ry group t h a t t h e user i s member o f .
#
#passwd e t c g r o up {
# f i l ename = / e t c / group
# format = ”=Group−Name : : : ∗ , User−Name”
# ha s h s i z e = 50
# i g n o r e n i s l i k e = yes
# a l l o wmu l t i p l e k e y s = yes
# d e l im i t e r = ” :”
#}
# Realm module , f o r p roxy ing .
#
# You can have mu l t i p l e i n s t a n c e s o f t h e realm module to
# suppor t mu l t i p l e realm syn t a x s a t t h e same time . The
# search order i s d e f i n e d by t h e order in t h e a u t h o r i z e and
# pr ea c c t s e c t i o n s .
#
# Four c o n f i g o p t i on s :
# format − must be ’ p r e f i x ’ or ’ s u f f i x ’
# d e l im i t e r − must be a s i n g l e c h a r a c t e r
# i g n o r e d e f a u l t − s e t t o ’ yes ’ or ’ no ’
# i g n o r e n u l l − s e t t o ’ yes ’ or ’ no ’
#
# i g n o r e d e f a u l t and i g n o r e n u l l can be s e t to ’ yes ’ t o p r e v en t
# the module from matching a g a i n s t DEFAULT or NULL rea lms . This
# may be u s e f u l i f you have have mu l t i p l e i n s t a n c e s o f t h e
# realm module .
#
# They bo th d e f a u l t t o ’ no ’ .
#
# ’ realm/username ’
#
# Using t h i s entry , IPASS us e r s have t h e i r realm s e t to ”IPASS ” .
realm IPASS {
format = pr e f i x
d e l im i t e r = ”/”
i g n o r e d e f a u l t = no
i g n o r e nu l l = no
}
# ’ username@realm ’
#
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realm s u f f i x {
format = s u f f i x
d e l im i t e r = ”@”
i g n o r e d e f a u l t = no
i g n o r e nu l l = no
}
# ’ username%realm ’
#
realm rea lmpercent {
format = s u f f i x
d e l im i t e r = ”%”
i g n o r e d e f a u l t = no
i g n o r e nu l l = no
}
#
# ’ domain\ user ’
#
realm ntdomain {
format = pr e f i x
d e l im i t e r = ”\\”
i g n o r e d e f a u l t = no
i g n o r e nu l l = no
}
# A s imp l e v a l u e ch e c k i n g module
#
# I t can be used to check i f an a t t r i b u t e v a l u e in t h e r e q u e s t
# matches a ( p o s s i b l y mu l t i v a l u ed ) a t t r i b u t e in t h e check
# i tems This can be used f o r example f o r c a l l e r−i d
# au t h e n t i c a t i o n . For t h e module to run , bo th t h e r e q u e s t
# a t t r i b u t e and the check i t ems a t t r i b u t e must e x i s t
#
# i . e .
# A user has an l dap en t r y w i th 2 r a d i u sC a l l i n g S t a t i o n I d
# a t t r i b u t e s w i th v a l u e s ”12345678” and ”12345679”. I f we
# enab l e r lm che c k va l , then any r e q u e s t which con t a i n s a
# Ca l l i n g−S ta t i on−Id w i th one o f t h o s e two v a l u e s w i l l be
# accep t ed . Reques t s w i th o t h e r v a l u e s f o r
# Ca l l i n g−S ta t i on−Id w i l l be r e j e c t e d .
#
# Regu lar e x p r e s s i o n s in t h e check a t t r i b u t e v a l u e are a l l owed
# as l ong as t h e ope ra t o r i s ’=˜ ’
#
checkval {
# The a t t r i b u t e to l o o k f o r in t h e r e q u e s t
item−name = Cal l ing−Stat ion−Id
# The a t t r i b u t e to l o o k f o r in check i t ems . Can be mu l t i v a l u ed
check−name = Cal l ing−Stat ion−Id
# The data t ype . Can be
# s t r i n g , i n t e g e r , ipaddr , date , ab inary , o c t e t s
data−type = s t r i n g
# I f s e t to yes and we dont f i n d t h e item−name a t t r i b u t e in t h e
# r e q u e s t then we send back a r e j e c t
# DEFAULT i s no
#notfound−r e j e c t = no
}
# rew r i t e a r b i t r a r y p a c k e t s . U s e f u l in accoun t ing and a u t h o r i z a t i o n .
#
#
# The module can a l s o use t h e Rewrite−Rule a t t r i b u t e . I f i t
# i s s e t and matches t h e name o f t h e module in s t ance , then
# t h a t module i n s t an c e w i l l be t h e on l y one which runs .
#
# Also i f n ew a t t r i b u t e i s s e t t o yes then a new a t t r i b u t e
# w i l l be c r e a t e d c on t a i n i n g t h e v a l u e r e p l a c ew i t h and i t
# w i l l be added to s e a r c h i n ( packe t , r ep l y , proxy , p r o x y r e p l y or c o n f i g ) .
# sea r ch f o r , i g n o r e c a s e and max matches w i l l be i gno r ed in t h a t case .
#
# Back r e f e r enc e s are suppor t ed : %{0} w i l l c on ta in t h e s t r i n g t h e whole match
# and %{1} t o %{8} w i l l c on ta in t h e c on t en t s o f t h e 1 s t t o t h e 8 th pa r en t h e s e s
#
# I f max matches i s g r e a t e r than one th e b a c k r e f e r e n c e s w i l l cor re spond to t h e
# f i r s t match
#
#a t t r r e w r i t e s a n e c a l l e r i d {
# a t t r i b u t e = Cal l ed−S ta t i on−Id
# may be ” pack e t ” , ” r e p l y ” , ” proxy ” , ” p r o x y r e p l y ” or ” c o n f i g ”
# sea r c h i n = pack e t
# s e a r c h f o r = ”[+ ]”
# r e p l a c ew i t h = ””
# i g n o r e c a s e = no
# n ew a t t r i b u t e = no
# max matches = 10
### I f s e t t o yes then the r e p l a c e s t r i n g w i l l be appended to t h e o r i g i n a l s t r i n g
# append = no
#}
# Preproce s s t h e incoming RADIUS reque s t , b e f o r e handing i t o f f
# to o t h e r modules .
#
# This module p r o c e s s e s t h e ’ huntgroups ’ and ’ h i n t s ’ f i l e s .
# In add i t i on , i t re−wr i t e s some weird a t t r i b u t e s c r e a t e d
# by some NASes , and c on v e r t s t h e a t t r i b u t e s i n t o a form which
# i s a l i t t l e more s tandard .
#
preproce s s {
huntgroups = ${ c on fd i r }/huntgroups
h in t s = ${ c on fd i r }/ h in t s
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# This hack changes Ascend ’ s wierd po r t numberings
# to s tandard 0−??? po r t numbers so t h a t t h e ”+” works
# f o r IP addre s s a s s i gnment s .
with ascend hack = no
a s c end channe l s p e r l i n e = 23
# Windows NT machines o f t e n a u t h e n t i c a t e t h emse l v e s as
# NT DOMAIN\username
#
# I f t h i s i s s e t t o ’ yes ’ , then th e NT DOMAIN po r t i on
# o f t h e user−name i s s i l e n t l y d i s c a r d e d .
#
# This c o n f i g u r a t i o n en t r y SHOULD NOT be used .
# See th e ” rea lms ” module f o r a b e t t e r way to hand l e
# NT domains .
with ntdomain hack = no
# Sp e c i a l i x Je t s t r eam 8500 24 po r t a c c e s s s e r v e r .
#
# I f t h e user name i s 10 c h a r a c t e r s or l onger , a ”/”
# and the e x c e s s c h a r a c t e r s a f t e r t h e 10 th are
# appended to t h e user name .
#
# I f you ’ re not running t h a t NAS, you don ’ t need
# t h i s hack .
w i t h sp e c i a l i x j e t s t r e am ha ck = no
# Cisco ( and Quintum in Cisco mode ) sends i t ’ s VSA a t t r i b u t e s
# wi th t h e a t t r i b u t e name ∗ aga in ∗ in t h e s t r i n g , l i k e :
#
# H323−A t t r i b u t e = ”h323−a t t r i b u t e=va l u e ” .
#
# I f t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n i tem i s s e t to ’ yes ’ , then
# the redundant data in t h e t h e a t t r i b u t e t e x t i s s t r i p p e d
# out . The r e s u l t i s :
#
# H323−A t t r i b u t e = ” va l u e ”
#
# I f you ’ re not running a Cisco or Quintum NAS, you don ’ t
# need t h i s hack .
wi th c i s c o v s a hack = no
}
# Liv ing s t on−s t y l e ’ u s e r s ’ f i l e
#
f i l e s {
u s e r s f i l e = ${ c on fd i r }/ use r s
a c c t u s e r s f i l e = ${ c on fd i r }/ a c c t u s e r s
# I f you want to use t h e o l d C i s t ron ’ u s e r s ’ f i l e
# wi th FreeRADIUS , you shou l d change t h e nex t l i n e
# to ’ compat = c i s t r o n ’ . You can the copy your ’ u s e r s ’
# f i l e from Ci s t ron .
compat = no
}
# Write a d e t a i l e d l o g o f a l l a c coun t ing r e co rd s r e c e i v e d .
#
d e t a i l {
# Note t h a t we do NOT use NAS−IP−Address here , as
# t h a t a t t r i b u t e MAY BE from the o r i g i n a t i n g NAS, and
# NOT from the proxy which a c t u a l l y s en t us t h e
# r e q u e s t . The C l i en t−IP−Address a t t r i b u t e i s ALWAYS
# the addre s s o f t h e c l i e n t which s en t us t h e
# r e q u e s t .
#
# The f o l l o w i n g l i n e c r e a t e s a new d e t a i l f i l e f o r
# eve ry r ad i u s c l i e n t ( by IP addre s s or hostname ) .
# In add i t i on , a new d e t a i l f i l e i s c r e a t e d eve ry
# day , so t h a t t h e d e t a i l f i l e doesn ’ t have to go
# through a ’ l o g r o t a t i o n ’
#
# I f your d e t a i l f i l e s are l a r g e , you may a l s o want
# to add a ’:%H ’ ( see doc / v a r i a b l e s . t x t ) t o t h e end
# o f i t , t o c r e a t e a new d e t a i l f i l e e v e ry hour , e . g . :
#
# . . . . / d e t a i l−%Y%m%d:%H
#
# This w i l l c r e a t e a new d e t a i l f i l e f o r eve ry hour .
#
d e t a i l f i l e = ${ r adac c td i r}/%{Client−IP−Address}/ de t a i l−%Y%m%d
#
# The Unix−s t y l e p e rm i s s i on s on the ’ d e t a i l ’ f i l e .
#
# The d e t a i l f i l e o f t e n con t a i n s s e c r e t or p r i v a t e
# in f o rma t i on about u s e r s . So by k e ep ing t h e f i l e
# pe rmi s s i on s r e s t r i c t i v e , we can p r e v en t unwanted
# peop l e from s e e i n g t h a t i n f o rma t i on .
deta i lperm = 0600
}
#
# Many peop l e want to l o g a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u e s t s .
# Rather than mod i f y ing t h e s e r v e r core to p r i n t out more
# messages , we can use a d i f f e r e n t i n s t an c e o f t h e ’ d e t a i l ’
# module , t o l o g t h e a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u e s t s to a f i l e .
#
# You w i l l a l s o need to un−comment t h e ’ a u t h l o g ’ l i n e
# in the ’ a u t h o r i z e ’ s e c t i on , be low .
#
# d e t a i l a u t h l o g {
# d e t a i l f i l e = ${ r a d a c c t d i r }/%{Cl i en t−IP−Address }/ auth−d e t a i l−%Y%m%d
#
D.1 The radiusd.conf FreeRADIUS configuration file 118
# This MUST be 0600 , o t h e rw i s e anyone can read
# the u s e r s passwords !
# de t a i l p e rm = 0600
# }
#
# This module l o g s a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e p l y p a c k e t s s en t
# to a NAS. Both Access−Accept and Access−Re j e c t p a c k e t s
# are l o g g e d .
#
# You w i l l a l s o need to un−comment t h e ’ r e p l y l o g ’ l i n e
# in the ’ pos t−auth ’ s e c t i on , be low .
#
# d e t a i l r e p l y l o g {
# d e t a i l f i l e = ${ r a d a c c t d i r }/%{Cl i en t−IP−Address }/ rep l y−d e t a i l−%Y%m%d
#
# This MUST be 0600 , o t h e rw i s e anyone can read
# the u s e r s passwords !
# de t a i l p e rm = 0600
# }
#
# This module l o g s p a c k e t s p r o x i e d to a home s e r v e r .
#
# You w i l l a l s o need to un−comment t h e ’ p r e p r o x y l o g ’ l i n e
# in the ’ pre−proxy ’ s e c t i on , be low .
#
# d e t a i l p r e p r o x y l o g {
# d e t a i l f i l e = ${ r a d a c c t d i r }/%{Cl i en t−IP−Address }/ pre−proxy−d e t a i l−%Y%m%d
#
# This MUST be 0600 , o t h e rw i s e anyone can read
# the u s e r s passwords !
# de t a i l p e rm = 0600
# }
#
# This module l o g s r e sponse pa c k e t s from a home s e r v e r .
#
# You w i l l a l s o need to un−comment t h e ’ p o s t p r o x y l o g ’ l i n e
# in the ’ pos t−proxy ’ s e c t i on , be low .
#
# d e t a i l p o s t p r o x y l o g {
# d e t a i l f i l e = ${ r a d a c c t d i r }/%{Cl i en t−IP−Address }/ post−proxy−d e t a i l−%Y%m%d
#
# This MUST be 0600 , o t h e rw i s e anyone can read
# the u s e r s passwords !
# de t a i l p e rm = 0600
# }
# Create a unique accoun t ing s e s s i o n Id . Many NASes re−use or
# rep ea t v a l u e s f o r Acct−Sess ion−Id , caus ing no end o f
# con fu s i on .
#
# This module w i l l add a ( p r o b a b l y ) unique s e s s i o n i d
# to an accoun t ing pac k e t based on the a t t r i b u t e s l i s t e d
# be low found in th e pack e t . See doc / r lm a c c t un i q u e f o r
# more in f o rma t i on .
#
acct un ique {
key = ”User−Name, Acct−Sess ion−Id , NAS−IP−Address , Cl ient−IP−Address , NAS−Port”
}
# Inc l u d e ano ther f i l e t h a t has t h e SQL−r e l a t e d c o n f i g u r a t i o n .
# This i s ano ther f i l e on l y because i t t end s to be b i g .
#
# The f o l l o w i n g c o n f i g u r a t i o n f i l e i s f o r use w i th MySQL.
#
# For Po s t g r e s q l , use : ${ c on f d i r }/ p o s t g r e s q l . con f
# For MS−SQL, use : ${ c on f d i r }/mssq l . con f
# For Oracle , use : ${ c on f d i r }/ o r a c l e s q l . con f
#
$INCLUDE ${ c on fd i r }/ s q l . conf
# For Cisco VoIP s p e c i f i c accoun t ing w i th Po s t g r e s q l ,
# use : ${ c on f d i r }/ pg s q l−vo i p . con f
#
# You w i l l a l s o need th e s q l schema from :
# sr c / b i l l i n g / c i s co h323 db schema−p o s t g r e s . s q l
# Note : This c o n f i g can be use AS WELL AS the s tandard s q l
# c on f i g i f you need SQL based Auth
# Write a ’ utmp ’ s t y l e f i l e , o f which u s e r s are c u r r e n t l y
# l o g g e d in , and where t h ey ’ ve l o g g e d in from .
#
# This f i l e i s used mainly f o r Simul taneous−Use check ing ,
# and a l s o ’ radwho ’ , t o see who ’ s c u r r e n t l y l o g g e d in .
#
radutmp {
# Where t he f i l e i s s t o r e d . I t ’ s not a l o g f i l e ,
# so i t doesn ’ t need r o t a t i n g .
#
f i l ename = ${ l o g d i r }/radutmp
# The f i e l d in t h e pac k e t to key on f o r t h e
# ’ user ’ name , I f you have o t h e r f i e l d s which you want
# to use to key on to c o n t r o l S imul taneous−Use ,
# then you can use them here .
#
# Note , however , t h a t t h e s i z e o f t h e f i e l d in t h e
# ’ utmp ’ data s t r u c t u r e i s smal l , around 32
# charac t e r s , so t h a t w i l l l i m i t t h e p o s s i b l e c h o i c e s
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# of keys .
#
# You may want i n s t e a d : %{St r i pped−User−Name:−%{User−Name}}
username = %{User−Name}
# Whether or not we want to t r e a t ” user ” t h e same
# as ”USER” , or ”User ” . Some sys tems have prob lems
# wi th case s e n s i t i v i t y , so t h i s s hou l d be s e t to
# ’ no ’ to enab l e t h e comparisons o f t h e key a t t r i b u t e
# to be case i n s e n s i t i v e .
#
c a s e s e n s i t i v e = yes
# Account ing in f o rma t i on may be l o s t , so t h e user MAY
# have l o g g e d o f f o f t h e NAS, bu t we haven ’ t n o t i c e d .
# I f so , we can v e r i f y t h i s i n f o rma t i on wi th t h e NAS,
#
# I f we want to b e l i e v e t h e ’ utmp ’ f i l e , then t h i s
# c on f i g u r a t i o n en t r y can be s e t to ’ no ’ .
#
check with nas = yes
# Set t h e f i l e permis s ions , as t h e c on t en t s o f t h i s f i l e
# are u s u a l l y p r i v a t e .
perm = 0600
c a l l e r i d = ”yes ”
}
# ”Safe ” radutmp − does not con ta in c a l l e r ID , so i t can be
# world−r eadab l e , and radwho can work f o r normal users , w i t h ou t
# expo s i n g any in f o rma t i on t h a t i s n ’ t a l r e a d y exposed by who ( 1 ) .
#
# This i s ano ther ’ i n s t an c e ’ o f t h e radutmp module , bu t i t i s g i v en
# then name ” sradutmp” to i d e n t i f y i t l a t e r in t h e ” accoun t ing ”
# s e c t i o n .
radutmp sradutmp {
f i l ename = ${ l o g d i r }/sradutmp
perm = 0644
c a l l e r i d = ”no”
}
# a t t r f i l t e r − f i l t e r s t h e a t t r i b u t e s r e c e i v e d in r e p l i e s from
# prox i e d s e r v e r s , t o make sure we send back to our RADIUS c l i e n t
# on ly a l l owed a t t r i b u t e s .
a t t r f i l t e r {
a t t r s f i l e = ${ c on fd i r }/ a t t r s
}
# counte r module :
# This module t a k e s an a t t r i b u t e ( count−a t t r i b u t e ) .
# I t a l s o t a k e s a key , and c r e a t e s a coun te r f o r each unique
# key . The count i s incremented when accoun t ing p a c k e t s are
# r e c e i v e d by t h e s e r v e r . The va l u e o f t h e increment depends
# on the a t t r i b u t e t ype .
# I f t h e a t t r i b u t e i s Acct−Sess ion−Time or o f an i n t e g e r t ype we add the
# va l u e o f t h e a t t r i b u t e . I f i t i s any th ing e l s e we i n c r e a s e t h e
# counte r by one .
#
# The ’ r e s e t ’ parameter d e f i n e s when the coun t e r s are a l l r e s e t t o
# zero . I t can be hour ly , d a i l y , week ly , monthly or never .
#
# hour l y : Reset on 00 :00 o f e v e ry hour
# d a i l y : Reset on 00 : 00 : 00 eve ry day
# week l y : Reset on 00 : 00 : 00 on sunday
# monthly : Reset on 00 : 00 : 00 o f t h e f i r s t day o f each month
#
# I t can a l s o be user d e f i n e d . I t s hou l d be o f t h e form :
# num[ hdwm ] where :
# h : hours , d : days , w : weeks , m: months
# I f t h e l e t t e r i s ommited days w i l l be assumed . In example :
# r e s e t = 10h ( r e s e t e v e ry 10 hours )
# r e s e t = 12 ( r e s e t e v e ry 12 days )
#
#
# The check−name a t t r i b u t e d e f i n e s an a t t r i b u t e which w i l l be
# r e g i s t e r e d by t h e coun te r module and can be used to s e t t h e
# maximum a l l owed va l u e f o r t h e coun te r a f t e r which t h e user
# i s r e j e c t e d .
# Something l i k e :
#
# DEFAULT Max−Dai ly−Se s s i on := 36000
# Fa l l−Through = 1
#
# You shou l d add the coun te r module in t h e i n s t a n t i a t e
# s e c t i o n so t h a t i t r e g i s t e r s check−name b e f o r e t h e f i l e s
# module reads t h e u s e r s f i l e .
#
# I f check−name i s s e t and the user i s to be r e j e c t e d then we
# send back a Reply−Message and we l o g a Fa i l u re−Message in
# the r ad i u s . l o g
# I f t h e count a t t r i b u t e i s Acct−Sess ion−Time then on each l o g i n
# we send back t h e remaining on l i n e t ime as a Sess ion−Timeout a t t r i b u t e
#
# The counter−name can a l s o be used i n s t e a d o f u s ing t h e check−name
# l i k e be low :
#
# DEFAULT Dai ly−Sess ion−Time > 3600 , Auth−Type = Re j e c t
# Reply−Message = ”You ’ ve used up more than one hour today ”
#
# The a l l owed−s e r v i c e t y p e a t t r i b u t e can be used to on l y t a k e
# in t o account s p e c i f i c s e s s i o n s . For example i f a user f i r s t
# l o g s in th rough a l o g i n menu and then s e l e c t s ppp t h e r e w i l l
# be two s e s s i o n s . One f o r Login−User and one f o r Framed−User
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# s e r v i c e t ype . We on ly need to t a k e i n t o account t h e second one .
#
# The module s hou l d be added in th e i n s t a n t i a t e , a u t h o r i z e and
# accoun t ing s e c t i o n s . Make sure t h a t in t h e a u t h o r i z e
# s e c t i o n i t comes a f t e r any module which s e t s t h e
# ’ check−name ’ a t t r i b u t e .
#
counter da i l y {
f i l ename = ${ raddbdir }/db . da i l y
key = User−Name
count−a t t r i bu t e = Acct−Sess ion−Time
reset = da i l y
counter−name = Daily−Sess ion−Time
check−name = Max−Daily−Ses s i on
allowed−s e r v i c e t yp e = Framed−User
cache−s i z e = 5000
}
# The ” a lways ” module i s here f o r debugg ing purpose s . Each
# in s t an c e s imp ly r e t u rn s t h e same r e s u l t , a lways , w i t hou t
# doing any th ing .
always f a i l {
rcode = f a i l
}
always r e j e c t {
rcode = r e j e c t
}
always ok {
rcode = ok
simulcount = 0
mpp = no
}
#
# The ’ e x p r e s s i o n ’ module c u r r e n t l y has no c o n f i g u r a t i o n .
#
# This module i s u s e f u l on l y f o r ’ x l a t ’ . To use i t ,
# put ’ exec ’ i n t o t h e ’ i n s t a n t i a t e ’ s e c t i o n . You can then
# do dynamic t r a n s l a t i o n o f a t t r i b u t e s l i k e :
#
# At t r i b u t e−Name = ‘%{ expr : 2 + 3 + %{exec : u id −u}} ‘
#
# The va l u e o f t h e a t t r i b u t e w i l l be r e p l a c e d w i th t h e ou tpu t
# o f t h e program which i s e x e cu t ed . Due to RADIUS p r o t o c o l
# l im i t a t i o n s , any ou tpu t over 253 b y t e s w i l l be i gno r ed .
expr {
}
#
# The ’ d i g e s t ’ module c u r r e n t l y has no c o n f i g u r a t i o n .
#
# ”Dig e s t ” a u t h e n t i c a t i o n a g a i n s t a Cisco SIP s e r v e r .
# See ’ doc / r f c / d ra f t−sterman−aaa−s ip −00. t x t ’ f o r d e t a i l s
# on per forming d i g e s t a u t h e n t i c a t i o n f o r Cisco SIP s e r v e r s .
#
d i g e s t {
}
#
# Execute e x t e r n a l programs
#
# This module i s u s e f u l on l y f o r ’ x l a t ’ . To use i t ,
# put ’ exec ’ i n t o t h e ’ i n s t a n t i a t e ’ s e c t i o n . You can then
# do dynamic t r a n s l a t i o n o f a t t r i b u t e s l i k e :
#
# At t r i b u t e−Name = ‘%{ exec : / path / to /program arg s } ‘
#
# The va l u e o f t h e a t t r i b u t e w i l l be r e p l a c e d w i th t h e ou tpu t
# o f t h e program which i s e x e cu t ed . Due to RADIUS p r o t o c o l
# l im i t a t i o n s , any ou tpu t over 253 b y t e s w i l l be i gno r ed .
#
# The RADIUS a t t r i b u t e s from the user r e q u e s t w i l l be p l a c ed
# in t o environment v a r i a b l e s o f t h e e x e cu t e d program , as
# d e s c r i b e d in ’ doc / v a r i a b l e s . t x t ’
#
exec {
wait = yes
i npu t pa i r s = reques t
}
#
# This i s a more g en e r a l example o f t h e e x e cu t e module .
#
# This one i s c a l l e d ” echo ” .
#
# At t r i b u t e−Name = ‘%{ echo : / path / to /program arg s } ‘
#
# I f you wish to e x e cu t e an e x t e r n a l program in more than
# one s e c t i o n ( e . g . ’ a u t h o r i z e ’ , ’ p r e p ro x y ’ , e t c ) , then i t
# i s p r o b a b l y b e s t t o d e f i n e a d i f f e r e n t i n s t an c e o f t h e
# ’ exec ’ module f o r eve ry s e c t i o n .
#
exec echo {
#
# Wait f o r t h e program to f i n i s h .
#
# I f we do NOT wait , then the program i s ” f i r e and
# f o r g e t ” , and any ou tpu t a t t r i b u t e s from i t are i gno r ed .
#
# I f we are l o o k i n g f o r t h e program to ou tpu t
# a t t r i b u t e s , and want to add t ho s e a t t r i b u t e s to t h e
# reque s t , then we MUST wai t f o r t h e program to
# f i n i s h , and t h e r e f o r e s e t ’ wa i t=yes ’
#
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# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
wait = yes
#
# The name o f t h e program to execu te , and i t ’ s
# arguments . Dynamic t r a n s l a t i o n i s done on t h i s
# f i e l d , so t h i n g s l i k e t h e f o l l o w i n g example w i l l
# work .
#
program = ”/bin /echo %{User−Name}”
#
# The a t t r i b u t e s which are p l a c ed i n t o t h e
# environment v a r i a b l e s f o r t h e program .
#
# Al lowed v a l u e s are :
#
# r e q u e s t a t t r i b u t e s from the r e q u e s t
# c on f i g a t t r i b u t e s from the c o n f i g u r a t i o n i t ems l i s t
# r e p l y a t t r i b u t e s from the r e p l y
# proxy−r e q u e s t a t t r i b u t e s from the proxy r e q u e s t
# proxy−r e p l y a t t r i b u t e s from the proxy r e p l y
#
# Note t h a t some a t t r i b u t e s may not e x i s t a t some
# s t a g e s . e . g . There may be no proxy−r e p l y
# a t t r i b u t e s i f t h i s module i s used in t h e
# ’ a u t h o r i z e ’ s e c t i o n .
#
i n pu t pa i r s = reques t
#
# Where to p l a c e t h e ou tpu t a t t r i b u t e s ( i f any ) from
# the e x e cu t ed program . The v a l u e s a l l owed , and the
# r e s t r i c t i o n s as to a v a i l a b i l i t y , are t h e same as
# f o r t h e i n p u t p a i r s .
#
output pa i r s = rep ly
#
# When to e x e cu t e t h e program . I f t h e pack e t
# type does NOT match what ’ s l i s t e d here , then
# the module does NOT exe cu t e t h e program .
#
# For a l i s t o f a l l owed pack e t types , s ee
# the ’ d i c t i o n a r y ’ f i l e , and l o o k f o r VALUEs
# o f t h e Packet−Type a t t r i b u t e .
#
# By d e f a u l t , t h e module e x e c u t e s on ANY packe t .
# Un−comment out t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e to t e l l t h e
# module to e x e cu t e on l y i f an Access−Accept i s
# be in g s en t to t h e NAS.
#
#pa c k e t t y p e = Access−Accept
}
# Do s e r v e r s i d e i p poo l management . Shou ld be added in post−auth and
# accoun t ing s e c t i o n s .
#
# The module a l s o r e q u i r e s t h e e x i s t a n c e o f t h e Pool−Name
# a t t r i b u t e . That way the a dm in i s t r a t o r can add the Pool−Name
# a t t r i b u t e in t h e user p r o f i l e s and use d i f f e r e n t p o o l s
# f o r d i f f e r e n t u s e r s . The Pool−Name a t t r i b u t e i s a ∗ check ∗ i tem not
# a r e p l y i tem .
#
# Example :
# rad iu sd . con f : i p p o o l s t u d e n t s { [ . . . ] }
# use r s f i l e : DEFAULT Group == s tuden t s , Pool−Name := ” s t u d e n t s ”
#
# ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ IF YOU CHANGE THE RANGE PARAMETERS YOU MUST ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
# ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ THEN ERASE THE DB FILES ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
#
i ppoo l main pool {
# range−s t a r t , range−s t o p : The s t a r t and end i p
# add r e s s e s f o r t h e i p poo l
range−s t a r t = 192 . 1 68 . 1 . 1
range−stop = 192 . 168 . 3 . 254
# netmask : The network mask used f o r t h e i p ’ s
netmask = 255 . 255 . 255 . 0
# cache−s i z e : The gdbm cache s i z e f o r t h e db
# f i l e s . Shou ld be e qua l t o t h e number o f i p ’ s
# a v a i l a b l e in t h e i p poo l
cache−s i z e = 800
# ses s i on−db : The main db f i l e used to a l l o c a t e i p ’ s to c l i e n t s
s e s s i on−db = ${ raddbdir }/db . ippoo l
# ip−i ndex : He lper db index f i l e used in mu l t i l i n k
ip−index = ${ raddbdir }/db . ip index
# ov e r r i d e : Wi l l t h i s i p p o o l o v e r r i d e a Framed−IP−Address a l r e a d y s e t
ove r r i d e = no
# maximum−t imeou t : I f not z e ro s p e c i f i e s t h e maximum time in seconds an
# en t r y may be a c t i v e . De f au l t : 0
maximum−timeout = 0
}
# ANSI X9 .9 token suppor t . Not i n c l u d e d by d e f a u l t .
# $INCLUDE ${ c o n f d i r }/ x99 . con f
}
# In s t a n t i a t i o n
#
# This s e c t i o n o rde r s t h e l o a d i n g o f t h e modules . Modules
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# l i s t e d here w i l l g e t l oaded BEFORE the l a t e r s e c t i o n s l i k e
# au tho r i z e , a u t h en t i c a t e , e t c . g e t examined .
#
# This s e c t i o n i s not s t r i c t l y needed . When a s e c t i o n l i k e
# au t h o r i z e r e f e r s to a module , i t ’ s a u t oma t i c a l l y l oaded and
# i n i t i a l i z e d . However , some modules may not be l i s t e d in any
# o f t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s , so t h ey can be l i s t e d here .
#
# Also , l i s t i n g modules here ensure s t h a t you have c o n t r o l over
# the order in which t h ey are i n i t a l i z e d . I f one module needs
# someth ing d e f i n e d by ano ther module , you can l i s t them in order
# here , and ensure t h a t t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n w i l l be OK.
#
i n s t a n t i a t e {
#
# Al lows th e e x e cu t i on o f e x t e r n a l s c r i p t s .
# The e n t i r e command l i n e ( and ou tpu t ) must f i t i n t o 253 b y t e s .
#
# e . g . Framed−Pool = ‘%{ exec : / b in / echo foo } ‘
exec
#
# The e x p r e s s i o n module doesn ’ t do au t h o r i z a t i o n ,
# au t h en t i c a t i o n , or accoun t ing . I t on l y does dynamic
# t r a n s l a t i o n , o f t h e form :
#
# Sess ion−Timeout = ‘%{ expr : 2 + 3} ‘
#
# So the module needs to be i n s t a n t i a t e d , bu t CANNOT be
# l i s t e d in any o t h e r s e c t i o n . See ’ doc / r lm exp r ’ f o r
# more in f o rma t i on .
#
expr
#
# We add the coun te r module here so t h a t i t r e g i s t e r s
# the check−name a t t r i b u t e b e f o r e any module which s e t s
# i t
# d a i l y
}
# Autho r i z a t i on . F i r s t p r e p r o c e s s ( h i n t s and huntgroups f i l e s ) ,
# then realms , and f i n a l l y l o o k in t h e ” u s e r s ” f i l e .
#
# The order o f t h e realm modules w i l l de termine th e order t h a t
# we t r y to f i n d a matching realm .
#
# Make ∗ sure ∗ t h a t ’ p r e p r o c e s s ’ comes b e f o r e any realm i f you
# need to s e t up h i n t s f o r t h e remote r ad i u s s e r v e r
author i z e {
#
# The p r e p r o c e s s module t a k e s care o f s a n i t i z i n g some b i z a r r e
# a t t r i b u t e s in t h e r e que s t , and t u rn in g them in t o a t t r i b u t e s
# which are more s tandard .
#
# I t t a k e s care o f p r o c e s s i n g t h e ’ raddb / h i n t s ’ and the
# ’ raddb / huntgroups ’ f i l e s .
#
# I t a l s o adds t h e %{Cl i en t−IP−Address} a t t r i b u t e to t h e r e q u e s t .
preproce s s
#
# I f you want to have a l o g o f a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e qu e s t s ,
# un−comment t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e , and the ’ d e t a i l a u t h l o g ’
# se c t i on , above .
# au t h l o g
# a t t r f i l t e r
#
# The chap module w i l l s e t ’ Auth−Type := CHAP’ i f we are
# hand l i n g a CHAP r e q u e s t and Auth−Type has not a l r e a d y been s e t
chap
#
# I f t h e u s e r s are l o g g i n g in w i th an MS−CHAP−Cha l l eng e
# a t t r i b u t e f o r a u t h en t i c a t i o n , t h e mschap module w i l l f i n d
# the MS−CHAP−Cha l l eng e a t t r i b u t e , and add ’Auth−Type := MS−CHAP’
# to the r e que s t , which w i l l cause t h e s e r v e r to then use
# the mschap module f o r a u t h e n t i c a t i o n .
mschap
#
# I f you have a Cisco SIP s e r v e r a u t h e n t i c a t i n g a g a i n s t
# FreeRADIUS , uncomment t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e , and the ’ d i g e s t ’
# l i n e in t h e ’ a u t h e n t i c a t e ’ s e c t i o n .
# d i g e s t
#
# Look f o r IPASS s t y l e ’ realm / ’ , and i f not found , l o o k f o r
# ’@realm ’ , and de c i d e whether or not to proxy , based on
# t h a t .
# IPASS
#
# I f you are u s ing mu l t i p l e k i nd s o f realms , you p r o b a b l y
# want to s e t ” i g n o r e n u l l = yes ” f o r a l l o f them .
# Otherwise , when the f i r s t s t y l e o f realm doesn ’ t match ,
# the o t h e r s t y l e s won ’ t be checked .
#
s u f f i x
# ntdomain
#
# This module t a k e s care o f EAP−MD5, EAP−TLS , and EAP−LEAP
# au t h e n t i c a t i o n .
#
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# I t a l s o s e t s t h e EAP−Type a t t r i b u t e in t h e r e q u e s t
# a t t r i b u t e l i s t t o t h e EAP type from the pack e t .
eap
#
# Read the ’ u s e r s ’ f i l e
f i l e s
#
# Look in an SQL da taba s e . The schema o f t h e da t a ba s e
# i s meant to mirror t h e ” u s e r s ” f i l e .
#
# See ” Au t ho r i z a t i on Quer ies ” in s q l . con f
# s q l
#
# I f you are u s ing / e t c / smbpasswd , and are a l s o do ing
# mschap au t h en t i c a t i o n , t h e un−comment t h i s l i n e , and
# con f i g u r e t h e ’ e tc smbpasswd ’ module , above .
# etc smbpasswd
#
# The l dap module w i l l s e t Auth−Type to LDAP i f i t has not
# a l r e ad y been s e t
# ldap
#
# Enforce d a i l y l i m i t s on t ime spen t l o g g e d in .
# d a i l y
#
# Use the c h e c k v a l module
# ch e c k v a l
}
# Auth en t i c a t i on .
#
#
# This s e c t i o n l i s t s which modules are a v a i l a b l e f o r a u t h e n t i c a t i o n .
# Note t h a t i t does NOT mean ’ t r y each module in order ’ . I t means
# t h a t a module from the ’ a u t h o r i z e ’ s e c t i o n adds a c o n f i g u r a t i o n
# a t t r i b u t e ’Auth−Type := FOO ’ . That a u t h e n t i c a t i o n t ype i s then
# used to p i c k t h e a p r o p r i a t e module from the l i s t be low .
#
# In genera l , you SHOULD NOT s e t t h e Auth−Type a t t r i b u t e . The s e r v e r
# w i l l f i g u r e i t out on i t s own , and w i l l do t h e r i g h t t h i n g . The
# most common s i d e e f f e c t o f e r r on eou s l y s e t t i n g t h e Auth−Type
# a t t r i b u t e i s t h a t one a u t h e n t i c a t i o n method w i l l work , bu t t h e
# o t h e r s w i l l not .
#
# The common reasons to s e t t h e Auth−Type a t t r i b u t e by hand
# i s to e i t h e r f o r c i b l y r e j e c t t h e user , or f o r c i b l y a c c ep t him .
#
authent i ca t e {
#
# PAP au t h en t i c a t i o n , when a back−end da ta ba s e l i s t e d
# in the ’ a u t h o r i z e ’ s e c t i o n s u p p l i e s a password . The
# password can be c l e a r−t e x t , or enc ryp t ed .
Auth−Type PAP {
pap
}
#
# Most p eop l e want CHAP au t h e n t i c a t i o n
# A back−end da ta ba s e l i s t e d in t h e ’ a u t h o r i z e ’ s e c t i o n
# MUST supp l y a CLEAR TEXT password . Encrypted passwords
# won ’ t work .
Auth−Type CHAP {
chap
}
#
# MSCHAP au t h e n t i c a t i o n .
Auth−Type MS−CHAP {
mschap
}
#
# I f you have a Cisco SIP s e r v e r a u t h e n t i c a t i n g a g a i n s t
# FreeRADIUS , uncomment t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e , and the ’ d i g e s t ’
# l i n e in t h e ’ a u t h o r i z e ’ s e c t i o n .
# d i g e s t
#
# P lu g g a b l e Au t h en t i c a t i on Modules .
# pam
#
# See ’man ge tpwent ’ f o r i n f o rma t i on on how the ’ unix ’
# module check s t h e u s e r s password . Note t h a t p a c k e t s
# con t a i n i n g CHAP−Password a t t r i b u t e s CANNOT be a u t h e n t i c a t e d
# ag a i n s t / e t c / passwd ! See t h e FAQ f o r d e t a i l s .
#
unix
# Uncomment i t i f you want to use l dap f o r a u t h e n t i c a t i o n
#
# Note t h a t t h i s means ” check p l a in−t e x t password a g a i n s t
# the l dap da taba s e ” , which means t h a t EAP won ’ t work ,
# as i t does not s upp l y a p l a in−t e x t password .
# Auth−Type LDAP {
# ldap
# }
#
# Allow EAP au t h e n t i c a t i o n .
eap
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}
#
# Pre−accoun t ing . Decide which accoun t ing t ype to use .
#
preacct {
preproce s s
#
# Ensure t h a t we have a semi−unique i d e n t i f i e r f o r eve ry
# reque s t , and many NAS boxes are broken .
acc t un ique
#
# Look f o r IPASS−s t y l e ’ realm / ’ , and i f not found , l o o k f o r
# ’@realm ’ , and de c i d e whether or not to proxy , based on
# t h a t .
#
# Account ing r e q u e s t s are g e n e r a l l y p r o x i e d to t h e same
# home s e r v e r as a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u e s t s .
# IPASS
s u f f i x
# ntdomain
#
# Read the ’ a c c t u s e r s ’ f i l e
f i l e s
}
#
# Account ing . Log t h e accoun t ing data .
#
account ing {
#
# Create a ’ d e t a i l ’ ed l o g o f t h e p a c k e t s .
# Note t h a t accoun t ing r e q u e s t s which are p r o x i e d
# are a l s o l o g g e d in t h e d e t a i l f i l e .
d e t a i l
# da i l y
# Update t h e wtmp f i l e
#
# I f you don ’ t use ” r a d l a s t ” , you can d e l e t e t h i s l i n e .
unix
#
# For Simul taneous−Use t r a c k i n g .
#
# Due to pac k e t l o s s e s in t h e network , t h e data here
# may be i n c o r r e c t . There i s l i t t l e we can do about i t .
radutmp
# sradutmp
# Return an addre s s to t h e IP Pool when we see a s t op record .
# main poo l
#
# Log t r a f f i c to an SQL da taba s e .
#
# See ”Account ing q u e r i e s ” in s q l . con f
# s q l
# Cisco VoIP s p e c i f i c b u l k accoun t ing
# pg s q l−vo i p
}
# Ses s i on database , used f o r ch e c k i n g Simul taneous−Use . E i t h e r t h e radutmp
# or r lm s q l module can hand l e t h i s .
# The r lm s q l module i s ∗much∗ f a s t e r
s e s s i o n {
radutmp
#
# See ” Simu l taneous Use Checking Querie ” in s q l . con f
# s q l
}
# Post−Au th en t i c a t i on
# Once we KNOW tha t t h e user has been au t h en t i c a t e d , t h e r e are
# a d d i t i o n a l s t e p s we can t a k e .
post−auth {
# Get an addre s s from the IP Pool .
# main poo l
#
# I f you want to have a l o g o f a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e p l i e s ,
# un−comment t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e , and the ’ d e t a i l r e p l y l o g ’
# se c t i on , above .
# r e p l y l o g
#
# Af t e r a u t h e n t i c a t i n g t h e user , do ano ther SQL qeury .
#
# See ” Au t h en t i c a t i on Logg ing Quer ies ” in s q l . con f
# s q l
#
# Un−comment t h e f o l l o w i n g i f you have s e t
# ’ e d i r a c c o u n t p o l i c y c h e c k = yes ’ in t h e l dap module sub−s e c t i o n o f
# the ’ modules ’ s e c t i o n .
#
# ldap
#
# Access−Re j e c t p a c k e t s are s en t th rough th e REJECT sub−s e c t i o n o f t h e
# post−auth s e c t i o n .
# Uncomment t h e f o l l o w i n g and s e t t h e module name to t h e l dap i n s t an c e
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# name i f you have s e t ’ e d i r a c c o u n t p o l i c y c h e c k = yes ’ in t h e l dap
# module sub−s e c t i o n o f t h e ’ modules ’ s e c t i o n .
#
# Post−Auth−Type REJECT {
# in s e r t−module−name−here
# }
}
#
# When the s e r v e r d e c i d e s to proxy a r e q u e s t t o a home se rve r ,
# the p ro x i e d r e q u e s t i s f i r s t pas sed through th e pre−proxy
# s t a g e . This s t a g e can re−wr i t e t h e r e que s t , or d e c i d e to
# cance l t h e proxy .
#
# Only a few modules c u r r e n t l y have t h i s method .
#
pre−proxy {
# a t t r r e w r i t e
# I f you want to have a l o g o f p a c k e t s p r o x i e d to a home
# serve r , un−comment t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e , and the
# ’ d e t a i l p r e p r o x y l o g ’ s e c t i on , above .
# p r e p r o x y l o g
}
#
# When the s e r v e r r e c e i v e s a r e p l y to a r e q u e s t i t p r o x i e d
# to a home se rve r , t h e r e q u e s t may be massaged here , in t h e
# post−proxy s t a g e .
#
post−proxy {
#
# I f you want to have a l o g o f r e p l i e s from a home se rve r ,
# un−comment t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e , and the ’ d e t a i l p o s t p r o x y l o g ’
# se c t i on , above .
# p o s t p r o x y l o g
# a t t r r e w r i t e
# Uncomment t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e i f you want to f i l t e r r e p l i e s from
# remote p r o x i e s based on the r u l e s d e f i n e d in t h e ’ a t t r s ’ f i l e .
# a t t r f i l t e r
#
# I f you are p roxy ing LEAP, you MUST con f i g u r e t h e EAP
# module , and you MUST l i s t i t here , in t h e post−proxy
# s t a g e .
#
# You MUST a l s o use t h e ’ n o s t r i p ’ op t i on in t h e ’ realm ’
# c on f i g u r a t i o n . Otherwise , t h e User−Name a t t r i b u t e
# in the p ro x i e d r e q u e s t w i l l not match t he user name
# hidden i n s i d e o f t h e EAP packe t , and the end s e r v e r w i l l
# r e j e c t t h e EAP r e q u e s t .
#
eap
}
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Listing D.2: EAP authentication security protocol codes.
#
# Whatever you do , do NOT s e t ’ Auth−Type := EAP ’ . The s e r v e r
# i s smart enough to f i g u r e t h i s out on i t s own . The most
# common s i d e e f f e c t o f s e t t i n g ’Auth−Type := EAP ’ i s t h a t t h e
# use r s then cannot use ANY o th e r a u t h e n t i c a t i o n method .
#
# $ Id : eap . conf , v 1 .4 2004/04/15 18 : 34 : 41 a land Exp $
#
eap {
# Invoke t h e d e f a u l t suppor t ed EAP type when
# EAP−I d e n t i t y r e sponse i s r e c e i v e d .
#
# The incoming EAP messages DO NOT s p e c i f y which EAP
# type they w i l l be us ing , so i t MUST be s e t here .
#
# For now , on l y one d e f a u l t EAP type may be used a t a t ime .
#
# I f t h e EAP−Type a t t r i b u t e i s s e t by ano ther module ,
# then t h a t EAP type t a k e s precedence over t h e
# d e f a u l t t ype c on f i g u r e d here .
#
de f au l t e ap type = t l s
# A l i s t i s mainta ined to c o r r e l a t e EAP−Response
# pac k e t s w i th EAP−Reques t p a c k e t s . A f t e r a
# c o n f i g u r a b l e l e n g t h o f time , e n t r i e s in t h e l i s t
# exp i r e , and are d e l e t e d .
#
t ime r exp i r e = 60
# There are many EAP types , bu t t h e s e r v e r has suppor t
# f o r on l y a l im i t e d s u b s e t . I f t h e s e r v e r r e c e i v e s
# a r e q u e s t f o r an EAP type i t does not suppor t , then
# i t norma l l y r e j e c t s t h e r e q u e s t . By s e t t i n g t h i s
# c on f i g u r a t i o n to ” yes ” , you can t e l l t h e s e r v e r to
# i n s t e a d keep p r o c e s s i n g t h e r e q u e s t . Another module
# MUST then be c on f i g u r e d to proxy t h e r e q u e s t t o
# another RADIUS s e r v e r which suppo r t s t h a t EAP type .
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#
# I f ano ther module i s NOT con f i g u r e d to hand l e t h e
# reque s t , then the r e q u e s t w i l l s t i l l end up be in g
# r e j e c t e d .
ignore unknown eap types = no
# Cisco AP1230B f irmware 12 . 2 ( 13 ) JA1 has a bug . When g i v en
# a User−Name a t t r i b u t e in an Access−Accept , i t c o p i e s one
# more b y t e than i t s hou l d .
#
# We can work around i t by c o n f i g u r a b l y add ing an e x t r a
# zero b y t e .
c i s co account ing username bug = no
# Suppor ted EAP−t y p e s
#
# We do NOT recommend us ing EAP−MD5 au t h e n t i c a t i o n
# f o r w i r e l e s s connec t i on s . I t i s in secure , and does
# not p r o v i d e f o r dynamic WEP keys .
#
md5 {
}
# Cisco LEAP
#
# We do not recommend us ing LEAP in new dep loyments . See :
# h t t p ://www. secur i t eam . com/ t o o l s /5TP012ACKE. html
#
# Cisco LEAP uses t h e MS−CHAP a l g o r i t hm ( bu t not
# the MS−CHAP a t t r i b u t e s ) to perform i t ’ s a u t h e n t i c a t i o n .
#
# As a r e s u l t , LEAP ∗ r e q u i r e s ∗ ac c e s s to t h e p l a in−t e x t
# User−Password , or t h e NT−Password a t t r i b u t e s .
# ’ System ’ a u t h e n t i c a t i o n i s imp o s s i b l e w i th LEAP.
#
l eap {
}
# Generic Token Card .
#
# Current l y , t h i s i s on l y p e rm i t t e d i n s i d e o f EAP−TTLS,
# or EAP−PEAP. The module ” c h a l l e n g e s ” t h e user w i th
# t e x t , and the re sponse from the user i s taken to be
# the User−Password .
#
# Proxying t h e t unne l e d EAP−GTC s e s s i o n i s a bad idea ,
# the u s e r s password w i l l go over t h e wire in p l a in−t e x t ,
# f o r anyone to see .
#
gtc {
# The d e f a u l t c h a l l e n g e , which many c l i e n t s
# i gno r e . .
#c h a l l e n g e = ”Password : ”
# The p l a in−t e x t r e sponse which comes back
# i s put i n t o a User−Password a t t r i b u t e ,
# and passed to ano ther module f o r
# au t h e n t i c a t i o n . This a l l ow s t h e EAP−GTC
# response to be checked a g a i n s t p l a in−t e x t ,
# or c r y p t ’ d passwords .
#
# I f you say ” Loca l ” i n s t e a d o f ”PAP” , then
# the module w i l l l o o k f o r a User−Password
# con f i g u r e d f o r t h e r e que s t , and do the
# au t h e n t i c a t i o n i t s e l f .
#
auth type = PAP
}
## EAP−TLS
#
# To gene ra t e c t e s t c e r t i f i c a t e s , run the s c r i p t
#
# . . / s c r i p t s / c e r t s . sh
#
# The documents on h t t p ://www. f r e e r a d i u s . org / doc
# are o ld , bu t may be h e l p f u l .
#
# See a l s o :
#
# h t t p ://www. d s l r e p o r t s . com/ forum/remark ,9286052˜mode= f l a t
#
t l s {
pr ivate key password = demo
p r i v a t e k e y f i l e = ${ c e r t s d i r }/FreeRADIUS . net−Server . pem
# I f Pr i v a t e key & C e r t i f i c a t e are l o c a t e d in
# the same f i l e , then p r i v a t e k e y f i l e &
# c e r t i f i c a t e f i l e must con ta in t h e same f i l e
# name .
c e r t i f i c a t e f i l e = ${ c e r t s d i r }/FreeRADIUS . net−Server . c r t
# Trusted Root CA l i s t
CA f i l e = ${ c e r t s d i r }/FreeRADIUS . net−CA. c r t
d h f i l e = ${ c e r t s d i r }/dh
random f i l e = ${ c e r t s d i r }/random
#
# This can never exceed th e s i z e o f a RADIUS
# packe t (4096 b y t e s ) , and i s p r e f e r a b l y h a l f
# tha t , t o accomodate o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s in
# RADIUS packe t . On most APs the MAX packe t
# l e n g t h i s c on f i g u r e d between 1500 − 1600
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# In t h e s e cases , f ragment s i z e s hou l d be
# 1024 or l e s s .
#
# f r a gmen t s i z e = 1024
# i n c l u d e l e n g t h i s a f l a g which i s
# by d e f a u l t s e t t o yes I f s e t t o
# yes , Tota l Length o f t h e message i s
# in c l u d e d in EVERY packe t we send .
# I f s e t t o no , Tota l Length o f t h e
# message i s i n c l u d e d ONLY in the
# F i r s t pac k e t o f a f ragment s e r i e s .
#
# i n c l u d e l e n g t h = yes
# Check t h e C e r t i f i c a t e Revocat ion L i s t
#
# 1) Copy CA c e r t i f i c a t e s and CRLs to same d i r e c t o r y .
# 2) Execute ’ c r e ha s h <CA c e r t s&CRLs Direc tory > ’.
# ’ c r e ha s h ’ i s OpenSSL ’ s command .
# 3) Add ’ CA path=<CA c e r t s&CRLs d i r e c t o r y >’
# to rad i u sd . con f ’ s t l s s e c t i o n .
# 4) uncomment t h e l i n e be low .
# 5) Re s t a r t r ad i u sd
# c h e c k c r l = yes
#
# I f c h e c k c e r t c n i s se t , t h e v a l u e w i l l
# be x l a t ’ ed and checked a g a i n s t t h e CN
# in the c l i e n t c e r t i f i c a t e . I f t h e v a l u e s
# do not match , t h e c e r t i f i c a t e v e r i f i c a t i o n
# w i l l f a i l r e j e c t i n g t h e user .
#
che ck c e r t cn = %{User−Name}
}
# The TTLS module implements t h e EAP−TTLS pro t o co l ,
# which can be d e s c r i b e d as EAP i n s i d e o f Diameter ,
# i n s i d e o f TLS , i n s i d e o f EAP, i n s i d e o f RADIUS . . .
#
# Su r p r i s i n g l y , i t works q u i t e w e l l .
#
# The TTLS module needs t h e TLS module to be i n s t a l l e d
# and con f i gu r ed , in order to use t h e TLS tunne l
# i n s i d e o f t h e EAP packe t . You w i l l s t i l l need to
# con f i g u r e t h e TLS module , even i f you do not want
# to dep l o y EAP−TLS in your network . Users w i l l not
# be a b l e to r e q u e s t EAP−TLS , as i t r e q u i r e s them to
# have a c l i e n t c e r t i f i c a t e . EAP−TTLS does not
# r e q u i r e a c l i e n t c e r t i f i c a t e .
#
t t l s {
# The tunne l e d EAP s e s s i o n needs a d e f a u l t
# EAP type which i s s e p a r a t e from the one f o r
# the non−t unne l e d EAP module . I n s i d e o f t h e
# TTLS tunne l , we recommend us ing EAP−MD5.
# I f t h e r e q u e s t does not con ta in an EAP
# conve r sa t i on , then t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n en t r y
# i s i gno red .
de f au l t e ap type = md5
# The tunne l e d a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u e s t does
# not u s u a l l y con ta in u s e f u l a t t r i b u t e s
# l i k e ’ Ca l l i n g−S ta t i on−Id ’ , e t c . These
# a t t r i b u t e s are o u t s i d e o f t h e tunne l ,
# and norma l l y u n a v a i l a b l e to t h e t unne l e d
# au t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u e s t .
#
# By s e t t i n g t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n en t r y to
# ’ yes ’ , any a t t r i b u t e which NOT in the
# tunne l e d a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e que s t , bu t
# which IS a v a i l a b l e o u t s i d e o f t h e tunne l ,
# i s cop i ed to t h e t unne l e d r e q u e s t .
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
copy r eque s t t o tunne l = no
# The r e p l y a t t r i b u t e s s en t to t h e NAS are
# u s u a l l y based on the name o f t h e user
# ’ o u t s i d e ’ o f t h e t unne l ( u s u a l l y
# ’ anonymous ’ ) . I f you want to send the
# r e p l y a t t r i b u t e s based on the user name
# i n s i d e o f t h e tunne l , then s e t t h i s
# c on f i g u r a t i o n en t r y to ’ yes ’ , and th e r e p l y
# to th e NAS w i l l be taken from the r e p l y to
# the tunne l e d r e q u e s t .
#
# a l l owed v a l u e s : {no , yes }
us e tunne l ed r ep l y = yes
}
#
# The tunne l e d EAP s e s s i o n needs a d e f a u l t EAP type
# which i s s e p a r a t e from the one f o r t h e non−t unne l e d
# EAP module . I n s i d e o f t h e TLS/PEAP tunne l , we
# recommend us ing EAP−MS−CHAPv2 .
#
# The PEAP module needs t h e TLS module to be i n s t a l l e d
# and con f i gu r ed , in order to use t h e TLS tunne l
# i n s i d e o f t h e EAP packe t . You w i l l s t i l l need to
# con f i g u r e t h e TLS module , even i f you do not want
# to dep l o y EAP−TLS in your network . Users w i l l not
# be a b l e to r e q u e s t EAP−TLS , as i t r e q u i r e s them to
# have a c l i e n t c e r t i f i c a t e . EAP−PEAP does not
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# re q u i r e a c l i e n t c e r t i f i c a t e .
#
peap {
# The tunne l e d EAP s e s s i o n needs a d e f a u l t
# EAP type which i s s e p a r a t e from the one f o r
# the non−t unne l e d EAP module . I n s i d e o f t h e
# PEAP tunne l , we recommend us ing MS−CHAPv2 ,
# as t h a t i s t h e d e f a u l t t ype suppor t ed by
# Windows c l i e n t s .
de f au l t e ap type = mschapv2
}
#
# This t a k e s no c o n f i g u r a t i o n .
#
# Note t h a t i t i s t h e EAP MS−CHAPv2 sub−module , not
# the main ’mschap ’ module .
#
# Note a l s o t h a t in order f o r t h i s sub−module to work ,
# the main ’mschap ’ module MUST ALSO be c on f i g u r e d .
#
# This module i s t h e ∗Mic ro so f t ∗ imp lementa t ion o f MS−CHAPv2
# in EAP. There i s ano ther ( i n c ompa t i b l e ) imp lementa t ion
# o f MS−CHAPv2 in EAP by Cisco , which FreeRADIUS does not
# c u r r e n t l y suppor t .
#
mschapv2 {
}
}
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Listing D.3: Defines RADIUS clients .
#
# c l i e n t s . con f − c l i e n t c o n f i g u r a t i o n d i r e c t i v e s
#
#######################################################################
#######################################################################
#
# De f i n i t i o n o f a RADIUS c l i e n t ( u s u a l l y a NAS) .
#
# The in f o rma t i on g i v en here over r i d e s any th ing g i v en in t h e
# ’ c l i e n t s ’ f i l e , or in t h e ’ n a s l i s t ’ f i l e . The c o n f i g u r a t i o n here
# con t a i n s a l l o f t h e in f o rma t i on from tho s e two f i l e s , and a l l ow s
# f o r more c o n f i g u r a t i o n i t ems .
#
# The ” shortname ” i s be used f o r l o g g i n g . The ” nas t ype ” , ” l o g i n ” and
# ” password ” f i e l d s are mainly used f o r checkrad and are o p t i o n a l .
#
#
# Def ine s a RADIUS c l i e n t . The format i s ’ c l i e n t [ hostname | ip−addre s s ] ’
#
# ’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ i s ano ther name f o r ’ l o c a l h o s t ’ . I t i s enab l e d by d e f a u l t ,
# to a l l ow t e s t i n g o f t h e s e r v e r a f t e r an i n i t i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n . I f you
# are not go ing to be p e rm i t t i n g RADIUS q u e r i e s from l o c a l h o s t , we s u g g e s t
# t h a t you d e l e t e , or comment out , t h i s en t r y .
#
c l i e n t 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 {
#
# The shared s e c r e t use to ” enc ryp t ” and ” s i g n ” pa c k e t s be tween
# the NAS and FreeRADIUS . You MUST change t h i s s e c r e t from the
# d e f a u l t , o t h e rw i s e i t ’ s not a s e c r e t any more !
#
# The s e c r e t can be any s t r i n g , up to 32 c h a r a c t e r s in l e n g t h .
#
s e c r e t = te s t i ng123
#
# The s h o r t name i s used as an a l i a s f o r t h e f u l l y q u a l i f i e d
# domain name , or t h e IP addre s s .
#
shortname = l o c a l h o s t
#
# the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e f i e l d s are op t i ona l , bu t may be used by
# checkrad . p l f o r s imu l t aneous use check s
#
#
# The nas t ype t e l l s ’ checkrad . p l ’ which NAS−s p e c i f i c method to
# use to query t h e NAS f o r s imu l t aneous use .
#
# Permi t t ed NAS t y p e s are :
#
# c i s c o
# computone
# l i v i n g s t o n
# max40xx
# mu l t i t e c h
# ne t s e r v e r
# pa th ra s
# pa t t on
# p o r t s l a v e
# t c
# u s r h i p e r
# o th e r # f o r a l l o t h e r t y p e s
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#
nastype = other # l o c a l h o s t i s n ’ t u s u a l l y a NAS . . .
#
# The f o l l o w i n g two c o n f i g u r a t i o n s are f o r f u t u r e use .
# The ’ naspasswd ’ f i l e i s c u r r e n t l y used to s t o r e t h e NAS
# l o g i n name and password , which i s used by checkrad . p l
# when que ry in g t h e NAS f o r s imu l t aneous use .
#
# l o g i n = ! roo t
# password = someadminpas
}
#c l i e n t some . ho s t . org {
# s e c r e t = t e s t i n g 1 2 3
# shortname = l o c a l h o s t
#}
#
# You can now s p e c i f y one s e c r e t f o r a network o f c l i e n t s .
# When a c l i e n t r e q u e s t comes in , t h e BEST match i s chosen .
# i . e . The en t r y from the sma l l e s t p o s s i b l e network .
#
#c l i e n t 192 . 168 . 0 . 0/24 {
# s e c r e t = t e s t i n g 1 23 −1
# shortname = pr i v a t e−network−1
#}
#
c l i e n t 192 . 168 . 0 . 0/16 {
s e c r e t = re s ea r ch
shortname = network
# s e c r e t = t e s t i n g 1 2 3
# shortname = pr i v a t e−network−2
}
#c l i e n t 1 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 {
# # s e c r e t and password are mapped through th e ” s e c r e t s ” f i l e .
# s e c r e t = t e s t i n g 1 2 3
# shortname = l i v 1
# # the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e f i e l d s are op t i ona l , bu t may be used by
# # checkrad . p l f o r s imu l t aneous usage check s
# nas type = l i v i n g s t o n
# l o g i n = ! roo t
# password = someadminpas
#}
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A simple text file containing authentication security and configuration information for
each user on the network. It is also associated with an accounting file acct users
which is not included in this Appendix since it is not processed.
Listing D.4: Contain information of all authenticated users.
#
# Please read th e documentat ion f i l e . . / doc / p r o c e s s i n g u s e r s f i l e ,
# or ’man 5 u s e r s ’ ( a f t e r i n s t a l l i n g t h e s e r v e r ) f o r more in f o rma t i on .
#
# This f i l e c on t a i n s a u t h e n t i c a t i o n s e c u r i t y and c o n f i g u r a t i o n
# in f o rma t i on f o r each user . Account ing r e q u e s t s are NOT proc e s s ed
# through t h i s f i l e . Ins t ead , s ee ’ a c c t u s e r s ’ , in t h i s d i r e c t o r y .
#
# The f i r s t f i e l d i s t h e user ’ s name and can be up to
# 253 c h a r a c t e r s in l e n g t h . This i s f o l l o w e d ( on the same l i n e ) w i th
# the l i s t o f a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r equ i r emen t s f o r t h a t user . This can
# in c l u d e password , comm se r v e r name , comm se r v e r po r t number , p r o t o c o l
# type ( perhaps s e t by t h e ” h i n t s ” f i l e ) , and huntgroup name ( s e t by
# the ” huntgroups ” f i l e ) .
#
# I f you are not sure why a p a r t i c u l a r r e p l y i s b e i n g s en t by t h e
# serve r , then run the s e r v e r in debugg ing mode ( rad i u sd −X) , and
# you w i l l s e e which e n t r i e s in t h i s f i l e are matched .
#
# When an a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u e s t i s r e c e i v e d from the comm serve r ,
# t h e s e v a l u e s are t e s t e d . Only t h e f i r s t match i s used un l e s s t h e
# ” Fa l l−Through” v a r i a b l e i s s e t t o ”Yes ” .
#
# A s p e c i a l u se r named ”DEFAULT” matches on a l l usernames .
# You can have s e v e r a l DEFAULT e n t r i e s . A l l e n t r i e s are p ro c e s s e d
# in the order t h ey appear in t h i s f i l e . The f i r s t en t r y t h a t
# matches t h e l o g i n−r e q u e s t w i l l s t o p p r o c e s s i n g un l e s s you use
# the Fa l l−Through v a r i a b l e .
#
# I f you use t h e da ta ba s e suppor t to turn t h i s f i l e i n t o a . db or . dbm
# f i l e , t h e DEFAULT e n t r i e s h a v e to be a t t h e end o f t h i s f i l e and
# you can ’ t have mu l t i p l e e n t r i e s f o r one username .
#
# You don ’ t need to s p e c i f y a password i f you s e t Auth−Type += System
# on the l i s t o f a u t h e n t i c a t i o n re qu i r emen t s . The RADIUS s e r v e r
# w i l l then check t h e system password f i l e .
#
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# Inden ted ( w i th t h e t a b c ha r a c t e r ) l i n e s f o l l o w i n g t h e f i r s t
# l i n e i n d i c a t e t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n v a l u e s to be passed back to
# the comm se r v e r to a l l ow the i n i t i a t i o n o f a user s e s s i o n .
# This can i n c l u d e t h i n g s l i k e t h e PPP c on f i g u r a t i o n v a l u e s
# or th e ho s t to l o g t h e user onto .
#
# You can i n c l u d e ano ther ‘ u s e r s ’ f i l e w i th ‘$INCLUDE use r s . o t h e r ’
#
#
# For a l i s t o f RADIUS a t t r i b u t e s , and l i n k s to t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s ,
# see :
#
# h t t p ://www. f r e e r a d i u s . org / r f c / a t t r i b u t e s . html
#
#
# Deny ac c e s s f o r a s p e c i f i c user . Note t h a t t h i s en t r y MUST
# be b e f o r e any o t h e r ’Auth−Type ’ a t t r i b u t e which r e s u l t s in t h e user
# be ing a u t h e n t i c a t e d .
#
# Note t h a t t h e r e i s NO ’ Fa l l−Through ’ a t t r i b u t e , so t h e user w i l l not
# be g i v en any a d d i t i o n a l r e s ou r c e s .
#
#lameuser Auth−Type := Re j e c t
# Reply−Message = ”Your account has been d i s a b l e d . ”
#
# Deny ac c e s s f o r a group o f u s e r s .
#
# Note t h a t t h e r e i s NO ’ Fa l l−Through ’ a t t r i b u t e , so t h e user w i l l not
# be g i v en any a d d i t i o n a l r e s ou r c e s .
#
#DEFAULT Group == ” d i s a b l e d ” , Auth−Type := Re j e c t
# Reply−Message = ”Your account has been d i s a b l e d . ”
#
############## RFC3580 ################
## Also th e ” eap . con f ” MUST be mod i f i e d to i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w l i n e :
## ” u s e t u n n e l e d r e p l y = yes ”
## the d e f a u l t i s ” u s e t u n n e l e d r e p l y = no”
## t h i s a l l ow the ”Tunnel∗” AV’ s to be passed o u t s i d e t h e eap t unne l
## o t h e rw i s e t h e sw i t c h w i l l NOT see t he VLAN to p l a c e t h e po r t i n t o
#### Comments added by J e f f R e i l l y ####
t e s t u s e r User−Password == ” testpw”
desktop User−Password == ” s ta t i ona ry ”
laptop User−Password == ”mobile ”
pda User−Password == ” smal l ”
FreeRADIUS . net−Cl i ent User−Password == ”demo”
r f c3580 User−Password == ”demo”
Tunnel−Type = ”VLAN” ,
Tunnel−Medium−Type = ”IEEE−802” ,
Tunnel−Private−Group−Id = ”1” ,
Reply−Message = ”Hel lo , %u”
#
# This i s a comp le t e en t r y f o r ” s t e v e ” . Note t h a t t h e r e i s no Fa l l−Through
# en t r y so t h a t no DEFAULT en t r y w i l l be used , and the user w i l l NOT
# ge t any a t t r i b u t e s in a d d i t i o n to t h e ones l i s t e d here .
#
#s t e v e Auth−Type := Local , User−Password == ” t e s t i n g ”
# Serv i c e−Type = Framed−User ,
# Framed−Pro to co l = PPP,
# Framed−IP−Address = 172 . 1 6 . 3 . 3 3 ,
# Framed−IP−Netmask = 255 . 2 55 . 2 55 . 0 ,
# Framed−Routing = Broadcast−Lis t en ,
# Framed−F i l t e r−Id = ” s t d . ppp ” ,
# Framed−MTU = 1500 ,
# Framed−Compression = Van−Jacobsen−TCP−IP
#
# This i s an en t r y f o r a user w i th a space in t h e i r name .
# Note t h e doub l e quo t e s sur round ing t h e name .
#
#”John Doe” Auth−Type := Local , User−Password == ” h e l l o ”
# Reply−Message = ”He l lo , %u”
#
# Dia l use r back and t e l n e t to t h e d e f a u l t h o s t f o r t h a t po r t
#
#Deg Auth−Type := Local , User−Password == ” ge55ged ”
# Serv i c e−Type = Ca l l back−Login−User ,
# Login−IP−Host = 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 ,
# Ca l l back−Number = ”9 ,5551212” ,
# Login−Se r v i c e = Telnet ,
# Login−TCP−Port = Te lne t
#
# Another comp le t e en t r y . A f t e r t h e user ” d i a l b k ” has l o g g e d in , t h e
# connec t i on w i l l be broken and the user w i l l be d i a l e d back a f t e r which
# he w i l l g e t a connec t i on to t h e ho s t ” t imeshare1 ” .
#
#d i a l b k Auth−Type := Local , User−Password == ” ca l lme ”
# Serv i c e−Type = Ca l l back−Login−User ,
# Login−IP−Host = t imeshare1 ,
# Login−Se r v i c e = PortMaster ,
# Ca l l back−Number = ”9,1−800−555−1212”
#
# user ” sw i l s o n ” w i l l on l y g e t a s t a t i c IP number i f he l o g s in w i th
# a framed p r o t o c o l on a t e rm ina l s e r v e r in Alphen ( see t h e huntgroups f i l e ) .
#
D.4 The users FreeRADIUS configuration file 131
# Note t h a t by s e t t i n g ” Fa l l−Through ” , o t h e r a t t r i b u t e s w i l l be added from
# the f o l l o w i n g DEFAULT e n t r i e s
#
#sw i l s o n Serv i c e−Type == Framed−User , Huntgroup−Name == ” a lphen ”
# Framed−IP−Address = 192 . 1 68 . 1 . 6 5 ,
# Fa l l−Through = Yes
#
# I f t h e user l o g s in as ’ username . s h e l l ’ , then a u t h e n t i c a t e them
# aga i n s t t h e system database , g i v e them s h e l l access , and s t op p r o c e s s i n g
# the r e s t o f t h e f i l e .
#
#DEFAULT S u f f i x == ” . s h e l l ” , Auth−Type := System
# Serv i c e−Type = Login−User ,
# Login−Se r v i c e = Telnet ,
# Login−IP−Host = your . s h e l l . machine
#
# The r e s t o f t h i s f i l e c on t a i n s t h e s e v e r a l DEFAULT e n t r i e s .
# DEFAULT e n t r i e s match w i th a l l l o g i n names .
# Note t h a t DEFAULT e n t r i e s can a l s o Fa l l−Through ( see f i r s t en t r y ) .
# A name−v a l u e pa i r from a DEFAULT en t r y w i l l NEVER ov e r r i d e
# an a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g name−v a l u e pa i r .
#
#
# F i r s t s e t up a l l accoun t s to be checked a g a i n s t t h e UNIX / e t c / passwd .
# ( Unles s a password was a l r e a d y g i v en e a r l i e r in t h i s f i l e ) .
#
DEFAULT Auth−Type = System
Fal l−Through = 1
#
# Set up d i f f e r e n t IP addre s s p oo l s f o r t h e t e rm ina l s e r v e r s .
# Note t h a t t h e ”+” beh ind th e IP addre s s means t h a t t h i s i s t h e ” base ”
# IP addre s s . The Port−Id (S0 , S1 e t c ) w i l l be added to i t .
#
#DEFAULT Serv i c e−Type == Framed−User , Huntgroup−Name == ” a lphen ”
# Framed−IP−Address = 192 .168 .1 .32+ ,
# Fa l l−Through = Yes
#DEFAULT Serv i c e−Type == Framed−User , Huntgroup−Name == ” d e l f t ”
# Framed−IP−Address = 192 .168 .2 .32+ ,
# Fa l l−Through = Yes
#
# De f a u l t s f o r a l l framed connec t i on s .
#
DEFAULT Serv ice−Type == Framed−User
Framed−IP−Address = 255 . 255 . 255 . 254 ,
Framed−MTU = 576 ,
Serv ice−Type = Framed−User ,
Fal l−Through = Yes
#
# De f au l t f o r PPP: dynamic IP address , PPP mode , VJ−compress ion .
# NOTE: we do not use Hint = ”PPP” , s i n c e PPP might a l s o be auto−d e t e c t e d
# by the t e rm ina l s e r v e r in which case t h e r e may not be a ”P” s u f f i x .
# The t e rm ina l s e r v e r sends ”Framed−Pro to co l = PPP” f o r auto PPP.
#
DEFAULT Framed−Protoco l == PPP
Framed−Protoco l = PPP,
Framed−Compression = Van−Jacobson−TCP−IP
#
# De f au l t f o r CSLIP : dynamic IP address , SLIP mode , VJ−compress ion .
#
DEFAULT Hint == ”CSLIP”
Framed−Protoco l = SLIP ,
Framed−Compression = Van−Jacobson−TCP−IP
#
# De f au l t f o r SLIP : dynamic IP address , SLIP mode .
#
DEFAULT Hint == ”SLIP”
Framed−Protoco l = SLIP
#
# Last d e f a u l t : r l o g i n to our main s e r v e r .
#
#DEFAULT
# Serv i c e−Type = Login−User ,
# Login−Se r v i c e = Rlogin ,
# Login−IP−Host = s h e l l b o x . i spdomain . com
# #
# # Last d e f a u l t : s h e l l on t h e l o c a l t e rm ina l s e r v e r .
# #
# DEFAULT
# Serv i c e−Type = She l l−User
# On no match , t h e user i s den ied a c c e s s .
